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ABSTRACT 
 
Theoretical understandings of war have been dominated by the thought of Clausewitz 
for a number of decades. His thought is valid in many respects, but for various reasons it is 
open to misinterpretation and misunderstanding; furthermore, a number of his observations 
(particularly on the prevalence of chance and uncertainty in war) are not fully explored and 
substantiated theoretically. This thesis is an attempt to present and elucidate a new theoretical 
understanding of war’s nature which complements Clausewitz’s theories and addresses these 
concerns: this is the understanding of war as a form of violent conflict which is not bound by 
rules. 
 
The thesis consists of five main chapters. The first is an in-depth study of Clausewitz, 
which will provide an exegesis of his theories and highlight the deficiencies in his thought, 
before positing how understanding war as ‘violent conflict without rules’ could be used to 
address and explain them. The second chapter is a study of the theory of rules, examining in 
particular the role they play in moderating conflict: we can find that amongst other things, 
rules lend predictability and psychological security to a contest, restrict the scope of physical 
harm and tend to preserve the political and social status quo. As war lacks rules (in the sense 
that there are no ‘rules of war’ as there are ‘rules of chess’), it therefore lacks these benefits. 
A following chapter on the laws and customs of war will address cases where war appears to 
be bound by rules, and clarify my position. 
 
The final two chapters explore the implications of war’s lack of rules with reference 
to two areas which are most commonly associated with war. The fourth chapter on strategy 
will explore how this military concept is necessitated by war’s ruleless nature; the final 
chapter will examine the uniquely violent, physical nature of war through the same 
theoretical prism, and will show how the technological innovation associated with war is a 
consequence of its lack of regulation, and a potent contributor to the chance and uncertainty 
which plagues warfare. 
  
6 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Many thanks to friends in the School of International Relations who have listened to 
presentations on the theme of the thesis, and given useful feedback (particularly Vassilis 
Paipais, for alerting me to the concept of constitutive rules). Thanks especially to François 
Sarah and Aviva Guttmann, whose friendship has always been effective in relieving my 
occasional panics over the course of the PhD. 
 
I wish also to thank my examiners, Profs. Christopher Coker and Richard English, for 
a white-knuckle viva (and the drinks afterwards), as well as for their willingness to read the 
thesis on short notice; thanks also to my supervisors Prof. Nicolas Rengger and Dr. Sibylle 
Scheipers for their help and input, and to Prof. Hew Strachan for reading over a selection of 
my material. 
 
Finally, for my parents – mum in particular – who have been more patient and helpful 
to me than I deserve. I wouldn’t have been able to start the thesis without your help, let alone 
finish it – I owe you so much. Thank you most of all. 
 
 
  
7 
 
 
CONTENTS 
 
 
 
 
Introduction          8 
 
 
 
Clausewitz’s Theory of War       25 
 
 
 
A Theory of Rules and the Characteristics of Rule-bound Conflict  59 
 
 
 
The Rules of Ruleless Conflict - The Laws and Customs of War  86 
 
 
 
The Problem of Strategy – Planning in Uncertainty    114 
 
 
 
The Physicality of War and the Means of Destruction    159 
 
 
 
Conclusions – The Meaning of War      197 
 
 
 
Bibliography          210 
  
8 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
War. sb. XII (werre, wyrre)... Old High German, werra confusion, discord, strife…. 
werran bring into confusion (Germanic wirren confuse, perplex).1 
 
 The idea that war is one of the most uncertain and unpredictable forms of human 
activity seems to be as old as the word we use for it; this is the case not only in the sense that 
an individual battle can turn on the effects of some unforeseen circumstance, but also in that 
the course of war can and generally does proceed in ways which defy efforts at prediction. In 
many other ways, war is undeniably one of the most extreme forms of human interaction. No 
other form of conflict is so violent, no other as dangerous; its political consequences are 
momentous whether the toppling of a government, a redrawing of national borders, or the fall 
of an empire; even ‘inconclusive’ wars can leave a trail of destruction which itself alters the 
balance of power in no small way. For these reasons, war has long exerted a powerful hold on 
our imaginations, and has been the object of intense study over the centuries. Indeed, history 
was written on the theme of ‘kings and battles’ to the extent that the tendency became a 
criticism of the study of history itself, and other academic disciplines are no less afflicted by 
war-centrism – the study of International Relations was founded in large part to facilitate a 
better understanding of the causes of war and the possibilities of preventing it, and this 
preoccupation with warfare and material power has persisted to this day in mainstream IR 
theory. This is only to speak of academic treatments of the subject; the experience of war has 
always played a central role in the cultural life of human societies, forming the setting for 
rites of passage and an enactment of citizenship and identity; furthermore, it has a long 
pedigree as the theme of works of art and literature, from the Iliad to the blockbuster films of 
the present day.  
 
Such a subject, enmeshed with human life for so long and in so many ways, has 
naturally acquired a thick patina of meaning and connotations over the centuries; attempts to 
define war as a concept necessarily have had to deal with these many different aspects of its 
nature. This difficulty is compounded by the immense variety of wars which have been 
                                                     
1 Terry F. Hoad, The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology, (Oxford University Press, 
1993), abbreviations expanded. 
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fought throughout the ages, from ancient tribal clashes fought with stone weapons to 
(thankfully unrealised) nuclear wars between global superpowers; in many ways it appears 
almost impossible to hope to extricate a ‘pure’ concept of war from these entanglements. In 
modern times, there have been occasional efforts made to analyse the concept of war in 
depth; one of the most ambitious was made by Quincy Wright, in his magisterial work A 
Study of War. Wright makes distinction between various types of warfare, from “primitive” 
warfare fought between non-civilised groups, to later manifestations of warfare – ‘historic’ 
and ‘modern’ – each of which he characterises as being motivated by their own ‘drives’ 
(food, sex, territory and so on in earlier forms of war, with modern warfare marked by the 
filtering of these impulses through the experience of modern life and the modern state)2, each 
possessing their own character and manifestations (indeed, Wright even goes so far as to talk 
of “animal warfare” as a category of war, fought between predators and prey and between 
rival colonies of insects)3. Wright’s general definition of war is suitably wide-ranging: 
 
In the broadest sense war is a violent conflict of distinct but similar entities. In this 
sense a collision of stars, a fight between a lion and a tiger, a battle between two 
primitive tribes, and hostilities between two modern nations would all be war.4 
 
More specifically, concerning wars between human societies: 
 
War is seen to be a state of law and a form of conflict involving a high degree of legal 
equality, of hostility, and of violence in the relation of organised human groups; or, 
more specifically, the legal condition which equally permits two or more hostile 
groups to carry on a conflict by armed force.5 
 
Such a definition is naturally open to question, particularly in days when wars are not 
often formally declared; nevertheless, Wright’s wider attempt to address war in its various 
forms and manifestations was a commendable effort (though there are probably not many 
other scholars who classify the collision of stars as an instance of warfare). Another attempt 
                                                     
2 Quincy Wright, A Study of War, Vol. 1 (University of Chicago Press, 1942), p.53-288 
3 Ibid., p.42-52 
4 Ibid., p.8 
5 Ibid., p.13 
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to survey the general subject of war is Julian Lider’s On the Nature of War, which similarly 
enumerates the various ways in which war can be viewed: as a biological process, a 
competition for survival fed by “aggressive drives” found in our biological nature; as a 
psychological phenomenon; or, from an anthropological perspective, as a product of our 
culture. It can also be seen as a product of pressures imposed on us by our ecological 
environment, as a legal condition (much as Wright defined it), or in a more esoteric sense, 
war can be seen as an almost religious space in which man can strive for “moral perfection”, 
cultural renewal and social status.6 War can of course be analysed as a political or 
sociological phenomenon, with different schools of thought coming to markedly different 
conclusions on the matter (some Marxist-Leninist thinkers maintaining that war is a 
temporary, class-based phenomenon which will necessarily cease upon the realisation of 
communism).7 This definition of war as a political phenomenon is the most popular; as Lider 
notes, “the commonly accepted concept of war… usually comprises two basic statements: 
that war is an organised armed struggle (i.e. waged by armed units) and that it is waged for 
political aims.”8 This definition of war is essentially that given by Clausewitz, the 
Napoleonic-era soldier who remains probably the most famous theorist of warfare: “War is 
merely the continuation of policy by other means.”9  
 
Given our knowledge of war’s protean character, however, we might expect there to 
be problems with this definition – indeed, Lider notes a few himself: depending on one’s 
definition of politics (whether exclusively interstate or including domestic politics), certain 
types of conflict, like civil wars, fall outside the definition of war; “organised armed struggle” 
can similarly confuse the issue, as this definition can cover any range of physical conflict – 
Lider notes partisan warfare as a potentially problematic case, but arguably any violent 
conflict between groups of people could fall under this definition.10 This is indeed what 
happened in the “new wars” debates in the 2000’s, which exposed some of the apparently 
deep problems in our understandings of war. Following the end of the Cold War, a number of 
                                                     
6 Julian Lider, On The Nature of War, (Farnborough: Saxon House, for the Swedish Institute of 
International Affairs, 1977), p.17-18 
7 Ibid., p.181-185  
8 Julian Lider, Military Theory, (Gower Publishing 1983), p.158 
9 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton University 
Press, 1976), p.87 
10 Lider (1983), p.159 
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sub-state conflicts erupted which to some appeared qualitatively different to earlier wars; 
defining features of these ‘new wars’ are the fact that they are not carried out by states, (Mary 
Kaldor, one of the central new wars thinkers, in fact speaks of “old-fashioned war between 
states”11), instead being fought by a range of actors within the boundaries of states – these can 
be warlords, criminal groups, and so on, with particular ethnic affiliations. Edward Newman 
has summarised the key points of the new wars thesis as follows: 
 
● most wars today are intrastate rather than interstate, and interstate wars have 
declined in number while intrastate wars have increased in number;  
● new wars are characterized by state failure and a social transformation driven by 
globalization and liberal economic forces; this gives rise to competition over natural 
resources and illegal commercial entrepreneurship, private armies, and criminal 
warlords, often organized according to some form of identity;  
● ethnic and religious conflict are more characteristic of new wars than political 
ideology;  
● civilian casualties and forced human displacement are dramatically increasing as a 
proportion of all casualties in conflict, especially since 1990;  
● civilians are increasingly deliberately targeted as an object of new wars; atrocities 
and ethnic homogenization are key hallmarks of contemporary conflict; and  
● a breakdown of public authority blurs the distinction between public and private 
combatants, and between combatants and civilians.12 
 
 These points certainly reflect the thinking of Kaldor, who claims that the ‘new wars’ 
have a logic which is distinct from the ‘old wars’ of the past, in terms of the actors which 
fight them, the goals for which they are fought, and the methods used to those ends. 
According to Kaldor, new wars are fought by “combinations of state and non-state actors”, 
where old wars were prosecuted by regular armies under the control of states; old wars were 
fought for reasons of policy – geopolitics and ideology – whereas new wars are motivated by 
identity politics; old wars were marked by the use of battle and the seizure of territory as the 
principal mechanisms by which war was decided – new wars are marked by the practice of 
                                                     
11 Mary Kaldor, “Wanted: Global Politics”, The Nation, 5 November 2001 
12 Newman, Edward. "The ‘New Wars’ Debate: A Historical Perspective Is Needed." Security 
Dialogue 35.2 (2004): 174-175 
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population displacement and the use of violence against civilians.13 The ‘criminal’ element of 
the New Wars is stressed by John Mueller: “most of what passes for warfare to-day is 
centrally characterised by the opportunistic and improvisatory clash of thugs, not by the 
programmed and/or primordial clash of civilisations – although many of the perpetrators do 
cagily apply ethnic, national or ideological rhetoric to justify their activities because to stress 
the thrill and profit of predation would be politically incorrect.”14 A key target of the new 
wars movement was the “Clausewitzian” understanding of war as violence carried out by 
states for political ends, an understanding which was held to be stuck in the past, and relevant 
only to the ‘old wars’ fought between modern European states.15 This definitional struggle 
was fought on particularly unfavourable ground from the new wars theorists’ point of view; 
as we shall see, Clausewitz’s understanding of war was misrepresented and misunderstood, 
and was in fact perfectly capable of incorporating the new forms of conflict which were held 
to be incompatible with his supposedly ‘state-based’ conception. What was ‘new’ about the 
new wars was primarily their lack of resemblance to a particular type of warfare which had 
developed in the western world in the modern era; this was hardly the way war had always 
been fought (indeed there are many aspects of the ‘new wars’ which could be identified in 
conflicts like the Thirty Years’ War), and the new wars scholars could have learned as much 
from a more thorough reading of Clausewitz. In a heated but generally one-sided exchange 
the primacy of the Clausewitzian conception of war as a political instrument was restored.16 
 
Indeed, Clausewitz’s understanding of war was not merely restored, but confirmed in 
its position as the definitive theory of war; the new wars debate was in fact just one episode 
in the emergence of a Clausewitzian ascendancy in academic and military circles which had 
begun with the publication of the 1976 Paret-Howard translation of On War. Nowadays 
Clausewitz is enjoying a long-awaited recognition and appreciation from military thinkers, 
                                                     
13 Mary Kaldor, ”In Defence of New Wars”, Stability, 2(1):4, 2 (2013), pp.1-16 
14 John Mueller, The Remnants of War, (Cornell University Press, 2004), 115 
15 Mary Kaldor, “Elaborating the ‘new war’ Thesis” in Isabelle Duyvesteyn and Jan Angstrom, eds., 
Rethinking the Nature of War (New York: Frank Cass, 2005), p.220; Martin van Creveld, On Future 
War (London: Brassey’s, 1991), p.155 
16 For an overview of the debate from both sides, see Bart Schuurman, ‘Clausewitz and the “New 
Wars” Scholars’, Parameters 40:1 (Spring 2010), p.89-100 and Kaldor (2003). One of the strongest 
and most comprehensive refutations of the anti-Clausewitzian trend was the collection of articles 
edited by Hew Strachan and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, Clausewitz in the Twenty-first Century (Oxford 
University Press, 2007). 
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one that has taken the form of a deep and thorough attempt to understand the lessons 
contained within his unfinished, but as-yet unrivalled book on the theory of war. Attempts to 
dethrone him have, if anything, reinforced his position as the central figure in military 
thought, and not only has he held a hegemonic position in academic discussion, but his 
writings are assigned to officers in training in practically every western military 
establishment – in 1997, The United States Marine Corps went so far as to publish a field 
manual, Warfighting, written to summarise and explain the lessons of On War (in theory) to 
all ranks, both commissioned and enlisted.17 “We are all Clausewitzians now”, as the saying 
might as well be: not only has the understanding of war as “the continuation of politics by 
other means” become orthodoxy, but so have the Clausewitzian concepts of ‘absolute’ and 
‘limited’ war, the notion that every war is the product of unique historical circumstances, and 
the idea that particular societies fight wars in their own unique ways; practically all of 
Clausewitz’s ideas are accepted – indeed, they are commonplace, and his definition of war 
has become the standard.  
 
This is true of one aspect of Clausewitz’s work in particular – the appreciation of the 
pervasive and unparalleled role played by chance and uncertainty in war. In his own words, 
“War is the realm of chance. No other human activity gives it greater scope: no other has 
such incessant and varied dealings with this intruder.”18 This focus is particularly prominent 
in Clausewitz’s work, and accordingly has attracted a great deal of academic attention.19 
However, I have come to believe that this is one aspect of Clausewitz’s thinking which leaves 
several questions unanswered; the substantiation he provides for his assertion that war’s 
exposure to chance and uncertainty is unsurpassed by any other form of human endeavour, is 
not in itself sufficient to show why this is the case: Clausewitz’s sources of chance and 
uncertainty – the unpredictable actions of an independent opponent, physical stresses, 
incomplete information and unquantifiable moral factors – are hardly unique to war. Whilst 
                                                     
17 MCDP 1 “Warfighting”, United States Marine Corps (1997), 
http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/MCDP%201%20Warfighting.pdf <accessed 4/9/15> 
18 Clausewitz (1976), p.101-102 
19 A number of articles have been written on this subject: see Alan Beyerchen, “Clausewitz, 
Nonlinearity, and the Unpredictability of War”, International Security, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Winter, 1992-
1993), p.59-90; Katherine Herbig, "Chance and Uncertainty in On War", The Journal of Strategic 
Studies 9.2-3 (1986), p.95-116; Thomas Waldman, “‘Shadows of Uncertainty’: Clausewitz's Timeless 
Analysis of Chance in War”, Defence Studies, 10:3, (2010), p.336-368  
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other inconsistencies and omissions of On War can be explained with reference to the fact the 
book is unfinished, it does not seem the case that Clausewitz was unsatisfied with the reasons 
he gave for this aspect of his theory; contemporary scholarship on the theory of chance in 
Clausewitz’s works has similarly been blind to the issue, despite the occasional explicit doubt 
being raised concerning the premise that war is a uniquely uncertain activity.20 Even the most 
technically sophisticated efforts to explain the prevalence of chance in war (most notably 
from the perspective of ‘nonlinear’ phenomena) fail to distinguish what makes war differ 
from other forms of human interaction.  
 
Research Question 
 
In short, the research question which I have set myself is, is it possible to develop a 
new theoretical understanding of war which goes ‘deeper’ than the existing Clausewitzian 
definition, and which can explain why war is so uncertain and unpredictable – along with 
explaining why other idiosyncratic aspects of war (such as the central role played by strategy, 
the escalation of war to the ‘absolute’, the shape-shifting quality of war through the ages, and 
the use and development of military technologies) are so intimately connected to it. The 
definition of war in this way is an important task, though it has not been considered much in 
recent years – probably part of the reason for this is that the meaning of war is almost taken 
for granted: it is so characterised by the use of violence and destruction, that what it ‘is’ is 
apparently obvious. Another reason is that much writing on military theory is focused on 
specific, ‘actionable’ problems in strategy, with the general tendency of academic and policy 
work being to focus on the military problems of the day, whether the formulation of nuclear 
strategy in the Cold War, or the study of terrorism and counterinsurgency in the current 
period. What theoretical work on war has been done more recently has, as I have mentioned, 
largely consisted of the treatment of Clausewitz and his ideas; his work has in fact dominated 
theoretical thought on war for at least the last thirty years, and the general satisfaction with 
                                                     
20 “Yet although he studies chance and uncertainty from many angles in On War, Clausewitz does not 
spell out the basis for his claim that war is the human activity most susceptible to the 'intruder' 
chance. Why is 'no other human activity' so uncertain, or so contingent (pp. 85,101)? Why is war 
'chancier' than business or commerce, competitive endeavors to which Clausewitz often refers for 
illustrations and analogies of war? Why is it 'chancier' than the legal competition of the courtroom, 
or the political competition of government which, Clausewitz insists, is the very context and 
grounding for war?” Herbig, p.96 
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his understanding of war has contributed to the lack of ‘new’ theory on war’s essential nature. 
This is of course due to the fact that Clausewitz’s theories are broadly correct: he was an 
extremely perceptive observer of his subject, one which (as we shall see) defies attempts to 
be represented by elaborate conceptualisations; in a sense, this restriction means that most of 
what can usefully be said about war as a theoretical concept is contained in the pages of On 
War. As a consequence, his theories have stood up to the criticism inflicted on them by the 
new wars scholars, with a little help from his latter-day interpreters.  
 
This point is crucial, however: the reasons why Clausewitz was criticised, and his 
model of war questioned, were not a reflection of the shortcomings of his ideas, but were a 
consequence of their misinterpretation by readers who did not approach his work with 
adequate precautions. Clausewitz’s combination of dense, early-nineteenth century German 
prose and his use of aphorisms makes him one of those authors who are “more quoted than 
read”; due to the fact that On War is an incomplete and partly-edited work, with much of its 
most important ideas presented in an unfolding dialectic, selective quotation and 
unsystematic reading will almost invariably rip a phrase out of its context and lead to the 
misunderstandings which have periodically flared up around his works. In short, despite the 
role of theory being to simplify reality, Clausewitzian theory is in need of a deal of 
clarification itself. Not only does his style of writing present challenges; his reference to 
potentially ambiguous concepts like ‘absolute war’ are open to misinterpretation, and this is 
even more the case with his more complex theoretical models, for instance, that of the 
‘trinity’ of passion, chance and reason – a concept too abstract for many readers, who instead 
seize on his subjective ‘people, army and government’, to their eventual embarrassment. 
Dealing with these difficulties is apparently hard enough for academics who should already 
be cognisant of the need to accommodate such problems; policymakers and practitioners, 
who have rather less time to come to grips with the subtleties of the dialectical method (or to 
allow for the difficulties presented by an unfinished work, written in a foreign language 
before the advent of industrial warfare), are even less likely to be able to take benefit from his 
theoretical understandings of war. These problems are not disastrous – the core of 
Clausewitz’s work remains intact, and as I have said, it is insightful and broadly correct – and 
the large secondary literature on Clausewitz’s work can guide those new to his thought past 
the pitfalls which trapped earlier readers. A study of Clausewitz will naturally take some time 
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and effort to undertake, and I firmly believe he will always merit this; however, there would 
be an obvious benefit to devising a simpler theoretical definition of war which allowed even 
those not of a particularly scholarly mindset to grasp its fundamental nature. 
 
In short, I am seeking to develop a concise theory of war which allows us to 
understand exactly why it is so unique: my thesis is that much of what is idiosyncratic to war 
follows from a fundamental aspect of its nature which has not yet been fully articulated by 
Clausewitz or by his successors. War is a form of violent, organised conflict – one which is 
not bound by rules.21 To explain by means of an analogy: the standard definition of war is as 
a violent contest, fought between states, for a political end. Though broadly correct, this 
definition could conceivably be used to describe the settling of a political dispute by means of 
a boxing match or some form of single combat – a state of affairs which no one would 
instinctively recognise as war. War can be defined against other forms of violent contestation 
by the fact that it lacks an ordered, regulated structure: in other cases of conflict, a framework 
of rules orders the conduct of the contest, and in so doing, reduces uncertainty and danger; 
limits the scope of conflict; controls for chance events; and facilitates the development of 
predictive theories – that war lacks rules, means that it lacks these benefits. The same lack of 
restriction also accounts for war’s variability, its escalatory dynamics, the panoply of 
weapons and tools with which it is fought, and the extremes of experience to which its human 
participants are exposed; the use of violence outside of a regulated framework of rules is the 
common denominator which all instances of war share.  
 
Methodology 
 
I will argue my thesis over a number of chapters; firstly I will establish the theoretical 
base of my argument with a detailed analysis of Clausewitz’s theories of war, and a study of 
the theory of rules and rule-bound behaviour in general. In this theoretical section I will first 
seek to draw out Clausewitz’s ideas from their presentation in On War, addressing the 
various factors which have obscured his meaning over the years. I will do this through a 
reading of his text with an eye to his intellectual context in the period where the 
                                                     
21 A similar concept of war, as a “condition of open-ended organised violence”, has been advanced in 
Darran Alexander Moseley, “A Philosophy of War”, (PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1997). 
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Enlightenment and Romantic eras overlap, and with attention to his formative intellectual 
influences; most of my study of Clausewitz will take the form of a close reading of On War, 
with particular attention being paid to his reasoning as to the core aspects of what defines war 
as a concept and especially what he has to say about the role of chance and uncertainty in 
warfare. The second half of the theoretical section will consist of an analysis of rules and 
their properties in social life; here I will cast my net particularly widely over sociological and 
more narrowly legalistic literature. As with my treatment of Clausewitz and the thesis as a 
whole, I am seeking to identify the very basic theoretical elements of rules in order that I 
might apply them to; I am especially concerned with identifying analogies between different 
forms and systems of rules, along with similar ‘mechanisms of action’. Once I have 
concluded with the explicitly theoretical sections of my thesis, I will go on to examine the 
practical side of war, addressing the existence of laws of war and examining the realms of 
strategy and technology through the prism of my theory of war along with the other 
theoretical observations I have made. By applying these to various aspects of war, I will 
explain the usefulness of my theory of war both with reference to the existing literature, and 
by examining aspects of warfare which it can reveal in a new light. 
 
Clausewitz’s Theory of War 
 
My first chapter, as I have said, will take the form of a summary of Clausewitz’s 
thoughts on war, with particular attention paid to his writings on chance and uncertainty. 
Clausewitz wrote in an age of particular importance regarding understandings of uncertainty, 
being subject to the influence of both the systematising, rationalising Enlightenment and the 
Romantic counter-reaction which rebelled against the assumptions of that age. He was also 
profoundly influenced by Machiavelli, whose conceptions of virtù (an amalgam of boldness, 
resourcefulness, and strength, commonly found in the great men of history) and its 
counterpoint, the force of the goddess fortuna – are mirrored in his own discussion of genius 
and chance. I will elaborate on these influences before describing the central aspects of 
Clausewitz’s understanding of war: the conception of war as a form of politics; his 
conception of ‘absolute’ and ‘limited war’, and the use of violence more generally; the 
concept of the ‘trinity’; and the possibilities for theoretical understanding of warfare. 
Following this survey, I will critique Clausewitz’s assumptions regarding the sources of 
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chance, and examine more recent explanations of why war is such an uncertain form of 
activity – in particular, Alan Beyerchen’s application of nonlinearity to Clausewitz’s theories. 
Finally, I will reiterate my thesis, and make clear the compatibility of my theory of “war as 
violent conflict without rules” with Clausewitz’s own theories. 
 
A Theory of Rules and the Characteristics of Rule-bound Conflict 
 
If I am to define war by its lack of rules, then what rules ‘are’ and what they ‘do’ must 
be properly elaborated. In my second chapter I will survey the literature on rules and norms, 
and advance a precise definition of the kind of rules which I argue war lacks. Rules can come 
in two main forms: explicit, codified laws, and implicit, internalised norms – collections of 
these rules serve to regulate various forms of social interaction, and are said to ‘constitute’ 
these activities; one subset of this kind of rule-system concerns the governance of what I call 
“abstract contests” – activities such as sports, games, and more serious contests like litigation 
and democratic elections: these ‘constitutive’ rules are the type of rule which I argue war 
lacks. In these forms of contests, rules serve a number of purposes, allowing a controlled 
process of conflict resolution with protections against escalation and physical harm, a clear 
set of criteria which delineate conditions for victory, and a reduced cost overall, by means of 
symbolic interaction. Lacking such rules, war lacks these benefits. All rules operate by 
restricting possible actions, and I note a number of dimensions of restriction which have 
particular importance with regards to war. In other forms of conflict, our actions are limited 
in terms of space and time, and with regard to the tools which we can use; typically, a place 
and time is allotted for the contest which favours neither side, and the means by which the 
contest is carried on are similarly regulated, with equality again a defining factor.  
 
Rules serve a number of functions and provide a number of benefits to those who 
operate within their bounds. Significantly for the explanation of the uncertainty of war, by 
structuring various forms of activity in a regular, consistent manner, rules allow actors to plan 
their future actions with a greater sense of security regarding the shape of their future 
environment.  Rules also serve the purpose of maintaining a given social order, typically 
serving the interests of powerful groups in society who hold a ‘hegemonic’ position with 
regards to the formulation of the rules. Furthermore, the fact that rules limit the scope of 
19 
 
conflict and require its contestation through symbolic interaction – rather than through a 
direct test of material strength – has the effect of limiting drastic change, reinforcing their 
generally conservative effects. After discussing the various types of rules and their effects, I 
will present a set of criteria which enables us to identify which rules have a particularly 
strong – or weak – effect on binding human behaviour, enabling the analysis of the 
conventions and regulations which have been built up around the conduct of war.  
 
The Rules of Ruleless Conflict - The Laws and Customs of War 
 
The conduct of war has been hedged around with customs and restrictions for as long 
as it has been fought, and the undeniable existence of ‘laws of war’ is the biggest threat to my 
thesis. To address this, I will undertake a survey of several manifestations of rules which 
have regulated the conduct of war, and analyse them in the light of my previous chapter on 
the nature of rules. In particular I will look at the laws of war of ancient Greece and the 
Middle Ages, which in a number of ways appear to structure war as an abstract contest. The 
hoplite-based laws of war in the ancient Greek world tended to produce battles which 
followed a broadly consistent pattern, and which were marked by various symbolic actions; 
the chivalric codes of the Middle Ages similarly structured battle as a formal contest between 
members of the knightly class, and drew distinction between different types of war which 
permitted greater or lesser amounts of savagery. I aim to show that these rules did not 
constitute rules for the conduct of war as a kind of ‘symbolic’ contest, where certain actions 
had significance beyond their physical effects; furthermore, I will show how the rules of 
these societies were founded on their unique socioeconomic and cultural characters, and 
explain the implications this has for my thesis. I will also look at a number of customs which 
are connected with war, and argue that these (and other self-imposed restrictions on conduct 
in warfare) are attempts to cope with a form of activity which is uniquely stressful, 
dehumanising and dangerous precisely because of a lack of rules inherent in itself. I will also 
give a brief summary of the laws of war which developed out of the Hague and Geneva 
conventions in the early twentieth century, which illustrate the weaknesses in laws which 
govern such an activity as war, which exerts extremely strong pressures to break rules – due 
to a lack of higher authority, a relative weakness (or absence) of shared cultural and material 
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interests between warring actors which otherwise provide the basis for rules, and the 
difficulty of regulating military technologies which are in constant state of evolution. 
 
Having established and defended the theoretical basis of my thesis, the final two 
chapters will apply the theory of war as violent conflict without rules to two areas of war 
which are particularly connected to war; firstly, the concept of strategy, which has been 
closely associated with warfare, but has come to be applied to other forms of human 
endeavour, and secondly, the phenomenon of technology and technological innovation in war 
and the wider implications of war as a physical process. Through a study of these two areas I 
will demonstrate the utility of conceiving of war as violent conflict without rules, and explore 
in depth the mechanisms through which war manifests its unique nature. 
 
The Problem of Strategy – Planning in Uncertainty 
 
As I have mentioned, one of the most idiosyncratic qualities of war is the central role 
played by strategy. That this is an intrinsically military pursuit is often taken for granted, but I 
believe that an understanding of war as a form of conflict which is unstructured by rules can 
explain why strategy is such a central part of war – and furthermore, which can account for 
why some strategies are more effective than others. The lack of a clear system of arbitration 
and substantive criteria for settling the contest means that each actor has to identify the way 
in which a war can be won – a task which is in some ways simple (destroy the enemy, or 
punish him until he gives in), but in fact requires that a huge amount of information be 
assimilated and processed; in certain cases (for instance, in the field of counterinsurgency) 
the strategist may be compelled to draw upon the disciplines of sociology, economics and 
anthropology as well as purely military learning. Strategy, along with the related concepts of 
tactics and operations, has developed over time as a concept; originally referring to purely 
military plans, its remit expanded with the increasing size and complexity of socio-political 
organisations and their similarly transformed armed forces: ‘grand strategies’, responses to 
the needs of industrial societies with worldwide reach, are in many ways far removed from 
the more limited concerns of the ancient Greek strategos. Nevertheless, all forms of strategy 
can ultimately be understood as plans for military action, drawn up without benefit of the 
guidelines which would otherwise be provided by constitutive rules. 
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In particular, I wish to draw attention to a number of approaches to the challenge of 
strategy which differ in their appreciation of war’s ruleless nature, and the difficulties that it 
poses. The first such approach is the application of ‘deductive’, prefabricated doctrine to 
strategy: these can be developed in two broad ways. Firstly, strategists, commanders, and 
societies are often inclined to cling to a conceptual model of what war ‘is’ based on 
subjective assumptions derived from historical experience and what is called ‘strategic 
culture’ (we can see such a dynamic manifested in the Greek and medieval constructions of 
war). Secondly, attempts have been made to consciously discern ‘objective’ principles which 
can be used to furnish predictive models for strategy; this has been exemplified by the 
disciplines of geopolitics and geostrategy, which seek to establish firm principles of strategy 
based on objective geographical facts (a similar use having been made of geometry during the 
Enlightenment). In either case, an inaccurate reading of war as a ‘fixed’ form of activity 
which can be prepared for and conducted with a reasonable level of certainty is a common – 
though mistaken – response to the unique problems it presents as an unstructured form of 
activity. Alternatively, there are a number of what I call ‘inductive’ strategic and tactical 
approaches, which are founded on an explicit understanding of war as a form of conflict 
without rules. ‘Maneuver warfare’ and irregular war are two of these, being particularly 
notable in drawing on the thought of both Clausewitz and Sun Tzu – each of whom have 
markedly different approaches to war, but whose theories are compatible with our own 
understanding of war. Each derives their strength from their conscious exploitation of the 
possibilities afforded by freedom of action (exploitation of movement in space and time, for 
instance, plays a key role in both doctrines) and crucially, each acknowledges the need to 
form a coherent theoretical understanding of the war in question in a way which addresses its 
lack of structure, which would otherwise be provided by a framework of rules. 
 
The aspect of war which necessitates strategy – the fact that it lacks a clear set of 
criteria as to how a victory can be achieved – is shared by a number of other forms of human 
interaction, such as commerce and politics (as it is conducted outside of institutional 
processes like elections). The emergence of strategic planning as a concept in these areas can 
be explained by this shared lack of structure; nevertheless, with a fuller understanding of how 
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war is distinguished from these areas, we can show that it is the home of strategy; war’s 
uniquely disordered nature leaves very little that can be taken for granted. 
 
The Physicality of War and the Means of Destruction 
 
As Clausewitz himself noted, a great deal of the chance and uncertainty which afflicts 
war stems from this particular aspect of its nature; that war is not conducted through 
symbolic channels but takes place in ‘the real world’ exposes it to the vagaries of chance 
events, irregularities in terrain and weather, and a host of other inputs, each of which can 
have outsize consequences which cannot be reliably predicted. This is not all, however. The 
physicality of war is one of its most important aspects, being one which is not shared to 
anywhere near the same extent by other forms of conflict – not excepting sports. This is 
because the extent to which war is prosecuted in the physical world is a necessary 
consequence of its rulelessness – and this has particularly profound implications when we 
consider the role of rules in conserving social and political order. By allowing conflict to be 
carried out through symbolic interactions and by otherwise restricting the scope of physical 
damage, rules limit the extent to which a given conflict can alter the distribution of material 
power in a society. Having no rules, war has to be waged in the physical world, which 
accordingly exposes its participants to much greater levels of harm – a fact which has 
important consequences with regards to war’s relationship with political order. The fact that 
war is fought through the medium of physical combat and is not subject to the restriction of 
rules has a number of other implications which help to further explain its character: in an 
immediate sense, the freedom to use new tools to prosecute wars results in technological 
innovation, which forms part of the escalatory dynamic which was noted by Clausewitz in 
regard to his conception of war approaching the ‘absolute’. This dynamic has its own effects, 
which exacerbate the chance and uncertainty in warfare; most obviously, new technology is 
by definition something of an unknown quantity, and its effects will not be fully understood. 
Less intuitively grasped, but more significant, is that war’s physicality and its tendency to 
make use of ever-more sophisticated and complex technologies has transformative effects on 
the societies which engage in it.  
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As I have mentioned, in rule-bound conflicts material damage is limited, and the 
means of conflict are generally bound in such a way as to restrict the scope of the contest; this 
serves to maintain a socio-political status quo which is in large part based on the distribution 
of material wealth and power within the society in question. Material damage is therefore 
more consequential, and has effects potentially more far-reaching, than that of symbolic 
damage as it is done within a rule-bound contest. The converse of material damage in war is 
the growth in size and complexity of the technologies and techne (the skills, or craft) which 
are used to prosecute it. The tendency toward the development, supply and use of 
increasingly complex weaponry and increasingly large armies has historically been a huge 
driver of social organisation; I will provide an overview of the “Military Revolution” debate 
and the literature on state formation to highlight the mechanisms by which these 
transformations of human social organisation are effected. That the actors themselves, and 
not merely their tools, are changed by war is another important contribution to its inherent 
uncertainty and unpredictability; an important point I will emphasise is that states are not 
only altered in their external characteristics by their adaptations to war, but that their internal 
dynamics are profoundly altered as sub-actors within them are alternately empowered and 
disenfranchised by the adoption of new military technologies. The distribution of these, what 
I call ‘the means of destruction’, within a society is a profound influence on its political 
order, and has important implications for the formulation of strategy (for instance, I believe 
that the Clausewitzian concept of the strategic ‘centre of gravity’ can be effectively explained 
with reference to this concept). The distribution of the means of destruction also has 
important implications for the conduct of war between groups which either share or lack a 
similar internal structure, which as mentioned is a key foundation of workable restrictions on 
warfare. 
 
I will conclude my thesis with some speculation as to the potential uses of this 
conception of war in other academic disciplines and in the formulation of policy. War has 
been an immensely important part of human life and will continue to be so for the foreseeable 
future; the areas covered in this work are but a small part of what can be explained by the 
understanding of ‘war as violent conflict without rules’. This new understanding of the most 
basic theoretical aspects of war’s nature will, I hope, prove convincing and useful – both in 
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explaining its many peculiarities, and in enabling policymakers and theorists to better 
understand the nature of their most dangerous instrument. 
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CLAUSEWITZ’S THEORY OF WAR 
 
Introduction 
 
As I have mentioned, the thought of Carl von Clausewitz is perhaps the closest thing 
to orthodoxy in the theoretical study of war, and indeed On War is one of only a few key 
texts which are considered classics on the subject. In his book, Clausewitz advances a theory 
of warfare which attempts to identify timeless truths about a form of conflict which he sees as 
uniquely resistant to elaborate, prescriptive theorising, and one which is highly sensitive to 
the influence of chance and uncertainty. Clausewitz’s thoughts are profound, and I do not 
take issue with them on their own merits, but I believe that there is more to add to his 
conceptualisation of war which would serve to provide an even firmer theoretical basis to his 
teachings. To make this point, I shall first examine Clausewitz’s thoughts on the nature of 
war, particularly his thoughts on war’s tendency to the ‘absolute’ (an extreme 
conceptualisation of the inherent tendencies in war which push it to higher and higher levels 
of violence and destruction); his characterisation of war as a political instrument; the 
conceptual tool of the ‘trinity’; and his analysis of the changing character of war through the 
ages. I will undertake a particularly detailed study of Clausewitz’s writings on chance and 
uncertainty, putting his thought on this subject into historical context, and paying attention to 
his intellectual influence in this regard. We will find that Clausewitz identified the sources of 
chance in war as the presence of high levels of mental and physical stresses, unquantifiable 
factors which make certainty impossible, and the reciprocal nature of warfare; later writers 
have also identified in On War an appreciation of what is now called a ‘nonlinear’ 
understanding of physical phenomena, which further explains the uncertainty of warfare. 
However, none of these factors or dynamics are exclusive to war. Clausewitz’s opinions on 
chance in war, though not necessarily unjustified, appear to rest on unquestioned assumptions 
which he may have inherited from intellectual influences such as Machiavelli, as well as from 
his own battlefield experiences: conceptualising war as a violent contest which is unbounded 
by constitutional rules, however, does provide a compelling rationale for Clausewitz’s claim 
that war is uniquely exposed to chance. I will explain how this is so with reference to the 
functions and properties of constitutive rules in other forms of conflict, before taking each of 
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the sources of chance Clausewitz identifies and explaining how they ultimately derive from 
the absence of a constitutive rule-based structure. 
 
Reading Clausewitz 
 
Clausewitz was born in 1780 into a family which like many others in Prussia had 
strong connections to the army. Clausewitz's father was a lieutenant under Frederick the 
Great, and of three sons who went into the military, all achieved general rank. Clausewitz's 
career began early when, as a 12 year old lance corporal, he fought in the Rhineland in the 
French Revolutionary wars. Upon graduation from the Berlin Military Academy in 1804 he 
was top of his class; one year later he wrote his refutation of Bülow, an influential 
enlightenment-era military theorist who attempted to apply geometric principles to the 
conduct of strategy. Fighting in the disastrous battle of Jena-Auerstadt, Clausewitz was 
captured and held prisoner in France; on his return to Prussia, he became part of a group of 
reform-minded officers, who advocated the restructuring of the Prussian military and social 
order along the lines of France. In the 1810s Clausewitz wrote a number of unpublished (or 
rather, unpublishable) memoranda, advocating the raising of a militia (Landwehr);22 this and 
his other writings which called for a 'nation in arms' and castigated the weak resistance to 
Napoleon put up by Prussia, along with his unorthodox conduct – attempting to join not only 
the Russian but also the Austrian armies when they seemed to offer more resistance to the 
French23 – were evidence both of his idealism and of a lack of political nous, a combination 
not to the benefit of his career. Introverted and aloof in manner, he does not appear to have 
the stomach for political intrigue; his career, though varied, lacked the high-level battle 
commands he craved. Sidelined into staff work and given the unglamorous post of director of 
the Kriegsacademie in Berlin, Clausewitz was instead forced to sublimate his intellectual 
energies into his writings on the theory of war. 
 
Clausewitz has been interpreted over the years by a number of thinkers, in a variety of 
different ways. Christopher Bassford identifies four main schools of thought: 
  
                                                     
22 Hugh Smith, On Clausewitz, (Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.15 
23 Peter Paret, Clausewitz and the State, (Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 104 
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● an “Original Intent” school, primarily historians narrowly focused on Clausewitz’s 
own influences, drives, goals, and often the presumed limits to his thought and 
perceptions in the specific context of Prussia in the periods immediately surrounding 
the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon. 
● an “Inspirationist” school, primarily present-minded political scientists, strategic-
affairs types, soldiers, and business theorists who are interested in freely adapting 
Clausewitzian concepts exclusively to current issues. It also includes some historians 
interested in applying Clausewitzian ideas to historical problems outside the 
boundaries of the modern West. 
● a “Receptionist” school, primarily historians who are interested in the ideas and 
impacts of Clausewitzian inspirationists over time. 
● an “Editorial” school—people who think they have clear ideas as to what Clausewitz 
“really meant” and how to edit the rough draft Clausewitz left behind in order to 
more faithfully convey his concepts.24 
  
My own analysis of Clausewitz’s thought is closest to the ‘inspirationist’ and ‘original 
intent’ schools; however, as regards the latter, I am not primarily concerned with establishing 
the genealogy of his ideas but am instead seeking to bear in mind the ways in which his 
experiences of war and his intellectual context have coloured his own writings. I am not 
concerned with exploring how exactly Clausewitz influenced those who came after him 
(though I will address his influence on certain doctrines in my later chapter on strategy), nor 
am I convinced I have a special insight into what Clausewitz really wanted to say in On War. 
Nevertheless, I am not merely “freely adapting Clausewitzian concepts exclusively to current 
issues” as other interpretationists might do: my purpose in writing this chapter is to expound 
the key concepts and overall form of Clausewitz’s theory of war in some depth, and in 
particular examine his reasoning for claiming that war is a unique form of human activity – 
especially the assertion that it is a uniquely chance-ridden and uncertain endeavour. 
 
There are important lessons to be drawn from writers who work in the other schools 
of the Clausewitzian academy; the reading of any historical text must be undertaken with a 
                                                     
24 Christopher Bassford, Tip-Toe Through the Trinity – The Strange Persistence of Trinitarian 
Warfare, (2016), http://www.clausewitz.com/mobile/trinity8.htm <accessed 15/02/2016> 
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great deal of care, and this is especially so with regards to On War, a work that has been 
frequently misinterpreted – to occasionally disastrous effect. There are various reasons why 
this has been the case: firstly, Clausewitz’s writing is at times confusing, with seemingly 
aphoristic passages set in the context of a dialectical argument, where one seemingly 
categorical statement is contradicted – or at least modified – by another in the following 
paragraph. Combined with Clausewitz’s occasionally dense prose style and difficulties with 
translation, the temptation is to take a line out of context and thus misrepresent his thinking; a 
habit which is especially pronounced when readers come across his mentions of the concept 
of absolute war, and which resulted in later thinkers caricaturing him as the prophet of total 
war and an exponent of the subordination of politics to the needs of strategy. Another 
problem with Clausewitz’s book is its unfinished nature; begun in 1815 but based on writings 
composed over many years, Clausewitz decided to make substantial revisions to the text of 
On War in 1827, and by the time of his death had completed only Book One (of eight) to his 
satisfaction – a point particularly associated with Raymond Aron.25 There are other issues 
with reading Clausewitz; Peter Paret and Azar Gat emphasise the difficulties which result if 
Clausewitz is not understood with reference to the intellectual context of his own time – 
particularly his place spanning the age of the Enlightenment and its intellectual antithesis, the 
Romantic era, a fact crucial in interpreting his dialectical style.26 Yet another issue is the need 
to understand the implications of the fact that Clausewitz wrote in a time where military 
technologies were far different to those of our own, and to incorporate this understanding into 
our interpretation of his theories.27 I will make an effort to bear these concerns in mind; 
whenever biographical or chronological factors are relevant, I will incorporate them – as most 
of my focus is on the theoretical side, technical details will not predominate, but similarly I 
will be alert as to this consideration. However, my own purpose is not to place Clausewitz in 
his historical context or to reconcile his writings to another world: the aim of my own study 
of Clausewitz is to examine his thoughts on the theory of war, what war is and why it is so, 
and explain them with reference to my theory of war as conflict without rules; in short, I 
                                                     
25 Raymond Aron, Clausewitz: Philosopher of War, trans. Christine Booker and Norman Stone, 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983) 
26 Paret, (1974); Azar Gat, The Origins of Military Thought: From the Enlightenment to Clausewitz. 
(Oxford University Press, 1989) 
27 For instance, see Michael Handel, War, Strategy and Intelligence, (London: Frank Cass, 1989), 
p.60 
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write to emphasise certain critical observations he makes as to the nature of war, the reasons 
and logic behind his assertions, and to identify consistencies with my own ideas. 
 
Clausewitz’s theory of war 
 
Clausewitz’s intention in writing On War was to write a theory of war that would be 
timeless and applicable to all forms of warfare; his intellectual integrity and his disdain for 
the fixed, incorrect, yet fashionable ideas of the moment were very much in evidence in his 
theoretical writings, particularly when he turned to the subject of chance and uncertainty in 
war. Clausewitz lived in an intellectual world dominated by the Enlightenment on one hand, 
and the Romantic reaction to it on the other: some thinkers believed that war, like the natural 
sciences, might be amenable to rational, scientific analysis – and therefore believed that 
prescriptive 'laws of war' could be uncovered. Examples of works from this school of thought 
include the Marquis de Puységur’s Art of War by Principles and Rules, Maurice de Saxe’s 
Reveries on the Art of War, and, most prominent in Clausewitz’s eyes, his contemporary 
Heinrich von Bülow’s Principles of Modern War, which advocated a geometric approach to 
warfare, specifying lines and angles of approach which would determine success (“rococo 
absurdity” in Clausewitz’s eyes).28 On the other side of the equation, Counter-Enlightenment 
theorists such as Georg Heinrich von Behrenhorst, who had fought in the wars of Frederick 
the Great, emphasised the chaotic nature of war, with all its unquantifiable aspects – success 
was rather more dependent on “courage, energy, skill, together with chance and luck”, than 
on the prescriptions of quasi-mathematical theories.29 
 
Clausewitz’s own theory of war fell somewhere between the two camps – perhaps 
closer to the latter. In a preface to an unpublished manuscript, he makes clear his opinions on 
theorists who seek to present self-contained theories: “Perhaps it would not be impossible to 
write a systematic theory of war… but the theories we presently possess… try so hard to 
make their systems coherent and complete that they are stuffed with commonplaces, truisms 
and nonsense of every kind.”30 With this in mind, what can we say of war – theoretically 
speaking? Clausewitz reaches an understanding of his concept through a dialectical argument 
                                                     
28 Smith, p.56 
29 Smith, p.57 
30 Clausewitz (1976) p.61 
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in the first chapter of On War. Firstly Clausewitz characterises war as “nothing but a duel on 
a larger scale” – a fight between two actors who each seek to disarm or otherwise beat the 
other through physical force, “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.”31 With 
both fighters seeking to overcome the other, war is driven by the logic of escalation: each 
must place their enemy in the most intolerable position – i.e. to disarm him (somewhat oddly, 
Clausewitz does not talk of a war of extermination) – and as each is aware that the other is 
trying do the same, the pressure is to always exert the maximum effort. A crucial point is that 
there is nothing inherent to war which limits this tendency, something which Clausewitz 
mentions repeatedly: 
 
War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force. 
Each side, therefore, compels its opponent to follow suit; a reciprocal action is started 
which must lead, in theory, to extremes.32 
 
If wars between civilized nations are far less cruel and destructive than wars between 
savages, the reason lies in the social conditions of the states themselves and in their 
relationships to one another. These are the forces that give rise to war; the same forces 
circumscribe and moderate it. They themselves however are not part of war; they 
already exist before fighting starts. To introduce the principle of moderation into 
the theory of war itself would always lead to logical absurdity.33 
 
Attached to force are certain self-imposed, imperceptible limitations hardly worth 
mentioning, known as international law and custom, but they scarcely weaken it.34  
 
War can be bound by rules – but it does not have to be, and these rules are likely to be 
weak. Clausewitz does not elaborate further on the character of these rules, or why exactly 
they are so weak when applied to war – probably he thought it obvious – or, equally likely, 
not worth mentioning. Clausewitz seems to develop his thinking on ‘absolute war’; at first it 
is an ideal for the commander to aspire to, as evidenced by Napoleon’s great successes – the 
                                                     
31 Ibid., p.75 
32 Ibid., p.77, my emphasis 
33 Ibid., p.76 – my emphasis. 
34 Ibid., p.75 
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time in which war came closest to the absolute, in his eyes. Later (in the revised Book One of 
On War, which was the only part of the work he considered complete) he treats it as a purely 
theoretical concept and one that should not be considered to exist in the physical world. 
Smith makes an analogy to absolute zero, a temperature never reached in reality but one 
which factors into our equations anyway.35 
 
That this push to extremes is not achieved in reality is due to the influence of three 
factors. The first is the fact that war is not an isolated phenomenon: it does not take place 
between two abstract entities, but between two sides each with some knowledge of the 
other’s capabilities and will. This knowledge enables a kind of calculation of what the enemy 
may do and moderates the drive to all-out conflict.36 The second factor that war is not waged 
in one single act; all military resources (which include the actor’s armed forces; its 
population; the physical features of its country; and any allies it may possess) cannot be 
mustered and applied to the war effort immediately, and so each side has an incentive to draw 
back its effort (the pressure to escalate in response to the enemy’s efforts being lessened).37 
The third factor is the fact that the result of war is never final (an oddly categorical statement, 
even if this is generally the case): states are not necessarily destroyed by losing a war, and so 
the lack of the threat of total annihilation – which would otherwise provoke absolute efforts – 
leads to a less intense prosecution of the war.38 Clausewitz mentions other reasons as to why 
war fails to approach its absolute state: the fact that the defence is stronger than the attack 
lends itself to a certain conservative disposition amongst generals, who for this and other 
reasons (such as incomplete knowledge of the enemy forces) will tend to hesitate from taking 
bold actions.39   
 
There are other, more significant reasons why war does not approach the absolute, 
which feed into Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity. Firstly, the political aim of a given war 
will in part determine the amount of effort which will be exerted; a modest aim will not 
ordinarily excite great passions, and equally will not threaten the enemy to the extent that he 
                                                     
35 Smith, p.113 
36 Clausewitz (1976), p.78 
37 Ibid., p.79-80 
38 Ibid., p.80 
39 Ibid., p.84-85 
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will unleash his full potential. The fact that war is fought for a political aim is of course one 
of the observations which is most associated with Clausewitz – war is “a continuation of 
political intercourse, carried on with other means.”40 Second, the fact that war is fought in the 
‘real world’ exposes it (as we have seen) to the chance and uncertainty which is so prevalent 
a force in warfare; guesswork based on the calculation of probabilities replaces certainty, and 
luck has an important role.41 The combination of these factors with the original drive to the 
absolute, results in Clausewitz’s concept of the trinity 
 
War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given 
case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical 
trinity – composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be 
regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which 
the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument 
of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. 
 
The point to be noted here is that Clausewitz claims that war can differ markedly from 
case to case: when he says that “war is more than a true chameleon” he is alluding to the fact 
that the differences in each case of war go deeper than surface appearance, with different 
political aims, variations in the play of chance, and the variable passions which each war stirs 
in the population all being capable of altering the character of the war concerned. The 
particularly Clausewitzian notion that every war is a unique occurrence which needs to be 
understood in its unique historical and social context, is encapsulated in this concept. 
Clausewitz explores this aspect of his thought in Chapter Three of Book Eight of On War, 
wherein he makes a historical survey of various societies and notes how in each case they 
made war in their own unique way. Not only will each individual society fight for different 
purposes, but they will differ in the proportion of their population which fights; their political 
and social structures will vary; and the resources upon which they can draw will be subject to 
their own particular limits. 
 
To go through Clausewitz’s examples: the “Tartar hordes” (the Mongols) went to war 
                                                     
40 Ibid., p.87 
41 Ibid., p.85-86 
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as a nation, with their entire families in tow. As such, their political aims were near-absolute 
– “to subdue their enemies or expel them”42 (whether this was indeed the case historically is 
another matter).43 Their uncivilised nature, says Clausewitz, was the only brake on their 
progress. The republics of the Classical world, on the other hand, fought wars which were 
limited in scale and scope due to a lack of military manpower (the common people being 
unable to bear arms) and the fact that they were “so many and so close together” that the 
balance of power would always mitigate against grand schemes of conquest by any one of 
them.44 Rome was different, thanks to her own unique circumstances; Alexander the Great 
was likewise an exceptional case – possessing a well-trained and organised army which was 
under his complete personal control and facing weak opposition, he could confidently aspire 
to huge conquests. The same could not be said of medieval monarchs, whose control over 
their subordinates was not so strong; the military technologies and techniques of the time 
were oriented towards individual combat, and as the liege lord relied so much on the whims 
of a loose confederation of warriors, campaigns were necessarily brief: as Clausewitz notes, 
“if a thing could not be finished quickly it was impossible.”45 The condottieri of the Italian 
city states were expensive and therefore few in number, and being mercenaries were not very 
passionate about the outcome of the battles they fought – war becoming so removed from its 
true nature that “its character was wholly changed, and no deduction from its proper nature 
was still applicable.”46 As we will see in a later chapter, this view of the condottieri is rather 
exaggerated, and it is likely that this is a prejudice Clausewitz has acquired from an uncritical 
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reading of Machiavelli. Clausewitz’s use of history, it may already be clear, is rather more 
useful as substantiation of his ideas than as accurate information in its own right. 
 
States with more disordered internal politics behaved differently to more centralised 
states; they would not have the consistency of action that marked a more united polity, and 
this was indeed the form of war fought by less cohesive states such as the Holy Roman 
Empire.47 Towards the end of the seventeenth century, however, most of Europe’s states had 
become more or less centralised, and maintained standing armies which were not composed 
of independently powerful feudal vassals but of hired soldiers. This, coupled with the 
increasingly sophisticated administration of states, gave them the ability to field armies much 
larger than they had been able to previously. The international context, claims Clausewitz, 
was more amenable to war in that the smaller number of independent states ceased to threaten 
the kind of situation as occurred in the Classical period, where dozens of rivals would 
intervene in an attempt to frustrate another’s attempts at total conquest (a bizarre thing to say, 
given the myriad number of wars aimed at maintaining the balance of power in this period). 
Despite these inducements to a more vigorous form of war, there existed a contrary influence, 
in that the government and the people of the states were drifting further apart; the ordinary 
people did not feel so invested in the fate of the polity as they might have done had they been 
citizen-soldiers in the Classical model, and the military capabilities of the states of Europe 
were relatively well-understood, being a function of the states’ wealth and the number of 
“such idle vagabonds as they could lay their hands on either at home or abroad.”48 
 
The break came with the French Revolution, when war began to approach the 
absolute (at least in the eyes of the ‘immature’ Clausewitz):  “War, untrammelled by any 
conventional restraints, had broken loose in all its elemental fury.”49 With the people finally 
returned to war as an active participant, the limits which restricted the conduct of war in the 
pre-revolutionary era could be transcended. The participation of the people as an active force 
in war enabled the French to field large armies and Napoleon to take the bold and decisive 
actions which won him his successes, no longer bound by the physical restrictions which 
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characterised (but were not an inherent part of) war as it was fought in the past.50 However, 
this success provoked a reaction, and in Spain, Austria, Russia and Prussia the masses were 
mobilised to meet the threat; the people were returned to war, and it was unclear whether 
there could be any going back to the old model of warfare. 
 
At this point our historical survey can end. Our purpose was not to assign, in passing, 
a handful of principles of warfare to each period. We wanted to show how every age 
had its own kind of war, its own limiting conditions, and its own peculiar 
preconceptions. Each period, therefore, would have held to its own theory of war, 
even if the urge had always and universally existed to work things out on 
scientific principles. It follows that the events of every age must be judged in the 
light of its own peculiarities. One cannot, therefore, understand and appreciate the 
commanders of the past until one has placed oneself in the situation of their times, not 
so much by a painstaking study of all its details as by an accurate appreciation of its 
major determining features. But war, though conditioned by the particular 
characteristics of states and their armed forces, must contain some more general 
– indeed, a universal – element with which every theorist ought above all to be 
concerned.51 
 
The principles of war and the possibilities for theory 
 
 The fact that every war is unique – to the extent that every age could conceivably 
have its own theory of war – has important implications for anyone who would try to devise 
lasting lessons about warfare. The aspiration for theory is to divine patterns and regularities 
in a given activity, to identify those ‘universal elements’ which define an activity, with the 
ultimate aim of being able to predict the course of events – or at least provide accurate 
guidance for the commander in a given set of circumstances. Clausewitz distinguishes 
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between a number of different types of ‘rules’ in this sense in Chapter 4 of Book 2 of On 
War. The first type is law, defined in the sense of a law of causality: “Viewed as a matter of 
cognition, law is the relationship between things and their effects. Viewed as a matter of the 
will, law is a determinant of action.” Next are principles, which are law-like in some respects 
but are not in themselves determinant of action: “Principle… represents only the spirit and 
the sense of the law: in cases where the diversity of the real world cannot be contained within 
the rigid form of law, the application of principle allows for a greater latitude for judgement.” 
Rules (as in rules of thumb) are similar to principles, in that they are laws which admit 
exceptions: “In another sense, the term “rule” is used for “means”: to recognise an underlying 
truth through a single obviously relevant feature enables us to derive a general law of action 
from this feature. Rules in games are like this, and so are the short cuts in mathematics and so 
on.”52 My own understanding of rules as they apply to games is somewhat different to this 
somewhat vague definition, as we will go on to see in the next chapter. 
 
Clausewitz is insistent that war does not admit for deterministic laws: “in the conduct 
of war, perceptions cannot be governed by laws… Principles, rules, regulations and methods 
are, however, indispensable.”53 The application of rules and principles in war can take the 
form of routine action, which can be useful; such patterns of behaviour derive their validity 
from the fact that they are based on average probabilities, a source of information which is 
especially important in an otherwise chaotic and unpredictable environment: “The frequent 
application of routine in war will also appear essential and inevitable when we consider how 
action is based on pure conjecture or takes place in complete ignorance...”54 Routines are 
especially useful for lower-ranking officers of uncertain quality – “Officers whom one should 
not expect to have any greater understanding than regulations and experience can give them 
have to be helped along by routine methods tantamount to rules”55 – however, there is a 
tendency of those who are not gifted to rely on the strategies of their more illustrious 
predecessors. Clausewitz criticises the trend of commanders copying the techniques of great 
commanders – Frederick II’s oblique order, or Napoleon’s “brutal rush of concentric masses” 
– without understanding of whether such a technique fits the circumstances. 
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So long as no acceptable theory, no intelligent analysis of the conduct of war exists, 
routine methods will tend to take over even at the highest levels. Some of the men in 
command have not had the opportunities of self-improvement afforded by 
education… Their only insights are those that have been gained by experience. For 
this reason, they prefer to use the means which their experience has equipped them, 
even in cases that should be handled freely and individually… The danger is that this 
kind of style [a ‘personal’ or routine way of doing things], developed out of a single 
case, can easily outlive the situation that gave rise to it; for conditions change 
imperceptibly56 
 
 An analogy might be made with a pianist who practices a few set tunes until he is 
proficient in them, but is otherwise completely unaware of musical theory – and is unable to 
improvise when called upon to do so. The important thing for a commander is to understand 
the principles of war and be able to apply them intelligently and flexibly to any set of 
circumstances. 
 
 What, then, are the principles of war which Clausewitz believes can be identified? In 
1812 (15 years before he decided to revise his writings in On War) he wrote a brief work on 
the subject for the crown prince of Prussia, Frederick William, before Clausewitz left for 
Russia. The principles he identifies touch upon various areas, principally concerned with the 
tactics and strategy.  Contained in the “General Principles for Defense” are such lessons as 
the need “to keep our troops covered as long as possible… not to bring our troops into 
combat immediately”57 and where exactly the commander should place this reserve;58 in his 
principles for the offense, Clausewitz advocates focusing the attack at only one point of the 
enemy’s forces, rather than dispersing the effort, and exhorts the would-be commander to cut 
off the enemy’s line of retreat.59 He goes into more detail as to how this should be done with 
armed forces of the time: artillery should open the battle “in great batteries massed against 
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one point”60, and afterwards light infantry should be employed; the cavalry should be kept 
out of range of the enemy, but close enough to take advantage of any tactical opportunities 
that arise.61 As far as principles regarding terrain are concerned, Clausewitz characterises it as 
providing benefits primarily to the defence, recommending that geographic features such as 
mountains or rivers should be used to secure one flank while the main effort to defeat the 
enemy is made by the other. In strategy, there are three objects of a given war: “(a) to 
conquer and destroy the armed power of the enemy; (b) To take possession of his material 
and other sources of strength, and (c) To gain public opinion”62 to achieve the first, offensive 
efforts should be concentrated at the “main body of the enemy army”; for the second, “we 
should direct our operations against the places where most of these resources are 
concentrated”. Finally, “public opinion is won through great victories and the occupation of 
the enemy’s capital.”63 
 
Clausewitz goes further into the subject of principles in On War Firstly, there is the 
factor of superiority of numbers. Clausewitz seems to hesitate to classify this as the most 
important factor when it comes to winning an engagement, but after qualifying himself in 
typically theoretical fashion64 he concludes that numerical superiority is an extremely 
important influence, with even great commanders like Frederick the Great and Napoleon 
struggling to prevail over forces with a two-to-one superiority over their own. Most important 
is not numbers per se, but the concentration of superior numbers at the decisive point: “the 
forces available must be employed with such skill that even in the absence of absolute 
superiority, relative superiority is attained at the decisive point.”65 The obverse of this is that 
one should not expose one’s own forces to being outnumbered: the army should not be 
divided. “There is no higher and simpler law of strategy than that of keeping one’s forces 
concentrated. No force should be detached from the main body unless the need is definite and 
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urgent.”66 Combined with the factor of concentration of forces in space is the need to 
concentrate forces in time; in strategy in particular, it is important to deploy all forces 
available simultaneously; “their employment will be the more effective the more everything 
can be concentrated a single action at a single moment.”67  
 
This last point is balanced by the need to maintain a reserve in the case of unexpected 
developments; Clausewitz maintains that this principle is more a requirement in the tactical 
sphere, as the sources of uncertainty are more keenly felt in combat. In the case of a strategic 
reserve, it must be useful – there is no point in withholding troops from combat, as that 
weakens one’s own effort with no strategic use – it is better to make simultaneous use of the 
forces available.68 All of these points are contained under Clausewitz’s heading of “Economy 
of Force”; this is not economy in the sense of a miserly eking out of military resources, but 
the most efficient use of all forces available to the commander. The principle is “always to 
make sure that all forces are involved – always to ensure that no part of the whole force is 
idle… When the time for action comes, the first requirement should be that all parts must 
act”.69 This is of course consistent with the concept of absolute war – overcoming the enemy 
by exerting a greater effort than he can provide in return.  
 
One of the ways in which this can be achieved is by the use of surprise – rather, it is 
necessary; “for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable… We 
suggest that surprise is at the root of all operations without exception, though in widely 
varying degrees”.70 In this area, Clausewitz again sees a distinction between the realms of 
tactics and strategy. Surprise is less likely in the strategic sphere, as effective surprise 
depends on the enemy being unaware, and that one’s own forces are able to take advantage of 
the situation as fast as possible – these circumstances are more likely to be found in a tactical 
situation where time and space are limited, whereas a strategic surprise is easily guessed at, 
with the preparations for strategic movements (preparation of supply depots) being hard to 
disguise or hide; in any case, effective surprise depends not only on the efforts of the 
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commander and his army, but on favourable chance circumstances which are effectively 
beyond their control.71 Clever ruses and cunning in general are things which Clausewitz does 
not believe factor into war as much as is supposed. Here he makes an interesting observation: 
 
Strategy is exclusively concerned with engagements and with the directions relating 
to them. Unlike other areas of life it is not concerned with actions that only 
consist of words, such as statements, declarations and so forth. But words, being 
cheap, are the most common means of creating false impressions… To prepare a 
sham action with sufficient thoroughness to impress an enemy requires a considerable 
expenditure of time and effort, and the costs increase with the scale of the deception.72 
 
War’s physical nature has important implications when it comes to undertaking action 
– a point we will explore in a later chapter. Another important principle of Clausewitz’s is the 
identification of the opponent’s “centre of gravity”. This is the most effective target for 
military action. 
 
A centre of gravity is always found where the mass is concentrated most densely… 
The fighting forces of each belligerent – whether a single state or an alliance of states 
– have a certain unity and therefore some cohesion. Where there is cohesion, the 
analogy of the centre of gravity can be applied. Thus, these forces will possess certain 
centres of gravity, which by their movement and direction, govern the rest...”73 
 
Elsewhere, Clausewitz characterises this centre of gravity as “the hub of all power and 
movement, on which everything depends.”74 The form this takes varies from case to case: 
sometimes the centre of gravity is the enemy army, while at other times – for instance, when 
domestic politics is a decisive factor – it is the enemy capital; in cases where the war is 
fought by an alliance, the centre of gravity is in the “community of interest” between the 
allies, and in rebellions it is found in the personalities of its leaders. Antulio Echevarria 
defines the common characteristic of these various centres of gravity as the fact that they 
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“possess a certain centripetal force that acts to hold an entire system or structure together”75 – 
they are what keeps the enemy force operating as a cohesive system.  
 
Many of the principles which Clausewitz advances are individually debateable, and 
bear the imprint of the military situation of his own time – his writings on strategic surprise, 
along with his well-known scepticism of intelligence, are particularly questionable in the 
light of the famous deception operations of the Second World War, such as Operations 
Mincemeat, misleading German intelligence as to the Allied invasion of Sicily in 1943, and 
Bodyguard, the equivalent operation for the 1944 Normandy landings (though the latter 
particularly relied on the manipulation of electronic signals intelligence to create the 
impression of phantom armies, which the German intelligence networks had no other access 
to, as well as the use of industrial technology to create large quantities of decoy materiel). 
While deception operations cannot obscure military build-up entirely, they can mislead the 
enemy as to where exactly it will be deployed. However Clausewitz might be criticised for 
these and other of his observations, it is important to note that his principles of war are 
predominantly ‘bottom-up’ in nature – they are concerned with ‘how to think’, more than 
‘what to do’, and are directly founded on basic assumptions about the theory of war; building 
abstraction on top of abstraction as the geometric thinkers of his time did is anathema.76  
 
Chance in War 
 
What were Clausewitz’s thoughts on the subject of chance and war? Firstly, we must 
understand what Clausewitz means when he speaks of ‘chance’ and uncertainty. While he 
does not make an explicit, self-contained definition of so obvious a term, by reading through 
his mentions of the concept we can establish what defines the ‘realm of chance’. Firstly, war 
is defined as uncertain due to the fact that it is inimical to precise calculation: there can be no 
descriptive theory of war as aspired to by the ‘geometric’ school of military strategy. 
 
In short, absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military 
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calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, 
good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the 
tapestry. In the whole range of human activities war most closely resembles a game of 
cards.77 
 
War is therefore more a matter of probabilities than of certainties, and nothing can be 
known for sure. This can be either a good or a bad thing: Clausewitz’s characterisation of 
chance and uncertainty in On War reflects the tension between the opportunities provided by 
these factors, and the difficulties they pose. Book One of On War speaks of chance with a 
kind of optimism, delighting in the opportunities that uncertain war provides:  
 
Although our intellect always longs for clarity and certainty, our nature often finds 
uncertainty fascinating. It prefers to day-dream in the realms of chance and luck rather 
than accompany the intellect on its narrow and tortuous path of philosophical enquiry 
and logical deduction only to arrive – hardly knowing how – in unfamiliar 
surroundings where all the usual landmarks seem to have disappeared. Unconfined by 
narrow necessity, it can revel in a wealth of possibilities; which inspire courage to 
take wing and dive into the element of daring and danger like a fearless swimmer into 
the current”78 
 
And in his famous concept of the ‘trinity’ he repeats this sentiment: 
 
As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a paradoxical 
trinity-composed of primordial violence, hatred, and emnity, which are to be regarded 
as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the 
creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument 
of policy, which makes it lubject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects 
mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the 
government. The passions that are to be kindled in war must already be inherent in the 
people; the scope which the play of courage and talent will enjoy in the realm of 
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probability and chance depends on the particular character of the commander 
and the army...79 
 
Here, chance and uncertainty is associated with new possibilities for action and 
freedom of movement – for those who are courageous enough to take advantage of it. A 
skilled commander can seize opportunities and take advantage of the freedoms afforded his 
“creative spirit”. Such an understanding is what underlies his discussion of surprise, which 
Clausewitz suggests “lies at the root of all operations without exception”, depending not so 
much on the ingenuity of the commander, but mostly on the fleeting alignment of chance 
circumstances.80 A commander who ‘thinks outside the box’ can exploit the possibilities of 
war and funnel uncertainty toward the enemy, either by using new weapons, which are 
terrifying to those who have not experienced them,81 or conversely by using techniques and 
manoeuvres which have fallen out of fashion – Clausewitz cites Napoleon’s use of 
circumvallation at the battle of Mantua as an example.82 In war, barriers to action “consist in 
a sense only in man’s ignorance of what is possible”. However, chance and uncertainty have 
their negative side – in other chapters Clausewitz characterises chance as an obstacle to be 
overcome rather than a source of opportunity. 
 
These are the effects of chance and uncertainty in war – but what brings them about? 
There are a number of factors to consider. One of the principal sources of uncertainty and 
chance mentioned by Clausewitz is the reciprocal nature of war: “War, however, is not the 
action of a living force upon a lifeless mass... but always the collision of two living forces… 
So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. 
Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him.”83 This combines with 
a ‘feedback’ effect wherein the political objectives of a war shift due to the influence of 
events during the course of the war, moving it in an unintended direction. Further to this, 
Clausewitz’s most categorical statement of what makes war so uncertain comes in his 
discussion of the moral factor: “The influence of the great diversity of intellectual qualities… 
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is the primary cause for the diversity of roads to the goal… and for the disproportionate part 
assigned to the play of probability and chance in determining the course of events”  
 
For Clausewitz, there are at least four factors inherent to war which contribute to 
making it an especially uncertain phenomenon. Firstly, there is danger, on which he speaks 
with some authority, describing the feelings which beset a novice soldier as he nears the 
battlefield in evocative manner. Cannonballs and bursting shells hit the ground all around and 
casualties occur with increasing regularity; as grapeshot rattles against roofs and the ground, 
shot falls “like hail” and musketballs “whistle around us”, and while “the sight of men being 
killed and mutilated moves our pounding hearts to awe and pity”, the novice cannot help but 
notice his own conduct and that of his comrades begin to change. Indeed, as Clausewitz 
concedes, “even the bravest can become slightly distracted.”84 In essence: 
 
The novice cannot pass through these layers of increasing intensity of danger without 
sensing that here ideas are governed by other factors, that the light of reason is 
refracted in a manner quite different from that which is normal in academic 
speculation. It is an exceptional man who keeps his powers of quick decision intact if 
he has never been through this experience before.85 
   
The emphasis is on how exposure to danger affects the mind of the commander and to 
an extent everyone involved – in such a setting, “the ordinary man can never achieve a state 
of perfect unconcern in which his mind can work with normal flexibility”,86 and the scope of 
chance (that which is out of our control) – increases accordingly. The temptation to hesitate 
and procrastinate in this sort of situation is another source of uncertainty; decisions to 
‘consolidate’ one’s own position, rather than push on and maintain momentum and initiative, 
“could make offensive wars easier; but they cannot make its results more certain. They 
usually camouflage misgivings on the part of the general”87 – such dithering exposes the 
army to counterattack and other perils. How commanders and soldiers will react to such 
stresses is not a known quantity either; this “great diversity in mental qualities” in an army is 
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another cause of “the disproportionate part assigned to… probability and chance in 
determining the course of events.”88 
 
The influence of physical effort (or as Clausewitz puts it, ‘friction’) is a source of 
chance in its own right, due to its unquantifiable nature: “because its limits are uncertain, it 
resembles one of those substances whose elasticity makes the degree of its friction 
exceedingly hard to gauge.”89 Each army and general will be capable of different degrees of 
effort, and this depends on the circumstances of each particular case. The third source of 
uncertainty is the factor of intelligence. Of all of Clausewitz’s opinions, his scathing views on 
the unreliability of intelligence are perhaps the most dated and one-sided, and his conclusions 
are debatable to say the least – though as it forms the core of his argument we shall deal with 
it here. 
 
By "intelligence" we mean every sort of information about the enemy and his country 
– the basis, in short, of our own plans and operations. If we consider the actual basis 
of this information, how unreliable and transient it is, we soon realize that war is a 
flimsy structure that can easily collapse and bury us in its ruins… Many intelligence 
reports in war are contradictory; even more are false, and most are uncertain.90 
 
This is due not only to the potentially contradictory nature of intelligence reports 
received in the heat of battle (or afterwards, in the shape of falsified casualty reports91), but 
also to those times when false reports pile up and the commander acts upon them – “just as 
the reports turn out to be lies, exaggerations, errors and so on. In short,” Clausewitz 
concludes, “most intelligence is false”. The natural propensity of commanders to err on the 
side of caution compounds the influence of bad intelligence and again introduces more 
‘friction’ into the conduct of the war, which “has a way of masking the stage with scenery 
crudely daubed with fearsome apparitions”92. Finally, we come to Clausewitz’s much-noted 
concept of general friction, the aggregate effect of hundreds of actions and minor occurrences 
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which cannot be predicted.  
 
Everything in war is very simple, but the simplest thing is difficult. The difficulties 
accumulate and end by producing a kind of friction that is inconceivable unless one 
has experienced war… countless minor incidents – the kind you can never really 
foresee – combine to lower the general level of performance, so that one always falls 
short of the intended goal.93  
 
Clausewitz uses the image of a carriage journey to illustrate his point – a simple case, 
but still one in which so much in the way of “minor incidents” can contribute to a lack of 
correspondence with idealised plans. In essence, the sources of chance and uncertainty which 
Clausewitz identifies are as follows: firstly, the reciprocal dynamic provided by active 
opposition – the uncontrollable and unpredictable plans and actions of the enemy, which 
when combined with one’s own generate even more unpredictable consequences; secondly, 
the central role of unquantifiable factors like willpower (and the difficulty of achieving 
certainty regarding more quantifiable factors, due to poor intelligence), along with the 
confounding effects of friction; and third, acute mental strain stemming from the danger and 
violence of war, which affects the decision-making process. 
 
Clausewitz is known to have read Machiavelli, and their similarities on the subject of 
chance and uncertainty are so pronounced that he must have been an especially profound 
influence.94  Machiavelli himself was heir to an understanding of a concept of fortune which 
had been prevalent in the classical era, deified as the goddess Fortuna. What is fortune? 
anything out of human control, both the contingent event, and prevailing circumstances in 
general – ‘the times’.95 Federico Chabod believes that for Machiavelli, fortune was “a 
mysterious, transcendent grouping of events, whose incoherence is unintelligible to human 
minds.”96 Conceptions of the extent to which fortune governed human affairs varied from age 
to age; according to Thomas Flanagan, it was commonplace in classical times to debate the 
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relative importance of fortune and human effort in the affair of man, whereas by the Middle 
Ages fortune’s vicissitudes were thought to be part of a divine order, and not to be resisted.97 
Machiavelli took a middle road: “Many think that the affairs of the world are so ruled by 
fortune... that the ability of men cannot control them. Rather, they think that we have no 
remedy at all... Nevertheless, so as not to eliminate human freedom, I am disposed to hold 
that fortune is the arbiter of half our actions, but that it lets us control roughly the other 
half.”98  
 
For Quentin Skinner the most fundamental lesson that Machiavelli is trying to convey 
is that success depends on “recognising the force of circumstances, accepting what necessity 
dictates and, harmonising one's behaviour with the times.”99 Machiavelli recognises that this 
is harder than it sounds, due to our being stuck in accustomed habits, and lack of skill when 
we do change, even to the point of doubting whether such a shift is actually possible.100 How 
to accurately gauge the spirit of the times is not explicitly stated in Machiavelli's works; I 
suspect that a thorough knowledge of history and familiarity with the lives of the great men 
of the past would be Machiavelli's recommendation, as well as from personal experience: 
Pandolfo Pettruchi, the lord of Siena, who was renowned for his “tricks and intrigues”; 
confronted over these by Machiavelli, the then-representative of Florence, Pettruchi replied 
“wishing to make as few mistakes as possible, I conduct my government day by day, and 
arrange my affairs hour by hour; because the times are more powerful than our brains”101, 
impressing Machiavelli enough to include Pettruchi as one of the few contemporary Italian 
princes to receive a favourable mention in his works.102 
 
However, there is a more central quality which is the determinant of success in the 
face of fortune – virtù. What is this quality? Derived from the Latin virtus (man, male), 
textual analysis of Machiavelli's works shows virtù is variously opposed to indolence (ozio) 
and fury (furore); Machiavelli also uses it (as his medical contemporaries did) to denote life-
force or vigour; mostly it is referred to as “energy of will, manliness, excellence... a kind of 
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energetic decisiveness”103 – other meanings under its rubric are “foresight, self-discipline, 
constancy, strength of mind, fortitude, determination, purposefulness, decisiveness, 
manliness, bravery, boldness, vigour.”104 John Plamenatz gives a similar description: 
“Firmness of purpose, presence of mind, resourcefulness, the ability to see more clearly and 
further than others, fortitude in adversity... to display virtù... is to make your will and your 
person count for something in the eyes of other men and your own.”105 Wood's analysis of the 
virtùosi (that is men specifically referred to as possessing virtù in Machiavelli's works) is 
particularly informative. There are fifty-three identified by name – most are ancients, and 
most of those Romans from the Republican era; practically all are warriors. Wood 
summarises: 
 
“I conclude, therefore, that Machiavelli's men of virtù are predominantly warriors 
who in circumstances of extreme danger, hardship, and chance. Success is not always 
proof of virtù, if one fails, he must do a glorious fashion as Leonidas did at 
Thermopylae, or Cato the Younger at Utica. Virtù is most typically exhibited by an 
individual who (1) a commonwealth and secures it, or inherits a commonwealth and 
secures it; (2) conspires to seize power and, having seized it, secures it; (3) preserves 
or extends a commonwealth by organizing an army and commanding it, or by 
commanding an army already organized”106 
 
 The connection of virtù with the creation of order as well as military action is 
intriguing – but above all, virtù is a manly concept linked to war, as Wood shows. He argues, 
convincingly, in my view, that the various nuances of virtù can be considered part of a 
broader dynamic, intimately linked with war and conflict more generally, with chance 
permeating everything: 
 
To Machiavelli war is the archetypal contest between virtù and fortuna, between all 
that is manly, and all that is changeable, unpredictable, and capricious, a struggle 
between masculine rational control and effeminate irrationality... In war the best laid 
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plans go astray. The cautiously and skilfully executed manoeuvre may meet with 
unexpected accident. Certain victory may suddenly become the possibility of disaster. 
As the tide of battle changes adversely, as the peril mounts, and as the sand of time 
runs out, at such unnerving moments, the virtù of the captain is on trial... Against 
overwhelming odds, the leader often must discard his carefully prepared battle plan, 
and rally his forces by a determined and audacious improvisation. How many times 
has victory been snatched from defeat by a great general, and how often has the moral 
victory and the glory gone to, even in defeat!”107 
 
 This linkage of war and chance is shared between Clausewitz and Machiavelli, along 
with a shared circumspection on likelihood of success – a common theme which may have 
something to do with both thinkers’ frustrations in their own lives: Machiavelli, exiled from 
Florence, and from any hope of resuming the career in politics with which he was obsessed; 
Clausewitz, similarly denied the field command he longed for, as a consequence of his 
controversial political writings and his principled resignation from the Prussian service in 
1812. Each was forced to sublimate their energies into their writings; in both cases, these 
evince an appreciation of the tragic aspect of human striving in the face of obstacles which 
will at times be insurmountable – a humility lacking in some more self-congratulatory works, 
penned by figures who achieved recognition and success merely within the span of their own 
lives. 
 
What is needed to thrive in an environment where chance and uncertainty are present 
to this extent? Clausewitz’s answer is the ‘genius’ of the commander. Clausewitz’s 
conception of ‘genius’ is very similar to Machiavelli’s ‘virtù’ – an emphasis on boldness, 
activity, resourcefulness and mental strength is common to both, and similarly, the key 
qualification of a commander of genius or virtù is ability to thrive in conditions of 
uncertainty, whilst being exposed to the storm of chance and contingency. There are two 
main qualities in Clausewitz’s conception of genius – one is that the commander should have 
the strength of will, steadiness of purpose and calm confidence necessary to take bold risks 
when required, and drive on coordinated action in the face of rapid, confusing and potentially 
demoralising changes in circumstances: “a distinguished commander without boldness is 
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unthinkable.”108 The second requirement that the commander has the intellectual ability to 
make sense of that same chaotic reality in a very short period of time. This can, in part, be 
inculcated through internalisation of those few principles of war which can be arrived at 
through theory,109 and also by experience of war; repeated exposure to novel dangers lessens 
their terrifying effect and “breeds that priceless quality, calm...”110 Even more important is 
some advice which Clausewitz gives regarding the understanding of terrain: this is especially 
important, he notes, as it is one of the few permanent factors in war.111 Clausewitz 
recommends, as we are only able to see so much of a battlefield at once (and, unlike other 
activities tied to the land, will be moving from place to place rather than keeping to one 
particular area), that the would-be commander acquaints himself well with the natural 
environment, as to develop an understanding of the regularities of terrain, “a sense of 
locality”. 112 A powerful talent for imagination is needed for this,113 as is also the case with a 
similar concept which applies not only to the battlefield but to the battle itself – the 
commander’s coup d’oeil, the ability to intuit at a glance the right course of action to take in 
an otherwise incomprehensible, violent and disordered setting.114 Clausewitz makes frequent 
reference to the impossibility of codifying genius, with the claim that it lies “outside of the 
rules”:115 
 
...it is simply not possible to construct a model for the art of war that can serve as a 
scaffolding on which the commander can rely for support at any time. Whenever he 
has to fall back on his innate talent, he will find himself outside the model and in 
conflict with it… talent and genius operate outside the rules, and theory conflicts with 
practice.116 
 
The commander has to incorporate a vast number of factors into his decision-making 
process, from tactical matters to strategic aims – and ultimately to the overall political and 
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historical context of the war. As a consequence, no two wars will be exactly alike, and 
prescriptive models will sooner or later be overtaken by the shifting flow of events. This is 
how Clausewitz conceives of the role of chance and uncertainty in war. 
 
Why is war uncertain? 
 
So far, we have seen that Clausewitz understands war as a particularly uncertain and 
changeable form of activity, not just in that it is exposed to chance events to a high degree, 
but also in that each of its manifestations throughout history are so varied and unique. 
Clausewitz appears to have arrived at this appreciation of chance’s place in war from a 
number of directions: firstly, from personal experience (as can be seen most clearly in his 
descriptions of danger in war) and from his reading of military history; and secondly, from 
reading Machiavelli. As I have mentioned, he does not delve deep into the theory of why war 
should be so chancy and uncertain, at least on a conscious level, and the unique chanciness 
and uncertainty of war is something which Clausewitz almost seems to take for granted. 
Given Clausewitz’s long experience and study of war, we should not be inclined to dismiss 
his judgement; however, we cannot fail to notice that none of the specific factors he gives to 
explain the prevalence of chance – unquantifiable variables, ‘friction’, danger, active 
opposition and the dynamics of interaction – substantiates his claim that war is the most 
uncertain form of human activity: none are the exclusive preserve of war, with the possible 
exception of danger and violence (though some sports are arguably exposed to these factors, 
not to mention the violent contests of duels, jousts and so on). More recent attempts to 
explain why it is that war is so uniquely uncertain have not adequately addressed this 
problem either: I take as an example Alan Beyerchen’s “Clausewitz, Nonlinearity and the 
Unpredictability of War”, probably the most technically sophisticated attempt to unravel 
Clausewitz’s claims that has so far been made. 
 
Beyerchen’s thesis is that Clausewitz’s message has been misunderstood and 
underappreciated over the years because he (unlike some of his readers and most other 
theorists) had an intuitive understanding of war as what we now call a ‘nonlinear’ 
phenomenon. Though mathematicians have been aware of the problems of nonlinearity since 
Poincaré, general appreciation of nonlinearity grew in the late twentieth century with the 
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application of computers to the area and the resultant popularisation of ‘chaos theory’, which 
describes systems where minute changes in inputs can lead to greatly divergent results. 
Nonlinearity is a concept, as we have seen, derived from mathematics and the physical 
sciences, which broadly refers to dynamic systems which do not proceed in a regular, 
predictable manner, ‘linearity’ describing those systems and processes which do (the most 
widely known example of a nonlinear process is the ‘butterfly effect’, where a tiny input into 
a weather system – the flapping of a butterfly’s wings – is theoretically sufficient to change 
the location of storms and hurricanes). Beyerchen describes the significance of the difference: 
 
"Linear" applies in mathematics to a system of equations whose variables can be 
plotted against each other as a straight line. For a system to be linear it must meet two 
simple conditions. The first is proportionality, indicating that changes in system 
output are proportional to changes in system input... The second condition... is that the 
whole is equal to the sum of its parts. This allows the problem to be broken up into 
smaller pieces that, once solved, can be added back together to obtain the solution to 
the original problem. 
 
Nonlinear systems are those that disobey proportionality or additivity. They may 
exhibit erratic behavior through disproportionately large or disproportionately small 
outputs, or they may involve "synergistic" interactions in which the whole is not equal 
to the sum of the parts. If the behavior of a system can appropriately be broken into 
parts that can be compartmentalized, it may be classified as linear, even if it is 
described by a complicated equation with many terms. If interactions are irreducible 
features of the system, however, it is nonlinear even if described by relatively simple 
equations.117 
 
 In short, linear problems are easy to extrapolate from; non-linear ones, involving 
many variables (such as trying to predict the weather), are much more difficult. Beyerchen 
points out that science and mathematics have been, until very recently, chiefly concerned 
with linear equations, and that this was mainly for the reason that the mathematical tools 
available before computerisation were not powerful enough to handle anything beyond this. 
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This did not stop scientists from trying to approximate linear solutions for nonlinear problems 
– a practice imitated by the Enlightenment-era military theorists who sought to apply 
geometric principles to warfare.118 
 
 On the face of it this is a promising approach, and brings to mind Chabod’s 
“mysterious, transcendent grouping of events, whose incoherence is unintelligible to human 
minds.”119 Beyerchen’s grounds for speculating that Clausewitz implicitly understood 
nonlinear principles and their relevance to war rests on his use of a particular metaphor, in his 
discussion of the ‘trinity’ of chance, passion and reason: "Our task therefore is to develop a 
theory that maintains a balance between these three tendencies, like an object suspended 
between three magnets."120 Beyerchen explains the significance of this image: 
 
Positioned over two equally powerful magnets, the pendulum swings toward first one, 
then the other, and still settles into a rest position as it is captured by one of the points 
of attraction. But when a pendulum is released over three equidistant and equally 
powerful magnets, it moves irresolutely to and fro as it darts among the competing 
points of attraction, sometimes kicking out high to acquire added momentum that 
allows it to keep gyrating in a startlingly long and intricate pattern. Eventually, the 
energy dissipates under the influence of friction in the suspension mountings and the 
air, bringing the pendulum's movement asymptotically to rest. The probability is 
vanishingly small that an attempt to repeat the process would produce exactly the 
same pattern. Even such a simple system is complex enough for the details of the 
trajectory of any actual "run" to be, effectively, irreproducible.121 
 
 Whether Clausewitz was using the metaphor in this way is (at best) moot. In the 
context of the chapter, Clausewitz is primarily using the three-magnet metaphor to argue that 
the conduct of war should not be dominated by any one of the three aspects of the trinity 
(this, rather than a self-conscious allusion to nonlinearity, is the reason for that particular 
number), but instead he believed that war ought to maintain an equal distance from each, a 
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necessarily static balance – after all, we know the ultimate fate of the experiment is that the 
pendulum will settle directly above one of the three magnets, not to be moved away by the 
others.122 Nevertheless, the experiment is a useful illustration of how little is needed to turn a 
linear relationship nonlinear: the source of unpredictable behaviour is, in this case, the mere 
presence of more than two magnets, and in war, there are a great many such variables to 
consider.  
 
Beyerchen considers three types of uncertainty in war: uncertainty from interaction, 
uncertainty from friction, and uncertainty from chance. Interaction occurs in two ways; 
firstly, war does not take the form of action on a passive body (as in the science of physics), 
but against an active opponent who seeks to resist our attacks and to deal damage on his own 
account.123 Secondly, our interactions with the enemy and the environment alter the dynamics 
of the contest; a successful cavalry charge might spark a small-scale rout which discourages 
other soldiers, whose own subsequent flight discourages still more troops and thereby builds 
momentum into a general rout – a case of “amplifying feedback”, typical of nonlinear 
phenomena.124 The second source of uncertainty is through Clausewitz’s concept of friction, 
which frustrates the efforts of the commander by dissipating his effort, and which effectively 
denies us the possibility of a perfect understanding of the initial conditions of a war; with so 
many potentially relevant factors, and so many possible interactions between them, definitive 
predictions are effectively impossible.125 The presence of these factors, and the impossibility 
of anticipating the developments which proceed from their interactions, is what brings about 
uncertainty from chance; this, and the relevance of the wider political and historical context 
of the war, is another reason why no two wars are quite alike; as Clausewitz noted, 
 
[Analysis] is bound to be easy if one restricts oneself to the most immediate aims and 
effects. This may be done quite arbitrarily if one isolates the matter from its setting 
and studies it only under those conditions. But in war, as in life generally, all parts of 
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the whole are interconnected and thus the effects produced, however small their 
cause, must influence all subsequent military operations and modify their final 
outcome to some degree, however slight.126 
 
The understanding of war as a nonlinear phenomenon is a useful one, and can help us 
to appreciate the limits of any attempt to theorise principles for its conduct along classical 
‘mathematical’ lines. But so far, just as we have not read of anything exclusive to war in 
Clausewitz’s sources of chance, there is nothing about nonlinearity which is exclusive to war 
either. War might very well be a nonlinear phenomenon, but the question is why this is so, 
and why it is (if Clausewitz’s claims are correct) more uncertain than other forms of 
interaction which also exhibit nonlinear characteristics. Beyerchen’s specifications for a 
nonlinear conflict are essentially twofold: the presence of dynamics of interaction; and 
multiple potentially relevant ‘variables’. Neither of these, alone or in combination, is 
exclusive to war – politics and commerce are similarly exposed to these influences: John 
Pocock after all characterised politics as “the art of dealing with the contingent event”127 – 
what Harold Macmillan is famously said to have feared above all else – and nonlinear 
dynamics can be seen in stock and commodities trading – the need to appreciate the 
importance of unpredictable, unimaginable ‘black swans’ is currently popular knowledge.128 
Even if it may prove to be the most nonlinear form of human endeavour, war clearly cannot 
be defined exclusively by its nonlinear nature. What separates war from ‘normal’ politics and 
commerce? Clearly, the most notable difference is use of violence. Is this the deciding factor? 
To an extent, it is – war cannot exist without the use of violence (or at least the threat of its 
use). The use of violence, involving danger, introduces mental stress and thereby uncertainty; 
but again, this is not enough to explain the outsize levels of chance we have been told about. 
Furthermore, the use of violence as the means of a contest is not unique to war: martial arts 
and boxing are not wars, though their players attempt to make their opponent submit through 
the use of physical harm. Even duels, jousts, knightly melees and gladiatorial combats – 
contests where death is far from unknown – do not quite meet the criteria of war. What 
distinguishes not only these sports, but politics, commerce, and every other competitive 
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activity from war? It is not Clausewitz’s references to the magnet experiment which are 
significant, but another of his turns of phrase which hint at an underlying understanding of 
the true nature of war, regarding the quality of “genius, which rises above all rules.”129  
 
In short, the one way in which war differs from all other forms of competition – 
martial arts, football, chess, jousts, elections, duels, court cases and so on – lies in the fact 
that these are ‘constitutional’ contests, interactions which are governed and structured by a 
framework of rules. All are processes for resolving (or enabling) conflict by means of an (at 
least partly) abstract mechanism, using symbolic interactions which have significance in the 
context of the constitutional framework of the contest (for instance, physical interactions are 
given significance not primarily because of their physical effects – as they are in war, where 
the destruction of the enemy force is the end in itself in this sense- but because of the ‘rules 
of the game’: kicking a ball past the opponent's’ goal line for example, is understood as 
having the symbolic significance of ‘scoring a goal’).130 I believe that this aspect of war – the 
fact that it does not have rules in this sense – explains its uniquely uncertain nature. 
Beyerchen himself comes close to identifying rules as a source of predictability and certainty 
– “many theorists tend, for the sake of analytical simplicity, to force war into the model 
sequence of move-countermove. But… war is not chess; one's opponent is not always playing 
by the same rules, and is often, in the effort to win, attempting to change what rules there 
are.”131 – however, he does not unpack the implications of his observation, which is that war 
has no rules (at least in the sense of the rules of chess), and that rules in other contests have 
served the function of mitigating many of the uniquely uncertain aspects of war. Rules can 
lessen different aspects and causes of chance: for example, a chance event such as an 
earthquake does not necessarily affect outcome of a chess game, even if one player’s king is 
knocked over by the tremor; in a similar way, constitutional political contests, games, and 
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litigation are all, to varying extents, insulated from exogenous contingent events. As we have 
seen from Clausewitz’s writings, in war nothing is ‘exogenous’. Rules provide information 
and even if they do not facilitate perfect prediction, they at least allow certain things to be 
taken for granted: no football team will have to worry whether their pitch has been mined (at 
the very least, their opponents would be disqualified); coupled with the tendency of rules to 
limit damage and physical harm (most combat sports drawing a line before maiming or 
death), the fear of danger is lessened if not entirely eliminated, reducing this aspect of 
uncertainty. Accordingly, hesitation is less tempting than in war (or, in the case of some turn-
based games, can be indulged without risk), and chance events associated with 
procrastination are thereby avoided.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The concept of war as a form of conflict which is not structured by rules therefore 
seems a promising explanation for much of what Clausewitz says about war – not just 
regarding chance, but its other unique aspects, like the drive to absolute war, its danger, the 
role of the creative ‘genius’ who operates in a chaotic environment, and so on. For 
Clausewitz, war was uniquely inimical to the kind of analysis which sought to identify 
comprehensive rules and laws which could be used to create a definitive guide to fighting and 
understanding it. Not only does war different from all other forms of human behaviour, but 
each war differs from the next in hugely significant ways – so much so that its more-than-
chameleon-like nature presents manifestations so different and varied that identifying a 
common factor between the wars of different ages is no simple task. Added to this is the 
inherent uncertainty and unpredictability of war, brought about by the influence of 
unquantifiable moral and physical factors, the inherently unpredictable actions of the 
opponent, and the escalatory dynamic of war. 
 
 Common to all wars is in fact the very thing which gives rise to this great variety of 
conflicts and its pervasive uncertainty – its lack of rules, which would otherwise structure and 
give regularity to the process of warfare. As Clausewitz notes in his treatment of absolute 
war, there is no restriction inherent to war itself which limits the scope of the violence and 
effort with which it is prosecuted – the only things that do restrain this, and which give each 
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war its unique character, are circumstantial factors like the political aim of the given war, the 
passions this aim gives rise to – and the influence of the physical world and its interplay of 
probabilities and chance circumstances. This unique exposure to chance and uncertainty, as 
we have seen, is itself explicable when seen through the prism of war as ruleless activity; 
neither Clausewitz’s own explanations, nor those of later writers like Beyerchen, fully 
explain this aspect of war – though each have much to recommend them in other ways. 
 
 In the rest of this thesis, I will apply this idea to other areas of war, and use it to 
explain how its idiosyncratic character and peculiar manifestations can ultimately be traced to 
a lack of rules. However, before we go on I must clarify exactly what I mean by ‘rules’ in 
greater depth. War, as we have seen, can indeed be hedged around with rules – even if only 
superficially – and there are a number of different types of regulation we must be made aware 
of before we proceed. However, once we are made familiar with the forms they take and the 
functions they serve, we will be better equipped to explore exactly how the absence of rules 
shapes – or does not shape – war. In the next chapter, I will explore in greater depth the 
nature, purpose and functions of rules, so as to enable us to appreciate exactly in what ways 
war differs from other forms of conflict, and how it is so unique a phenomenon as Clausewitz 
would claim.  
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A THEORY OF RULES AND THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RULE-BOUND 
CONFLICT 
 
If concepts can be defined with reference to what they are not, we might say that war 
is not-peace. But what is peace? Clearly, it is not a lack of conflict in itself – elections, 
business competition and social conflicts of many kinds can be pursued without ‘breaking the 
peace’ – but rather, a lack of violent conflict. But one can have violent conflict in peacetime, 
whether in a boxing match or in a knightly joust; there is another factor which must be at play 
in demarcating peace from war. As I have already posited, such ‘peaceful’ conflict is 
facilitated by mutual consent to a system of rules, whether explicit laws or more informal 
strictures. Often peace is synonymous with 'law and order', the mutually acknowledged and 
socially enforced rules which structure social interactions in a predictable and 'safe' fashion. I 
would not say that war is completely free of rules – or indeed that it is free of rules at any 
time. But I would argue that what makes war ‘war’ is its basically un-ordered condition – the 
conduct of war does not proceed in an orderly way.  
The chapter that follows will explain my ‘theory of rules’ in greater detail. Here I take 
a rather broad view of ‘rules’, drawing together disparate conceptions of regulation which 
would ordinarily be kept apart; for instance, I will be drawing from literature from both 
dedicated legal studies and sociology; this is because I believe we can understand all types of 
laws and rules to be members of the same family, structures and institutions which restrict 
behaviour. Both explicit law (for example, codified laws of the type made by states) and the 
interlinked concepts of implicit law and ‘practice’ (manifested by norms and other informal 
rules) order human behaviour – either individually, or more often as a collection of rules 
which constitute a certain form of behaviour. Some collections of rules are explicitly 
constitutive in that they structure conflict in the form of a symbolic interaction, as a game or 
constitutional process (one wherein certain actions have significance with reference to a 
system of rules). The way these rules are made manifest – the forms they take, the roles they 
play and effects they have, along with why and how they are followed, and from whence they 
originate – will be explained. In particular I will explore the link between material power and 
order, how bodies of rules are shaped by the distribution of material power within a society 
and how rules restrict the scope of material damage through enabling symbolic interaction. 
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Rules, particularly those which provide for abstract, symbolic contests, provide a number of 
benefits to those who obey them: a level of predictability can be taken for granted when 
engaging in a rule-bound contest, with certain eventualities able to be ruled out, including to 
some degree the effects of chance events; violence is typically restrained, and with it the 
prospect of material harm; and as mentioned, the interests of established powers can be met 
by reinforcing the status quo. Rules achieve this by regulating possible actions in a variety of 
dimensions – limiting action in space and time, imposing restrictions on the tools with which 
conflict can be prosecuted, and by providing an objective standard of arbitration for the 
resolution of the contest. War, which lacks rules (in the sense of a symbolic contest), lacks 
the benefits which rules provides: it is unpredictable, exposes those who engage in it to 
physical harm, and lacks a predetermined and mutually-acknowledged mechanism for 
deciding its outcome. That is not to say that war does not or cannot have rules applied to it – 
in the next chapter we will examine such a selection – but these are not ‘constitutive’ rules 
which transmute war into a symbolic interaction. 
  
“Order… A method according to which things act or events take place; the fixed 
arrangement found in the existing constitution of things; a natural, moral or spiritual 
system in which things proceed according to definite laws… The condition in which 
the laws or usages regulating the public relations of individuals to the community, and 
the public conduct of members or sections of the community to each other, are 
maintained and observed; the rule of law or constituted authority; absence of 
insurrection, riot, turbulence, unruliness, or crimes of violence.”132 
 
‘Order’, like ‘war’, is a word that has a number of distinct meanings and connotations; 
and like ‘war’, it has rarely been defined to a level of precision required to avoid 
misunderstanding in academic debate. As can be seen from the definitions given in the OED, 
‘order’ has at the least connotations of regularity and stability, of a pre-defined way of doing 
things. Scholars with an interest in the subject consider the defining feature of order its nature 
as a stable system – the more ‘ordered’ the order, the more stable a platform it provides for 
progress and the accumulation of material prosperity (Fukuyama); it is typically defined in 
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opposition to the use of violence – though as we shall see violence is not necessarily inimical 
to an ordered social system. I understand ‘order’, in the abstract, to mean a structured pattern 
of behaviour, in which human action is bound by a set of rules. Order in this sense can 
emerge ‘spontaneously’, but it is more often created and maintained by the imposition of 
laws and rules, regulations varied in origin and character but linked by a common mechanism 
of action – the restriction and regulation of behaviour.  
 
The two principal types I will describe here are explicit and implicit rules. By 
‘explicit’ rules I mean written laws, rules which have been explicitly codified. Perhaps the 
most immediately obvious form taken by explicit rules is ‘the law’.  The earliest explicit laws 
were developed in the early civilisations of the Middle East – the Babylonian ‘Code of 
Hammurabi’ being perhaps the earliest surviving example.133 Such laws took the form of 
written commands which either compelled or prohibited certain actions (thou shalt; thou 
shalt not); if these were broken, specific punishments were inflicted – the punishment “an eye 
for an eye” dates back to Hammurabi.134 These stipulations limited the extent to which a 
conflict could continue – an injury which might have provoked an extended feud was now 
answered with one proportional punishment. Ensuring social harmony has been the avowed 
purpose of many law codes; Hammurabi’s professed aim was “to bring about the rule of 
righteousness in the land, to destroy the wicked and the evil-doers; so that the strong should 
not harm the weak...”135 Nevertheless – as we shall see – explicit laws are also used to 
maintain the social status quo and serve entrenched interests. 
 
Explicit laws are not necessarily strong, nor do all such laws regulate activity in the 
same way. In an article for International Organisation, “The Concept of Legalization”, 
Abbott et al. provide criteria for this distinction: laws can be classified as ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ 
depending on the extent to which they meet the criteria of obligation, precision and 
delegation. Obligation refers to the level to which the law is binding – certain agreements 
which are explicit are in fact explicitly non-binding, being closer to norms than laws; others 
are more conventional in that they lay out binding obligations on those subject to laws. 
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Precision is the level of detail and specificity to which these obligations are set out; the 
wording of the obligation can range from a vaguely-defined principle to an exacting set of 
requirements. Delegation refers to the extent to which the enforcement of law is referred to 
lower-level organs of state, away from the realm of politics – Abbott et al. characterise the 
theoretical minimum of delegation (as regards international law) as “pure political 
bargaining” between national representatives, opposed to the delegation of legal decision-
making and the alteration of laws to independent third parties, who would carry out their 
duties in a less arbitrary fashion.136 Whether a law which is ‘hard’ is necessarily stronger than 
one which is ‘soft’ is not necessarily so; while these criteria are suitable for judging ‘explicit’ 
laws, implicit rules and norms can bind human behaviour very strongly indeed without need 
for precision. 
 
Examples of explicit law towards the hard end of the scale include contract law, 
which regulates commercial agreements and transactions: contract between two agents will 
commonly specify certain duties, to be fulfilled at an agreed time in a certain way, with 
penalties for breach of contract. However, a law may be explicit and still lack mechanisms 
for enforcement – the Hague and Geneva conventions are instances of explicit laws which 
seek to regulate the conduct of warfare as regards permissible weaponry and the treatment of 
prisoners, which do not provide for punishment of rule-breakers. This tendency was 
manifested to an even greater extent by the 1975 Helsinki Accords, an international 
agreement between the USA, the USSR and their respective allies which was relatively 
precise in wording, but explicitly non-binding in nature. Nevertheless, this agreement served 
a function in sharing information and conveying intentions, and was at least intended to 
influence the parties’ future decisions and actions. 
 
Explicit laws depend on their perceived legitimacy to be effective. This legitimacy is 
generally articulated with reference to external principles, and these are varied in nature 
according to the culture in which the law exists; in Western societies, one of the key 
distinctions has been that made between ‘positive’ and ‘natural’ law. From the approach of 
positive law, law is not merely enforced but is also given legitimacy by state authority, which 
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aims to bring about results consistent with some objective stet of criteria – Bentham’s 
utilitarianism, for example – in theory without being influenced by custom, tradition or 
precedent. The jurist John Austin’s (1797-1859) ‘command theory’ of law defines law as 
such a system of rules commanded by a sovereign legal authority, and Hobbes’ view of the 
role of the sovereign as the enforcer of a system of law which ensures peaceful social 
relations matches this description; Max Weber’s legal-rational authority is an equivalent 
source and guarantor of a rational, self-contained system of hard law. Positive law is unusual 
in this respect – legal codes typically derive their legitimacy from other sources; pre-existing 
forms of order are generally appealed to in this capacity, religion and tradition being common 
influences. The concept of ‘natural law’ has been a particularly important source of 
legislation, having a marked influence on international law from its beginnings under Grotius, 
de Vitoria and Gentili. However it is justified according to God-given principles, the creation 
of law is generally influenced by less edifying factors, with international law in particular 
bearing the imprint of politically motivated compromises – one of the the most obvious 
instances being the constitution of the United Nations, reflecting as it does the balance of 
power following the Second World War rather than the influence of an abstract legal ideal. 
One might paraphrase Clausewitz – “law is a continuation of political intercourse, with the 
addition of other means.”137 
 
Where ‘explicit’ rules are characterised by codification, the rules I categorise under 
the term ‘implicit’ rules are not. These are rules which are commonly understood and 
acknowledged on a level that is ‘felt’ rather than consciously thought, originating from a 
number of sources – custom, habit, cultural beliefs, instinctive notions of justice and 
appropriateness being examples. That these laws are implicit does not mean that they are 
weaker than those written up in statute: as we have seen with the concept of hard and soft 
laws, there are varying degrees to which laws bind the behaviour of their subjects, and 
unwritten laws are no exception to this – often they are more potent in their effects, not being 
weakened by the lack of an ‘artificial’ legal authority or its enforcement agencies but rather 
being strong enough not to require them. Perhaps the most typical examples of implicit law 
are norms. Norms have been the subject of much recent analysis in International Relations: 
Theo Farrell gives a good description in Norms of War: 
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“Norms are beliefs shared by a community about who they are, what the world is like, 
and given these two things, what they can and should do in given circumstances… 
Norms can comprise both identities and worldviews that collectively provide guides 
for action… A community’s understanding of the natural world will determine what 
they believe to be possible, just as its view of the social world will determine what the 
community believes to be proper.”138 
 
As is clear from Farrell’s definition, the concept of norms goes beyond explicit law’s 
conscious framework of regulation, and moves into ‘deeper’ cognitive territory – what is 
considered appropriate, relative to an internalised system of beliefs, or even what is believed 
to be within the bounds of physical possibility. Norms in this sense include expectations and 
‘practical’, pragmatic judgements of what will happen if a certain course of action is taken, as 
well as the moral sentiment regarding the ethical ‘rightness’ of a particular course of action. 
At the ‘deep end’ of this form of regulation, psychological mechanisms which drive and 
shape behaviour, internalised at a subconscious level, we get closer and closer to rules which 
have a force of their own, and do not rely on conscious artifice for their legitimacy or 
enforcement. The concept of practice is related to this sort of rule – strictly speaking, practice 
is a form of custom, an internalised system of rules as to what sort of social behaviour is 
appropriate at a given time. Practice Theory attempts to explain the interaction of agency and 
structure in social life by examining how the actions of social agents are shaped by wider 
social rules, and how the performance of action (i.e. practice) reinforces those rules. The 
concept is typically used to explain regularities in the actions carried out in a given society:139 
human behaviour, both individually and socially, is bound by rules of habit and precedent, 
and as we narrow our choice of actions by our unconscious adherence to the patterns of 
behaviour carried out by members of a society, the disposition to behave in these ways 
becomes ‘natural’ in the same way as the norms discussed above – and sometimes, even more 
unconsciously ingrained.140  
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This process is otherwise known as socialisation; the aggregate of the social rules and 
norms which are so internalised by a member of a society are known as habitus. Habitus 
bears great similarity to the concept of norms, in that habitus demarcates what is considered a 
‘normal’ and socially acceptable choice of actions. The habitus is typically acted on not in a 
consciously strategic or instrumental way, but, as with norms, according to a feeling of what 
is appropriate for a given situation. Such observations have been made for a long time – the 
idea of habitus as an ingrained disposition brought about by repeated behaviours is first 
mentioned by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics (in Greek, hexis);141 Aristotle’s focus was 
on virtue as a disposition brought about by behaviour, but the term came to be applied more 
widely in twentieth century sociology. Norbert Elias’ The Civilising Process introduced the 
term in the sense we take here; looking at the development of ideas of what it meant to be 
‘civilised’ from the middle ages onwards, Elias theorised that from the Middle Ages onward, 
a common habitus of attitudes to etiquette developed, especially regarding what sort of bodily 
functions were inappropriate in public. These developed as ‘delicate’ behaviour and bodily 
restraint became a mechanism by which nobles could differentiate themselves from their 
social inferiors, in in a time when European nobles moved from an independent military life 
to a one which took place at the court of increasingly powerful monarchs. As new generations 
(and as time went on, social classes) became socialised into the collective habitus, rules that 
once had to be explicitly stated fell out of the etiquette books, as they were internalised 
through repeated practice.142  
 
The author most associated with habitus, however, is the French sociologist Pierre 
Bourdieu, who expounded his theories in his Outline of a Theory of Practice. For Bourdieu, 
habitus is again a set of dispositions and internalised social rules, and (again similarly to 
Elias’ theories) is linked with questions of power. In Bourdieu’s analysis, habitus grows out 
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of the objective, material structures of society – these include purely practical aspects such as 
the rhythms of agricultural life and their accompanying tasks, based on physical changes (it is 
felt ‘appropriate’ to carry out certain tasks, such as planting crops or harvesting them, at 
certain times143), but it also includes areas like economic relations between social groups; 
reflecting these aspects, the habitus, which sets what are considered appropriate forms and 
standards of behaviour, is shaped by the underlying distribution of ‘hard power’ in a given 
society. Bourdieu is at pains to stress that adherence to the rules of the habitus is not 
deterministic – while there is a certain predictability to the encounter when two agents with 
the same habitus interact, there are a huge number of potential actions which could be chosen 
– as the term suggests, the habitus predisposes agents to certain mental habits.144  
 
How rules are followed 
 
Rules governing social order influence behaviour through a number of mechanisms. 
In the first instance, rules can be obeyed according to a rational cost-benefit calculation; 
following inconvenient rules may have its costs, but the threat of punishment – or the risk of 
destabilising an otherwise advantageous body of legislation – can encourage would-be 
rulebreakers to continue regulating their own behaviour. This is the approach taken by more 
positivist approaches to political science; other perspectives acknowledge that rules can be 
internalised and followed in more unconscious and non-instrumental fashions. 
 
James March and Johan Olson refer to these two approaches as the logic of 
consequences, and the logic of appropriateness, respectively.145 Acting according to a logic 
of consequences, actors base their actions on the basis of their preferences and their 
expectation of the likely consequences of action. Rules are to be obeyed if the cost of 
breaking them exceeds likely benefits, and ignored if vice-versa. A logic of appropriateness, 
however, is followed when the rules of a given order have been internalised and are felt rather 
than consciously thought. Here the actor might view a particular course of action with moral 
opprobrium, or consider it a poor choice of action on some vaguely conceived practical 
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grounds (while it is an instinctively felt unwillingness to try something that diverges from 
common practice being the real motive). This dichotomous approach corresponds with the 
distinction between the sociological concepts of gemeinschaft/gesellschaft, societies where 
conduct is influenced by either an affective or calculating logic respectively. 
 
The most extreme case of internalisation of rules is exemplified by the constructivist 
concept of the ‘constitution of reality’ – standards of behaviour, norms and so on become so 
ingrained and unquestioned that the order they form is ‘mistaken’ for reality, and possibilities 
for action outside of that system are dismissed as impossible, or otherwise neglected. As we 
might expect, this development can come about through repeated practice and mental habit, 
though there are other mechanisms whereby it can come about. Bourdieu speaks in similar 
terms when referring to doxa – a particularly strong habitus or worldview whose perfect 
convergence with reality is assumed. In Bourdieu’s view, this is a result of the order/doxa 
being closely based on the underlying material reality: “in a determinate social formation, the 
stabler the objective structures and the more fully they reproduce themselves in the agents’ 
dispositions, the greater the extent of the field of doxa, of that which is taken for granted”146 
(for instance, when legitimate power is held by those who hold material power).  
 
 Rules are rarely found on their own; more often, they function as part of a larger 
system of laws, norms, practices and so on. Various understandings of these bodies of rules 
and laws are found throughout various academic disciplines in a number of guises – 
Bourdieu’s notion of habitus is an example of such a rule-system which provides a context 
for social interaction; the same concept is known by the term ‘regime’ in international 
relations, or constitutive rules. I will refer to these rule-systems as ‘orders’. The most obvious 
variety of orders are explicit legal frameworks – the protocols governing the interaction of 
those who operate within bureaucratic or other corporate entities. Military establishments are 
especially good examples, being ordered by extensive disciplinary regulations which regulate 
a host of activities, and reinforce a clear hierarchy of command. ‘International regimes’ such 
as the Bretton Woods system are an example of another type of order on the international 
level – Stephen Krasner defined them in a special issue of International Organization as 
“implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which 
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actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations”147. One example of a 
particularly informal order was that of the Cold War détente between America and the Soviet 
Union, whose rules enabled the two superpowers to interact peacefully on a basis of mutual 
understanding.148 Though realist IR scholars might downplay the importance of normative 
standards at the international level, there exists a certain level of ‘order’ in the international 
sphere more generally, despite the ‘anarchy’ which prevails between sovereign states; the 
notion of an ‘international society’ especially presupposes at least some degree of shared 
values, assumptions and so on. Indeed, for any society to function, Kratochwil notes that 
there are a number of “fundamental” rules which are essential: “norms against lying… norms 
against the resort to violence… and norms against the breaking of promises”149 (essentially, 
rules which compel the actors to carry out their interactions in a manner consistent with the 
order).  
 
Rules are so pervasive in all walks of life that some – notably Kratochwil – claim that 
all meaningful behaviour is based on rule-following:  
 
“human action in general is “rule-governed”, which means that – with the exception 
of pure reflexes or unthinking conditional behaviour – it becomes understandable 
against the background of norms embodied in conventions and rules which give 
meaning to an action.”150 
 
L. L. Fuller makes a similar argument when he discusses the nature of customary law, 
which he describes as  
 
… a language of interaction. To interact meaningfully men require a social setting in 
which the moves of the participating players will fall generally within some 
predictable pattern. To engage in effective social behaviour men need the support of 
enmeshing interactions that will let them know what their opposite numbers will do, 
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or that will at least enable them to gauge the general scope of the repertory from 
which responses to their actions will be drawn.151  
 
 For a rule to have ‘meaning’ in this sense is to say that it has significance beyond its 
immediate physical effects; this is determined by the rules which constitute the activity. To 
take an everyday example, kicking a ball through goalposts has no meaning by itself, beyond 
its purely physical consequences; only when this action is performed as part of a game of 
football does it take on a wider significance. This conception of action being meaningful in 
relation to a system of rules is rather broad, and has been applied to very basic forms of 
interaction; for instance, Searle argues that “speaking a language is engaging in a (highly 
complex) rule-governed form of behaviour.”152 The Wittgensteinian concept of a ‘language 
game’ is essentially an order within which speech acts can be performed; for example, in his 
case of the “builder’s language,” individual words have a symbolic meaning with reference to 
a set of rules: 
 
The language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an 
assistant B. A is building with building-stones: there are blocks, pillars, slabs and 
beams. B has to pass the stones, in the order in which A needs them. For this purpose 
they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "slab", "beam". A calls 
them out; — B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such-and-such a call. 
Conceive this as a complete primitive language.153  
 
Here, communication depends on the two individuals’ mutual knowledge of a set of 
rules (stating ‘slab’ is an instruction for the assistant to pass one, etc.). The implication of this 
is that all forms of human interaction which operate on the basis of communication are rule-
bound to some degree; indeed, that communication is defined as symbolic interaction within 
the context of a set of rules. This is a rather broad understanding of rules, which as we have 
seen encompasses international and domestic political institutions, as well as economic 
transactions, bureaucratic procedures and even everyday conversations. At least on first 
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impressions, war might be another form of interaction which takes place in a framework of 
rules (vide Quincy Wright’s ‘legalistic’ definition of war mentioned in the introductory 
chapter), and as we will go on to see, war has had a number of rules and regulations attached 
to it throughout various periods in history; nevertheless, there is a clear distinction between 
the settling of disputes by war and through symbolic interaction. 
 
 Human social behaviour is therefore conducted within a context of rules which imbue 
actions with a wider significance. These systems of rules in a sense ‘constitute’ a certain type 
of interaction – for instance, the international legal order has the function of “defining the 
game of international relations”,154 and actions carried out within a certain habitus will have 
different implications and significance. Some thinkers of an especially constructivist bent 
have argued that all rules have this effect – Nicholas Onuf argues that as our understanding of 
what is possible and permissible ‘constructs’ our reality, there is no rule which merely 
regulates our behaviour without shaping our understanding of our world.155 I wish to step 
back from such a sweeping definition – which is not to say that I disagree with it as such. 
However, this understanding of rules is rather too broad, and though it might be the case that 
all rules are constitutive, there are undeniably some rules which are more constitutive than 
others. I refer here to John Searle’s application of constitutive (as opposed to regulative) 
rules, which intentionally and explicitly allow for new forms of interaction, for example 
sports and other such contests: 
 
Constitutive rules do not merely regulate, they create or define new forms of 
behaviour. The rules of football or chess, for example, do not merely regulate playing 
football or chess but as it were they create the very possibility of playing such games. 
The activities of playing football or chess are constituted by acting in accordance with 
(at least a large subset of) the appropriate rules. Regulative rules regulate a pre-
existing activity, an activity whose existence is logically independent of the rules. 
Constitutive rules constitute (and also regulate) an activity the existence of which is 
logically dependent on the rules.156 
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Whether or not Searle would agree that all rules have the effect of constituting certain 
activities, I wish to draw attention to the role of constitutive rules in establishing the 
framework of an abstract contest. The framework of rules which define what is possible in 
chess – the capabilities of the pieces, the turn-based format of the game, the criteria for 
victory, and so on – provide an ‘abstract space’, an artificial, conceptual environment in 
which the contest can be played out. These rules make it possible to do something novel – to 
win a game of chess (or a game of football, a court case, and so on) and be recognised as the 
victor by those who observe the same rule. Such rules are used to structure a wide variety of 
contests; democratic elections, legal trials, debates, boardroom votes, as well as games like 
chess – and even violent conflicts such as duels or jousts – are regulated and arbitrated by 
means of a set of constitutive rules. The crucial aspect of these rules as regards this study is 
that they enable the creation of a wholly or partially ‘abstract space’ in which conflict can be 
played out, and provide for a symbolic contest which is effectively a surrogate for physical 
competition (Kratochwil speaks in similar terms of the “bargaining zone” which legal 
procedures provide for conflict resolution).157 The absence of such a mechanism in war is 
(along with its use of violence) what defines it as an activity; here I will go into more detail 
as to the properties of abstract contests to provide a picture of what war is not. 
 
Mechanisms of abstract contests 
 
Perhaps the most crucial quality of abstract contests, even their definitive 
characteristic, is that they provide a set of criteria which allows for the arbitration of a 
contest’s result: a victory can be achieved either by reference to some objective standard, or 
is awarded by an arbitrator who interprets the rules as they apply to the contest at hand. 
Sports and games tend to the former; the number of points scored by the close of play 
typically decides the victor of a game of football, and a checkmate is easily identified with 
reference to the rules of chess and the placement of pieces on the board. More complex 
contests with more ambiguous outcomes due to a wider range of rules and potential 
outcomes, such as litigation, depend more heavily on the discretion of an arbitrator (a judge, 
or jury). The important thing to note is that the parties to the conflict agree to abide by the 
outcome as if it were ‘real’, despite it having been carried out by means of symbolic 
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interactions. This is rather academic in the case of some of the most explicitly ‘constitutional’ 
conflicts, like sports and games, where the prize is to be recognised as the ‘winner’ of the 
contest in question, but it has important consequences in the case of litigation, where a wider 
quarrel is settled by the outcome of a contest governed by constitutive rules. Determining 
‘victory’ is only one aspect of the rules of arbitration of an abstract contest – especially 
important is the notion of punishment of rule-breaking, particularly disqualification from the 
contest or the declaration that the result is invalid as a consequence of rule-breaking. In 
whatever case, the actors competing within the framework of rules are provided with a 
relatively explicit set of criteria which they can use to guide their actions; when preparing for 
the contest, they can take account of a number of ‘givens’ which form the basis of their 
strategy. 
 
As I mentioned earlier, all social rules operate by restricting the scope of legitimate 
action (whether by compelling or prohibiting certain actions). These restrictions are exercised 
over a number of dimensions; here I speculate as to a number of these (though there are 
undoubtedly more) which are imposed to an especially high degree in abstract contests. First, 
such contests impose temporal restrictions – which include rules set determining the duration 
of a contest (for example, the 90 minutes given for a football match) and the particular time at 
which the contest is to be held (Prime Minister’s questions are heard on Wednesdays at noon; 
trading in stocks is restricted to weekdays). The ‘tempo’ of a contest can also be determined 
by rules – for example, board games follow a turn-based system where each player performs 
their actions at the same rate as their opponent; legal trials also take this form, with 
prosecution and defence arguing their cases one after the other, each taking turns to examine 
and cross-examine witnesses, and so on.  
 
Similarly, spatial restrictions limit legitimate contests to a predetermined place or 
arena. In the most stylised cases, this can take the form of a chequered game board or a 
manicured football pitch. In legal and political contests, a courthouse or legislative chamber 
serves as the legitimate space. Even in less ordered proceedings there is a tendency for an 
‘appropriate’ space for action of a certain kind – for instance, in the Classical world the 
forum or agora were seen as the proper place to make business deals. In most of these cases 
the space is carefully ‘neutral’, ostensibly affording no advantage to either side; sport and 
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game spaces are extremely formalised examples, being laid out to standard dimensions – 
typically symmetrical, with each side occupying their corresponding half of the field (those 
which are not, such as cricket and baseball, switch ‘sides’ at some point half-way through the 
match). Such scrupulous attention to neutrality is reflected in the metaphor, ‘a level playing 
field’ – i.e. one that does not give advantage to either side.  
 
The last dimension – the technological – concerns the means by which the contest is 
prosecuted. The term ‘technology’ is here quite broad; I use it to mean any kind of tool or 
medium which is employed in the interaction. Physical contests are perhaps the ones most 
obviously bound by restrictions in this regard; sports paraphernalia (e.g. balls, bats, helmets 
and so on), and weapons (nothing but gloved fists in boxing – and no using them to hit below 
the belt) are all physical technologies which are hedged about with restrictions regarding their 
use (the number of players permitted in a contest is a related restriction). In more wholly 
abstract contests, the ‘technology’ used is symbolic: gaming pieces (chessmen, playing cards) 
have particular symbolic properties in the context of a game, their physical properties not 
being particularly significant. And as we have seen, speech acts can function as ‘moves’ in a 
language game – one could characterise court cases or parliamentary debates as highly 
sophisticated language games, where the use of language is restricted to certain forms of 
address and vocabulary, for instance the conventions of parliamentary language or legal 
jargon. Again, equality is a theme; particularly regarding physical equipment, each side is 
typically equipped to the same standard in a rule-bound contest, at least in principle. 
 
 
 
What is order for? 
  
What, then, is the purpose of such restrictions? The answer is that rules provide a 
number of benefits, both for all who engage in a given order, but in particular for privileged 
groups within it. The benefits of order which I wish to emphasise are the predictability it 
lends to social interaction; its use as a tool to reinforce and exercise power within a system; 
and its function of limiting the scope of conflict, specifically its tendency to curtail violence. 
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Predictability 
 
As we have seen, the social order (along with other forms of ordering) restricts action, 
both through the physical enforcement of laws and by shaping perceptions of what sort of 
action is desirable, effective or even possible. The restriction of action in this way has the 
counterintuitive effect of enabling other varieties of action. As Hobbes noted, in time of war 
where there is no order holding men together - 
 
“there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain, and consequently 
no culture of the earth, no navigation nor use of the commodities that may be 
imported by sea, no commodious building, no instruments of moving and removing 
such things as require much force, no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account 
of time, no arts, no letters, no society, and, which is worst of all, continual fear and 
danger of violent death, and the life of man solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and 
short.”158 
 
Order – or the stability and predictability that it provides – enables us to act with an 
eye to the future, and to take a long-term view of our affairs. Living within a mutually 
acknowledged social order enables us to engage in meaningful action with other members of 
that order – to convey our intentions and operate on the assumption of a trust that we will act 
according to the rules and standards of the order. The physical restrictions I have listed above 
function to facilitate this state of mind – in an ordered system, we can act in the realm of 
mental abstractions, which are more efficient than the Hobbesian free-for-all. Whether 
provided for by a common expectation of trust or underwritten by the power of a political and 
legal authority, order provides a degree of certainty and confidence in the future – an 
expectation of stability, and by extension, predictability. This is achieved by reducing the 
number of factors members of a society need to bear in mind whilst acting: certain things, 
such as standards of behaviour, can be taken for granted – the cognitive load is lessened, as 
rules effectively provide information. Kratochwil makes this argument repeatedly in Rules, 
Norms and Decisions: 
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“one of the most important functions of rules and norms... is the reduction of 
complexity of the choice-situations in which the actors find themselves. Rules and 
norms are therefore guidance devices which are designed to impart “rationality” to 
situations by delineating the factors that a decision-maker has to take into account.”159 
 
This is especially the case if the contest is especially tightly regulated, as in the games 
of poker and chess; in these cases the number of factors under consideration is so limited that 
it is possible to ‘predict’ the future course of the contest within a range of probabilities – 
though perhaps it is more useful to state that rules enable the contestants to predict what is 
not going to happen, rather than predict the future course of the contest. The psychological 
benefits of operating within an ordered system are considerable: these can extend beyond 
matters of mere practicality, and contribute to a sense of psychological security regarding the 
workings of the world and one’s place in it (a condition Anthony Giddens has termed 
‘ontological security’)160. In addition, abstract contests – not being bound to a moment in 
time and space per se – provide a sense of security in the sense that they are protected from 
chance and contingency; an earthquake will not unduly influence the verdict of an ongoing 
court case, nor a shower of rain the result of a tennis match – in these cases the final 
judgement will be postponed.161 
Power 
 
Rules have an intimate relationship with power; as Nicholas Onuf observes, 
“wherever rules have the effect of distributing resources unequally, the result is rule.”162 A 
concern for egalitarianism is a common theme in regulated contests – as we have seen, a 
great deal of effort is made in formulating rules to make sure that neither side has an in-built 
advantage over the other, formalised contests consequently tending to be ‘symmetrical’ in 
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161 Of course this does not apply in all rule-bound cases – force majeure clauses can release parties 
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space, equipment, turns allotted and so on. John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, sees a shared 
conception of egalitarian justice as a necessary foundation for social order more generally:  
 
“Among individuals with disparate aims and purposes a shared conception of justice 
establishes the bonds of civic friendship; the general desire for justice limits the 
pursuit of other ends. One may think of a public conception of justice as constituting 
the fundamental charter of a well-ordered human association.”163 
 
However, these superficial shows of egalitarianism in the rules of many (but not all) 
social orders mask the unequal distribution of resources and power through a given society, 
and hides the truth that those with material power remain in a privileged position when it 
comes to engaging in even ‘fair’ ordered contests. Critical theorists have long argued that the 
social order tends to privilege the interests of the powerful, by presenting hierarchies as 
natural parts of social life; though Gramsci’s concept of cultural hegemony is perhaps the 
most well-known treatment of this phenomenon,164 there is a wider discourse of ‘Critical 
Legal Studies’ on the subject as it applies to formal laws.165 In each case, material power (and 
in particular its distribution throughout a society) provides the foundations for the higher 
social order; as Bourdieu notes, it is the “material conditions of existence characteristic of a 
class condition” – e.g. the distribution of ‘hard power’ – which produce habitus.166 This is of 
course related to the Marxist conception of ‘base and superstructure’, where the ‘base’ – the 
means and relations of production – shapes the cultural, legal and ideological 
‘superstructure’.167 The mechanics of this practice are varied: in the first instance, material 
power is needed to create and enforce statutory rules – as those with power have a say in 
                                                     
163 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Harvard University Press 1971), 176  
164 Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell 
Smith (Eds. and Trans.) International Publishers (1971), 195-196, 246-247 
165 For an overview, see Robert Gordon, "Law and Ideology." Tikkun 3.1 (1988): 14-18, 83-86 
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167 From Karl Marx, preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (Moscow: 
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writing the laws, these often ‘lock in’ a powerful actor’s dominant position.168 The UN 
Security Council’s distribution of permanent seats is perhaps the clearest example of this, 
reflecting the interests of the victorious coalition of the Second World War, rather than the 
result of disinterested calculation. Magna Carta is another such case – being primarily a 
confirmation of the rights of the nobility vis-a-vis the King, forced on the monarch by that 
materially powerful class. In some societies, domination by a ruling class is explicitly 
reflected in law – caste-based or slave-owning societies being the most obvious – and in 
political ‘spaces’ behavioural norms and customs can be explicitly hierarchical: court 
ceremony, for instance, requires repeated, ritualised acknowledgement of one’s place in the 
political and social hierarchy (extreme examples being the Chinese kow-tow, or prostration 
before the Emperor in the Byzantine court). Polite forms of address and etiquette are a more 
quotidian variation on the theme, with each act reifying the social structure: this dynamic is 
incorporated even into the grammar of the Japanese and Korean languages, where specific 
tenses are used depending on one’s social position relative to the speaking partner.  
 
Knowledge of the rules is one area in which powerful elements of society have an 
advantage – when a large number of rules are involved, as there often are in cases of 
litigation, complexity increases and contests can be prohibitively expensive – unless one has 
had the benefit of a thorough education in law, or is wealthy enough to employ someone who 
has, then one is at a disadvantage in a court of law. A similar dynamic can be observed in 
other processes which are used to ‘fairly’ distribute resources in society, for instance, the 
ostensibly egalitarian Chinese imperial examinations: In principle, they were open to students 
of all classes of society and indeed raised several persons of low birth to high office; 
however, the odds were in favour of those who had spare time enough to digest classical 
Confucian texts (and not insignificantly, to undertake the extremely time-intensive process of 
learning the written language) – in practice, the children of established nobility. In a similar 
fashion, the ‘neutral’ space of legitimate contest may shape social order in ways that privilege 
the already-powerful. Geographic remoteness and expense associated with residence near to 
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the seat of power effectively excludes large swathes of society from the political process; the 
classic case is the court of Versailles, created specifically to escape the influence of the Paris 
mob (and one might note contemporary restrictions on protesting near the UK Houses of 
Parliament169). In short, lack of physical proximity to the space where politics is ‘done’ 
precludes involvement in politics.170 
 
So, we have an apparently contradictory mix of principles which underlie social 
order: apparent egalitarianism, and the reinforcement and continued reification of the social 
hierarchy. Such a combination ceases to be confusing when we realise that in order to 
maintain the existence of a settled order, the needs and interests of both the wealthy and the 
dispossessed need to be met simultaneously. Aside from any other benefits they provide, the 
egalitarian character of the rules which govern social interaction satisfy the dignity of the less 
well-off – or at least, they are made oblivious to the uneven distribution of opportunities in 
society. In addition, these members of society are afforded at least some way to prosecute 
their interests; in societies where there is no effort made to obscure the master-slave dynamic 
or provide a vent for popular political expression, the slave revolt or its equivalent are a 
frequent interruption to ‘normal’ political life. Similarly, a given social order will need to 
reflect the interests of those who possess material power; in this case if social order is too 
restrictive, the materially powerful have a more immediate ability to go outside of the order 
to settle the issue. In both cases, there is a significant element of reliance on material power 
in the maintenance of order – this is not the only foundation of order by any means, but it is 
clearly significant. The role of power is most obvious in imposed orders, where an authority 
propagates and enforces law, typically by means of the state apparatus. 
 
Violence 
 
One of the most central features of order is the restriction it imposes on a certain type 
of behaviour – violence. The use of violence is considered ‘out of order’ in most social 
                                                     
169 Liberty, “Protest around Parliament” https://www.liberty-human-rights.org.uk/human-rights/free-
speech-and-protest/protest/protest-around-parliament <accessed 21/01/16> 
170 The opposite also applies – several offices of state in different cultures derive their titles from 
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beside [the emperor's chamber]"  
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situations, and restricting the scope for physical harm in general is a common theme in most 
orders – with most thinkers drawing a distinction between physical conflict and ordered 
behaviour. In Rules, Norms and Decisions Kratochwil frequently refers to rule-bound 
behaviour as the alternative to violence; adhering to a rule-system is defined as “the process 
by which people can adjust their differences without resorting immediately to violence”171 – a 
sentiment seemingly shared by Hugo Grotius: "The reason… why laws were invented, was to 
prevent any one from using personal violence, for wherein would peace differ from all the 
confusion of war if private disputes were terminated by force?"172 However, the relationship 
between violence and order is more convoluted than this tendency would suggest. In fact, in 
the form of statutory laws order ultimately rests on the legal authority’s ability to use 
violence and physical force to compel obedience – to incarcerate lawbreakers, or to 
administer corporal and capital punishment. The threat of physical harm is similarly implicit 
in the communal enforcement of customary law – ostracism from society will effectively 
expose the outcast to a great deal of potential harm. More peripherally, violence is not 
automatically denied as a means of settling disputes or contesting prizes – it occasionally 
features in sports, though strictly regulated: in a boxing match, one cannot hit below the belt 
or gouge the eyes; in past times violence was more often utilised, though similarly regulated 
– in a duel, joust, or knightly melee, the deadly contest is fought according to mutually 
acknowledged rules delineating certain spatial, temporal, and technological restrictions.173 As 
mentioned earlier, by restricting the means available and providing an objective standard for 
arbitration (and compelling acceptance of the outcome), constitutive rules limit the scope of 
the conflict and act to prevent its escalation. 
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In order to limit the scope of conflict and yet allow some degree of coercion, some 
rule-systems provide substitute means of inflicting damage which are not overtly oppressive 
or coercive. Bourdieu has a particularly developed understanding of this function of order: 
conflict, when enacted within the bounds of the habitus, is carried out with what Bourdieu 
calls ‘symbolic violence’. This is a controlled infliction of physical harm from one actor onto 
another, by means of an ostensibly unobjectionable act. Examples include the anthropological 
favourite, the potlach, whereby status is contested by means of lavish feasts and great 
bonfires of possessions which may financially ruin the contestants; richer chiefs would be 
able to humilate rivals by outspending them. Another is the ‘white elephant’ purportedly 
given as a gift to those who displeased the King of Siam – the elephant in question being 
symbolically valuable, but in material terms a liability, requiring a huge outlay in feed and 
unable to be put to work. In our own culture, the sacking of a public figure is more often 
transmuted into a face-saving ‘resignation’ or assignment to another position. Bourdieu notes 
that by means of such symbolic violence, damage could be inflicted without ending the 
relationship in question, which might be of use in the future. It is, as he calls it, “gentle 
violence.”174 The reason for such mealy-mouthed behaviour “is that the only way in which 
relations of domination can be set up, maintained, or restored, is through strategies which, 
being expressly oriented towards the establishment of relations of personal dependence, must 
be disguised and transfigured lest they destroy themselves by revealing their true nature; in a 
word, they must be euphemized.”175 Aside from providing ways of inflicting harm more 
‘efficiently’ than mere violence, such euphemised activity has other uses. The inherently 
selfish nature of transactions between individuals, especially if there exists an unequal 
‘master-slave’ power dynamic between them, is a potentially uncomfortable element in social 
relations: transmuting such self-interested activity into something else (i.e. behaving as if an 
economic transaction is a mutual gift-giving) provides a basis for a ‘friendly’ future 
relationship and saves face for all concerned.176 In the economic sphere, this can take the 
form of something as simple as polite conversation before business is mentioned (as is 
customary in Arab culture, much to the exasperation of capitalist-minded westerners who 
want to ‘get down to business’ as soon as possible). Bourdieu mentions the Kayble custom of 
a communal meal shared with the builder at the end of a building project, and one case where 
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a tradesman, trained in France, scandalised a community by asking for the monetary 
equivalent of the meal instead of participating.177 Such efforts seem to be a way of avoiding 
the mutual objectification which goes with a purely material interaction. If this argument has 
merit with economic transactions, I believe it is plausible to view customs and rules of war 
(the code of chivalry and so on) at least in part as an attempt to avoid the discomfort 
associated with the objectification which goes with treating another human as a material 
object.178 
 
 To summarise the main points of the chapter so far: many forms of human behaviour 
are bound by rules, restrictions on action – and in some cases, thought. These can be explicit, 
codified regulations; implicit, customary norms; or practices – accumulations of habitual 
action. Much of the time, human behaviour is governed by a number of rules at once – 
particularly in social situations, where behaviour is given meaning with reference to the 
habitus, the system of rules in which it is performed; this is especially the case when 
communication is involved. In this sense, rules ‘constitute’ various forms of activity – acting 
in accordance with the rules of language constitutes speech; acting in accordance with a 
political constitution (naturally) constitutes politics. One particular area in which rules 
constitute a new form of activity is in the realm of abstract contests. Here, a prize is contested 
or a dispute resolved through a rule-bound process, wherein contestants interact according to 
a set procedure, by means of symbolic actions; the contest is decided by the outcome of that 
process in line with a set of rules of arbitration, with the result taken as definitive by all 
involved. 
 
The rules which bind these contests can prohibit particular actions (e.g. footballers 
cannot use their hands to touch the ball), or compel them (only golf clubs may be used to play 
golf). They can take the form of explicit, codified rules, or implicit, customary ones. Such 
rules can be followed either in an instrumental, calculating way (according to a logic of 
consequences), or they can be followed due to affective motivations – a feeling of what is 
right or wrong in a certain situation (a logic of appropriateness). Rules can be enforced in a 
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number of ways; an authority or hegemon can underwrite the rule-system and punish those 
who break it, or the parties to the rules can enforce them with reciprocity – either through 
gaining mutual benefit or by tit-for-tat reprisals against rulebreakers. As regards the 
adjudication of a contest, this can be made in a number of ways; either the rules themselves 
are so specific that the outcome is easy to determine (as in a game of chess); otherwise, a 
judge, umpire, jury or some other adjudicator interprets the result and declares the winner (for 
example, determining a victory on points in a boxing match). 
 
 Adherence to a rules brings with it a number of benefits: communication, cooperation 
and other forms of productive activity are enabled; actors are provided with some degree of 
information, their choice of action being limited to a relatively small range of behaviour; 
furthermore, physical harm is minimised and the scope of the argument – its tendency to 
escalate – is curtailed. Rules also serve other purposes, particularly with regard to the 
exercise of power: those who had a share in the making of the rules (generally those with 
material power) tend to be privileged by them. Restrictions on action are not in the interests 
of any particular group – many might even resent such restrictions – but it is generally in the 
interests of all of society’s members that all others are restrained in their ability to prosecute 
their interests. Actors can follow an order in two main ways – either as an emotionally 
uninterested, ‘instrumental’ process of cost/benefit calculation, or as a result of having 
internalised a system of rules which are followed according to a sense of what is an 
‘appropriate’ course of action for a given situation; when specially strongly internalised, the 
rule-system can ‘constitute’ reality. 
 
Not only am I arguing that that war is defined in part by the fact that it is a form of 
conflict which lacks the character of an ‘abstract contest’ – I also wish to determine whether 
it is more weakly bound by other rules as well. If  we are to judge that war is less strongly 
bound by rules than other forms of conflict, a set of criteria which can be used to judge the 
strength of a given rule are needed. What makes for a strong rule has been discussed 
elsewhere, particularly with regard to international orders. Not all laws are equal in effect; as 
mentioned earlier, explicit laws can vary in their ‘hardness’ in respect to how rigidly and 
comprehensively they regulate behaviour in the dimensions of obligation, delegation and 
precision; and while these criteria are suitable for judging ‘explicit’ laws, implicit rules and 
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norms can bind human behaviour very strongly indeed without need for precision. A 
constructivist approach to implicit rules would categorise as ‘strong’ those rules which have 
been internalised to the point where they ‘constitute’ reality for those who operate within the 
order – that is to say, they are unable to conceive of actions beyond the conventional 
(Bourdieu’s concept of doxa is analogous to this.)  
 
The laws of war are also a subset of international law, which is an area which 
presents particular challenges regarding the effectiveness of rules. There are those in the 
discipline of International Relations – mainly of the ‘realist’ persuasion – who are largely 
dismissive of the possibility of international law effectively regulating the behaviour of state 
in any meaningful way; Eric Posner and Jack Goldsmith are among the most critical of the 
notion of international law having any force beyond its use as a tool of state power,179 and 
even those who are more open to the possibility of international law having some force of its 
own, such as Lang, Rengger and Walker, admit that there are particular challenges which the 
international environment poses: there are three aspects to rules which present “special 
problems at the global level: legitimacy, enforcement and technological change.”180 Unless 
they are being enforced from above, or have some obvious benefit to them, rules are followed 
because they are considered legitimate. The legitimacy of rules – the recognition of their 
being – has been posited to come from a number of sources. There are some like Thomas 
Franck who believe that the legitimacy of rules (in this case, those which operate at the level 
of international anarchy) result more from the ways in which they have been made rather than 
their content181 – “when rules are clear, grounded in accepted patterns, coherent and adhered 
to, they have the sort of legitimacy that makes them workable.”182 Others, such as Allen 
Buchanan, maintain that for a rule to be legitimate, the content of the rules must be 
considered just.183 Whatever case holds, a rule which is considered illegitimate is not likely to 
be one that is obeyed in the absence of compulsion. This last point is problematic at the level 
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of sovereign states, where there is no higher authority to enforce the rules as there exists at 
the domestic level. Therefore, argue the three, at the level of international anarchy the impact 
of rules is largely dependent on the agents subject to them and their interpretation of the 
rules184 – hardly a guarantee they will be obeyed in a consistent manner. Finally, 
technological change is a particular problem with international law, especially of the explicit 
type; as the material and physical environment changes, laws must adapt to ‘keep up’ with 
the change. Lang et al focus on the aspect of environmental protection, which requires a great 
deal of cooperation over very large areas – but as we shall see, war’s exposure to vast and 
rapid technological changes are a particular source of problems when it comes to enforcing 
rules on its conduct. 
 
Ultimately, a rule (or a rule-system) is strong when it consistently restricts and 
regulates human behaviour; the type of rules which are necessary for the prosecution of 
conflict in an abstract space, through symbolic rather than material means, have to be 
strongly binding of human behaviour. Other ‘regulative’ rules can be considered particularly 
strong if they regulate behaviour extensively – a rule compelling certain actions (for example, 
‘chess must be played on a 8x8 chequered board’) regulates behaviour in a more all-
encompassing way than one which merely forbids them (‘trading cannot take place on a 
Sunday’). Other cases are more ambiguous: if a rule is implicit and obeyed according to a 
‘logic of appropriateness’, it might be stronger than an explicit rule (which are generally 
written to prohibit pre-existing behaviours) followed in a conscious, instrumental fashion and 
without any internal motivation; on the other hand, rules which are enforced by an authority 
or by society at large are likely to have more force behind them than ones which are agreed 
between parties to a conflict with no other guarantee than their cooperation. Perhaps the 
easiest way to identify a strong rule is by the extent of the benefits it provides: the more 
effective the rule, the more we can expect it to provide an increased sense of predictability (or 
at least regularity) with regards to social action; rules enable actors to take certain things for 
granted by restricting the number of relevant inputs and variables they need to consider – as 
Kratochwil says, they reduce the “complexity of the choice-situation in which the actors find 
themselves.”185 Effective rules will also restrict the scope of physical harm; this can be 
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achieved by limiting the scope of the conflict, preventing escalation to more and more 
destructive stages, or by prohibiting the use of violence (or permitting it only under tightly 
regulated circumstances). Perhaps more controversially, strong rules will serve to maintain 
the social and political status quo. My thesis is that war lacks ‘constitutive’ rules which 
would otherwise give it the character of a symbolic contest, and accordingly those who 
engage in war lack the benefits which these rules would provide (as well as being freed from 
the restrictions which they would impose): there is no clear, predetermined process to victory, 
and war’s course is doubly uncertain in that chance events can affect the outcome of the 
contest, and that it is ‘uninsulated’ from a myriad of potential influences from the physical 
world. Lastly, war exposes its participants to higher levels of physical harm than would be 
the case under rules. War does not necessarily lack any rules, but these are not inherent to it, 
being self-imposed and unique in each case, rather than applying to all wars at all times; 
furthermore, the prospects for strongly binding and comprehensive laws in war are not 
particularly promising.  
 
Nevertheless, ‘laws of war’ do exist, spanning the whole range of explicit and implicit 
rules as we have examined them here; these are the focus of my next chapter. When 
considering the regulation of war, I will pay particular attention to rules which appear to 
create an abstract framework for the conduct of warfare, though I will also examine other 
forms of law in war and remark on their character – whether they are explicit or implicit; how 
wide-ranging their restrictions on action; how they are enforced; what functions they serve, 
and what benefits they provide – and particularly how they are shaped by and serve specific 
material interests. After clarifying how the existence of such rules does not invalidate my 
thesis, I will be able to move on to applying my theory of war to the practice of warfare. 
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THE RULES OF RULELESS CONFLICT – THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF WAR 
 
 Now that I have defined what I understand ‘rules’ to be, and how they shape and 
structure human activities, it becomes necessary to address what must be an obvious 
challenge to my thesis – the undeniable existence of laws, rules and customs which govern 
war. In the following chapter I will seek to demonstrate that I will analyse the laws of war in 
three periods – in Ancient Greece, the Middle Ages, and the modern era (following the birth 
of the modern laws of war, as made by the Hague and Geneva conventions). Each area serves 
to illustrate the properties of rules as I have outlined them in the last chapter, and indicates 
the strength (or lack thereof) of the rules which bind warfare; moreover, I have other reasons 
for looking at these areas in particular: the first two cases, of ancient Greek and Medieval 
laws of war, I have chosen because of their apparent attempts to render war into exactly the 
type of abstract contest which I claim it is not; the modern laws of war, which attempted to 
ameliorate war’s more terrible characteristics in an age where it nonetheless approached 
levels of barbarity previously unthought of, I have chosen to examine in order to demonstrate 
the difficulties which technological change in particular poses to the regulation of warfare 
and the inherent impossibility of controlling a fundamentally ‘open’ activity. I will also 
examine less formal rules which govern the behaviour of participants in war, particularly the 
concept of ‘strategic culture’. I wish to examine the strength and the nature of these various 
laws of war according to the criteria I have laid out previously: whether the laws prohibit a 
few behaviours, or compel many; whether they are obeyed through a logic of consequences 
or appropriateness; whether they are explicit or implicit; in what manner (if any) they are 
enforced; and, crucially, whether they act as constitutive rules which structure the contest as 
an abstract interaction. I believe that they do not, despite occasionally strong appearances of 
doing so. The lack of constitutive rules does not preclude the possibility of imposing other 
restrictions on the conduct of war – some of which are common to most wars, due to interests 
shared by humans in all times and places. Indeed, it could be argued that the uniquely 
stressful nature of otherwise-ruleless war provides a stimulus for the development of rules 
and customs which channel its destructive energies in a controlled and psychologically 
acceptable fashion. Nevertheless, war remains an unpromising environment for attempts at 
lasting and extensive regulation, for reasons which will become clear. 
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The Greek Laws of War 
 
You know as well as we do that right, as the world goes, is only in question between 
equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they 
must.186 
 
Ancient Greece is our first area of study of the laws of war, and from Thucydides’ 
observation above, one might suspect it to be an unpromising one. Indeed, there is some 
debate over the nature and extent of the laws of war in classical times, and on how firmly 
they governed Greek military behaviour. It is generally accepted that the rules of Greek 
warfare rested on twin foundations – shared Greek culture, and the material interests of the 
hoplite class, who favoured a particularly stylised form of battle and a common campaigning 
pattern, which had some semblance of a constitutional process. After looking at the historical 
debate over the Greek laws of war and in particular the institution of the hoplite phalanx 
battle, we can come to an assessment of the nature of the laws of war as they existed in 
classical Greece: these were generally weak; not especially binding, or enforced by a higher 
authority; founded on a shared culture and certain material interests; and despite some signs 
of aspiration to a ‘constitutional’ character, they were only ever regulative in nature. Despite 
the widespread conventions of Greek warfare, when there existed the means to fight in a 
different way, Greek states would; with the emergence of new forms of warfare in the 
Peloponnesian War and afterwards, the Greek laws of war began to decline in effectiveness 
and become obsolete entirely. 
  
 Josiah Ober’s chapter on the Greek laws of war contains a list of rules which he 
considers “to sum up the most important of the unwritten conventions governing interstate 
conflict.”187 It has been subject to some discussion, being a central part of the debate over the 
Greek laws of law – and as such is worth repeating in full: 
 
                                                     
186 Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War, Richard Crawley (trans.) (London: J. M. Dent, 1910), 5.89 
187 Josiah Ober, "Classical Greek Times" in Howard, Andreopoulos and Shulman (eds.), The Laws of 
War: Constraints on Warfare in the Western World, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), p.13 
88 
 
1. The state of war should be officially declared before commencing hostilities 
against an appropriate foe; sworn treaties and alliances should be regarded 
as binding. 
2. Hostilities are sometimes inappropriate: sacred truces, especially those 
declared for the celebration of the Olympic games, should be observed.  
3. Hostilities against certain persons and in certain places are inappropriate: the 
inviolability of sacred places and persons under protection of the gods, 
especially heralds and suppliants, should be respected. 
4. Erecting a battlefield trophy indicates victory; such trophies should be 
respected. 
5. After a battle, it is right to return enemy dead when asked; to request the 
return of one’s dead is tantamount to admitting defeat. 
6. A battle is properly prefaced by a ritual challenge and acceptance of the 
challenge. 
7. Prisoners of war should be offered for ransom rather than being summarily 
executed or mutilated. 
8. Punishment of surrendered opponents should be restrained. 
9. War is an affair of warriors, thus noncombatants should not be primary 
targets of attack. 
10. Battles should be fought during the usual (summer) campaigning season.  
11. Use of nonhoplite arms should be limited.  
12. Pursuit of defeated and retreating opponents should be limited in duration.188 
 
 As mentioned, there is some disagreement over Ober’s list. Adrian Lanni takes 
objection to the inclusion of ‘humanitarian’ rules such as the sparing of noncombatants and 
restraint in pursuing those fleeing battles. The Greek laws of war, such as they were, were not 
so much focused on humanitarian concerns but rather on matters of religion – and Greek 
religion was not so concerned with ethical standards, but rather it concerned places, objects of 
worship and observances.189 Going through Ober’s list, Peter Krentz similarly takes issue 
with the non-religious ones. Wars were not formally declared in Greece as they were in 
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Rome, though there would be a pattern of the aggrieved side seeking reparations before 
finally resorting to conflict.190 Noncombatants were not immune from fighting from any 
ethical considerations, but rather because in time of war they fled to walled cities or to the 
mountains – when cities were successfully invaded their fate was generally that of slavery or 
death.191 Summer campaigns were similarly fought out of military necessity – smallholding 
hoplites needed to return home to gather the harvest, though wealthier states could pay their 
soldiers and conduct year-round fighting, as was seen in the Peloponnesian war (which led to 
an increased incidence of sieges being able to be carried on to a successful conclusion, which 
Lanni believes partly explains the decline of the Greek laws of war in the Peloponnesian 
War).192 Pursuit of defeated enemies was similarly not prohibited as such – the risk of 
exposing soldiers to a counterattack when out of formation was reason enough not to do so, 
but there were occasions when efforts were made to kill routed enemies, such as an incident 
in the Peloponnesian war where the Athenians caught fleeing Corinthian soldiers trapped in a 
field surrounded by a ditch, stoning them to death.193 Ransoming soldiers rather than killing 
them was equally decided on the merits of the particular case and was not a norm as such, but 
there is plenty of other evidence to suggest that prisoners were killed on occasion.194 
 
One of the first things which can be noted about these rules is their shared religious 
aspect, a point agreed by both ‘schools’ of the Greek laws of war. Temples and sanctuaries 
were inviolate and when suspicion fell, the accused state was often quick to clarify and 
defend its actions – when Athens occupied Delium in their fight against the Boethians, they 
made a point of being scrupulously careful regarding their treatment of the temple – but had 
to excuse their use of the sacred water as military necessity.195 Priests and other religious 
functionaries were similarly considered off-limits, and war was meant to be avoided when 
religious festivals were in progress (this rule was occasionally broken, most famously by 
Leonidas, who marched to Thermopylae during the festival of the Carneia). Ambassadors and 
heralds too were respected, not only because of their usefulness but also because heralds were 
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considered the messengers of gods as well as men.196 The return of bodies after a battle was 
another rule with a religious basis – funeral rites would be impossible otherwise – and seems 
to have been one which was followed particularly assiduously.197 One explicit law based on 
broadly religious principles was that sworn by the members of the Amphictyonic Council 
(comprising the majority of Greek city-states), formed to protect the oracle’s sanctuary at 
Delphi: according to the oath, members were “not to lay waste to any city belonging to the 
Amphictyonic Council, nor keep it from using any spring, neither in war, nor in peace; but if 
anyone violate these oaths, to take the field against him and lay waste to his cities...” It was 
not generally effective.198 
 
The strength of the Greek laws of war is certainly up for debate. Concerning whether 
the rules were explicit or implicit, Ober is careful to note that none of the rules he mentions 
could be considered formal – he describes them as ranging from “what might be called 
neoformal rules to practices conditioned largely by practicality.”199 Indeed, there is a general 
agreement that the Greek laws of war were customary in nature (i.e. they were implicit rules); 
Lanni notes that the Greeks used the same term for written and unwritten laws – nomos – but 
suspects that the latter may have been more effective, having the weight of history and 
accumulated practice behind them.200 Though the revisionists focus more narrowly on shared 
religious customs, the laws were also effective because of their being enmeshed in common 
Greek cultural values. In terms of the scope of their restriction of behaviour, the Greek laws 
of war were not enormously restrictive in terms of time or space – only certain times and 
places are inappropriate, but there is no ‘set’ location for the battle beyond ground which 
favoured both sides (which, as their armies were similarly constituted, was easily ‘agreed’ 
upon.) 
 
There is also the factor of enforcement to consider, which as in many cases of the 
regulation of war was quite weak. The laws of war, as they were customary in nature, were 
not enforced as such, but retaliation was a potential source of compulsion – after the 
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Athenians ‘desecrated’ the temple at Delium, the Boeotians denied the burial of their dead 
following a later battle.201 The retaliatory principle is in evidence in an excerpt from 
Thucydides: 
 
In 431 B.C.E. a group of Thebans attacked Plataea. In doing so, they contravened a 
peace treaty and violated the prohibition against attacking a state during a religious 
festival. The Plataeans defeated the invaders and took over one hundred prisoners, 
whom they later killed. A few years later, the Thebans and their Spartan allies attacked 
Plataea. After a long siege, the Plataeans surrendered on terms brought by a herald: “if 
they were willing, voluntarily, to turn their city over to the Spartans and accept them as 
judges, they would punish only the guilty, but no one contrary to justice.” At the trial 
before the Spartan judges, the Plataeans argue that their assassination of the Theban 
prisoners was justified as a reprisal: “The Thebans have committed many other crimes 
against us, and you yourselves know of their latest crime, the reason we are now put to 
this ordeal. You see, we took action against them when they attacked our city during a 
truce, and, besides that, during a holy month. We did so properly, in accordance with a 
universal law that makes self-defense against an aggressor a divinely-sanctioned act; 
and now, it would not be seemly if we suffer because of the Thebans.202 
 
Though the Spartans took on the duty of judges of Theban misconduct in this case, the 
Greek laws of war essentially lacked a higher authority to enforce them, depending on mutual 
enforcement of the rules via the mechanism of tit-for-tat reprisals, though as we see from the 
Theban argument above, this action could involve breaking the rules themselves. Otherwise 
the rules of war were based on a common cultural understanding: “these states shared a 
common language, worshipped the same gods, relied on the same Homeric epics as a guide to 
moral values, and shared cultural traditions at periodic panhellenic festivals”203 – Lanni 
argues that within this shared cultural context, considerations of honour and status provided a 
kind of substitute enforcement mechanism.204 As a consequence, the Greek rules of war only 
applied to inter-Greek warfare; in wars with the Persians, heralds were executed and at the 
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battles of Marathon and Plataea fleeing or otherwise beaten Persian soldiers were slaughtered 
without mercy.205 The belief that wars between Greeks should not approach the severity of 
wars against barbarians can be found in Plato’s Republic, but the way the statement is made 
belies the fact of the matter:  
 
"Therefore, as Greeks, they won't ravage Greece or burn houses, nor will they agree 
that in any city all are their enemies—men, women, and children—but that there are 
always a few enemies who are to blame for the differences... "I for one," he said, 
"agree that our citizens must behave this way toward their opponents [i.e. other 
Greeks]; and toward the barbarians they must behave as the Greeks do now toward 
one another."206 
 
In Plato’s day, we may suppose, the laws of war were not observed perfectly. That the 
laws of war are have something of an aspirational quality is reflected in other mentions of 
them in historical texts – Krentz notes that Polybius’ claims that the ancient Greeks fought 
‘battles by agreement’ and shunned the use of ranged weapons is not substantiated in texts 
from the period he describes.207 This distance between theory and reality is a factor which is 
often found in other laws of war, as we shall see. 
 
Earlier, I mentioned that the ancient Greek rules of war seemed to serve as 
constitutive laws and made war approach the nature of an abstract contest. Without doubt the 
most significant ‘constitutive’ aspect of the Greek laws of war was the type of battle used to 
fight wars between Greek states. Ancient Greek warfare was predominantly based around the 
phalanx battle – two armies of hoplite spearmen, in heavy armour and round shields, pushing 
against each other on a wide open plain. Skirmishers and cavalry would be involved on the 
outskirts of the battlefield, but hoplites would play the starring role part in a battle which 
would take the form of a quick and decisive clash of phalanxes. The mutually ‘agreed’ 
pattern of battle and the customs stipulating that war had to be declared, battles ritually 
prefaced by a challenge and acceptance of that challenge, and that there were accepted ways 
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of declaring victory or admitting defeat (erecting a trophy, asking for permission to recover 
one’s dead) implies that war and the hoplite battle were a form of constitutive conflict. Victor 
Davis Hanson has advanced a particularly infamous thesis that the Greek (and more broadly, 
the Western) “way of war” was based on the desire to stage “fair” fights such as these, fought 
between broadly symmetrical armies; these battles facilitated a quick decision and the 
avoidance of a long drawn-out conflicts.208 Whatever the merits of Hanson’s theory, to 
characterise the phalanx battle as an abstract contest played out as a series of symbolic 
interactions is wide of the mark. Many of the rules of the phalanx battle arise from the 
practical necessities of a form of combat, requirements which were amenable to both sides 
due to the fact that their armies were similarly equipped and constituted. The stipulations 
regarding declaration of victory were symbolic not so much in the sense that they gained 
victory in the context of a rule-system, but that they confirmed the obvious fact that one side 
had physically beaten the other. Erecting a trophy was not necessary to win, but the losing 
side was hardly in a position to do so – and though there might be reputational benefits of 
‘winning’ a battle in the sense that one was able to erect a trophy, the true measure of victory 
rests in the destruction meted out to the enemy and to one’s own troops, as Greek generals 
like Pyrrhus could attest. 
 
The phalanx-centric battle had its roots in the material composition of the armies 
which fought it, in which hoplites were the key arm; these soldiers formed a class with its 
own particular interests, and these were reflected in the Greek laws of war. A hoplite was in 
the most general sense a free adult male who could afford the appropriate armour and 
weapons, able to go on campaign in the summer. “The typical hoplite”, writes Ober, “was an 
independent subsistence farmer: a man who owned enough land – perhaps ten or fifteen acres 
– to support himself and his big family without the need for family members to work for 
wages on a regular basis.”209 However, economic circumstances were not overly 
deterministic and “we may suppose in the period 700 to 450B.C. hoplites typically 
represented roughly 20 to 40 percent of the free adult males of a Greek polis” – a substantial 
minority. Those poorer would serve as light infantry and the most wealthy would serve as 
cavalry; but the hoplite-centered battle gave the middle stratum of society a privileged 
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position in the life of the polis, and one which was not directly tied to economic factors.210 It 
is instructive to note that a breakdown in the Greek laws of war took place in the 
Peloponnesian War, where this material and social foundation to the laws had been eroded. 
The roots of this degeneration were to be found partly in conscious strategy, and also in 
deeper social trends; the war was marked, claims Ober, by “the conscious employment of 
systematic pressure on the enemy’s social system”211 – citing Athenian attempts to foment a 
helot revolt in Sparta and a similar Spartan attempt to win away Athens’ slave population,212 
though perhaps more important was the influence of Athens’ atypical demography, wealth 
and democratic political system. Athenian society was less hierarchical than the other poleis, 
with adult male citizens technically equal in the court and assembly; hoplites had less of an 
identity than in other cities, and instead the key political force was formed by the rowers in 
the Athenian triremes, whose consciousness of their pivotal role in the wars against the 
Persians had, as Aristotle first noted, led them to take a more active role in Athenian 
politics.213 The Athenians’ empire provided Athens with a large strategic reserve and required 
a primarily naval military structure. At the outset of the Peloponnesian war, Pericles 
identified a strategy for the Athenians to follow, which radically departed from the traditional 
hoplite-focused strategy: Athens would refuse to venture out and fight the Spartan armies in 
the usual manner, instead hiding behind their newly reconstructed city walls while their navy 
operated elsewhere, attempting to bottle Sparta up in the Peloponnese by forcing the 
submission of the strategically important city-state of Megara.214 The Athenians would lose 
in a traditional fight against Sparta, but had the option of fighting in another way entirely. As 
Ober notes: 
 
… so by the mid-fifth century BC the Athenians could afford to break the rules of 
war. Their unique social system meant that the Athenians need not fear social 
instability as a result of this breach of convention, and their unique political system 
meant that men with a primary stake in maintaining the rules were no longer in 
charge.215 
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This is not, of course, how events played out, thanks to the plague which struck 
Athens and the Spartan adaptation to the changing situation. As demographic change 
occurred through war and particularly the plague, the laws of war began to break down and 
with them the social order – “without the mediating factor of the political and social 
dominance of the hoplite class, the underlying conflicts between rich and poor escalated more 
easily into bloody internecine conflicts”216 – leading to instances of civil war and revolution 
such as the events on Corcyra in 427 B.C., described in gory detail by Thucydides,217 whose 
history is one of the clearest examples of the ultimately uncontrollable course of conflict. 
Thucydides’ account of the events in Corcyra is particularly interesting in the way he 
describes the breakdown of law and order; revolution and civic strife in one place spread “a 
general deterioration of character throughout the Greek world”;218 breakdown in order was 
contagious, and material circumstances grew straightened, which led to a further corrosion in 
mores: 
 
In times of peace and prosperity cities and individuals alike follow higher standards, 
because they are not forced into a situation where they have to do what they do not 
want to do. But war is a stern teacher; in depriving them of the power of easily 
satisfying their daily wants, it brings most people's minds down to the level of their 
actual circumstances.219 
 
 The dependency of the laws of war upon a material balance of power is even more 
clearly shown by political developments after the war, as other powers unconstrained by the 
traditional Greek modes of war arose: Philip II of Macedon had at his command torsion-
powered catapults which were able to destroy previously redoubtable city walls, and 
individual city states were unable to afford the cash for this new technology – nor for the 
large mercenary armies of the Hellenic period.220 These developments resulted in the eclipse 
not only of the Greek laws of war but of the Greek city-state as a viable political unit. 
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The Laws of War in the Middle Ages 
 
The laws of war in the Middle Ages bear a number of striking resemblances to those 
in classical Greece, from the attention given to a military ‘caste’ to similar protections 
afforded to religious groups and individuals. Naturally, the intellectual basis for the medieval 
laws of war was much different to that of the Greeks; but despite the influence of Christianity 
there remains a large overlap between the two. Here I will primarily draw upon the research 
of Geoffrey Parker, Robert Stacey (in particular their chapters in Howard, Andreopoulos and 
Shulman’s collection on the laws of war) and Maurice Keen. 
 
Geoffrey Parker notes five sources of the laws of war from the Middle Ages onwards: 
these included texts such as the Bible and written Roman and canon law, along with the 
writings of Augustine and Aquinas; the doctrines of the Peace and the Truce of God; the legal 
codes of the armies themselves; precedent of what had comprised acceptable behaviour in 
war previously; and finally, areas of mutual self-interest which established grounds for 
cooperation.221 The problem of Christians fighting wars was partly resolved by the just war 
tradition and an appeal to the earlier Roman ‘law of nations’,  jus genitum, was very much 
intertwined with the laws of war.222 The Church and Christian teaching concerned itself 
mostly with considerations of jus ad bellum, the proper grounds for waging war, but did 
occasionally try to ameliorate the conduct of war itself. This most famously took the form of 
the aforementioned initiatives of the Peace and the Truce of God. The Peace of God 
attempted to make the clergy, women, children, the elderly, peasants, the poor – as well as 
church lands and property – inviolate during wars between Christians. The object of the 
Truce of God was to restrict fighting between Christians from Monday morning to Thursday 
evening, and not even that during Lent and Advent. Both are remembered as a slightly 
ridiculous attempt to square the circle of Christian violence, along with the attempt to ban the 
use of crossbows (indeed all types of bow). All were notoriously unsuccessful, but reflected 
an inclination to make war between Christians something different from the kind of brutal 
conduct meted out to the infidel. Similarities with the Greek laws of war can be noted, 
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particularly with regards to the religious and cultural basis of the laws of war – and the 
differential treatment meted out to members of other groups who did not share this common 
foundation. 
 
According to Maurice Keen, there were a number of distinct types of war in the 
Middle Ages. The first was guerre mortelle (or bellum Romanum, as the Romans had been 
assumed to wage war without restraint – as they often did), in which the fight was 
unrestrained and where prisoners could be massacred. No ransoms were to be expected. The 
commonly acknowledged sign for a belligerent to advertise his intention to fight a guerre 
mortelle was a red banner.223 Guerre mortelle could therefore be understood as a more 
‘absolute’ form of warfare; appropriate only in cases of war against the infidel or against 
rebels. The common theme of restraining war against fellow Christians is one reason why it 
was not used so often, but there are perhaps other reasons it was not resorted to in the first 
instance. An interesting instance of the qualified use of guerre mortelle was that of Prince 
Edward (later Edward I) against Simon de Montfort at the Battle of Evesham. Whilst de 
Montfort was killed in the battle (his body being spectacularly mutilated afterwards), a 
number of his fellow rebels who were held out against a siege at Kenilworth Castle were 
eventually spared and allowed to ransom back their lands, originally held to be forfeit; the 
conflict was too expensive to continue on the lines of bellum Romanum. Stacey notes: 
 
The consequences of the battle of Evesham were thus, in the end, something less than 
they might have been. Under the laws of war, however, there is no doubt that the 
king’s initial intentions were just under the conventions of guerre mortelle. Politically, 
however they were inadvisable because they would have made a lasting peace 
impossible. Such savagery made a mockery of the international brotherhood of 
knighthood; and insofar as guerre mortelle could admit of no lasting resolution short 
of the unconditional elimination of one force or the other, it was also a deeply 
unsatisfactory way for an individual soldier to pursue the business of war.224 
  
                                                     
223 Maurice Keen, The Laws of War in the Late Middle Ages, (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965), p.104-
106 
224 Robert Stacey “The Age of Chivalry”, in Howard, Andreopoulos and Shulman (eds.), p.34 
98 
 
It is important to note that the loss of a battle is not taken as the ‘end’ of the war; the 
conditions of bellum Romanum do not form a set of constitutive rules, functioning more as a 
signal of intent. A more ‘satisfactory’ form of warfare from a financial point of view was that 
of bellum hostile, or open war between Christian sovereigns; here the prince’s banner was 
flown as a formal declaration of war, and ransoms and plunder shared out. To be legally 
entitled to a share of plunder a soldier had to fight under the banner of a prince225 – this was 
no doubt intended to restrict participation in war, but in reality the letter of the law could be 
stretched to ridiculous extremes, such as the case of John Verney, an English freelancer who 
claimed as his patron a lunatic who had proclaimed himself the rightful king of France.226 
Technically, under the church-inspired rules, exploitation of the common people was 
forbidden in bellum hostile, but as soldiers depended on plunder for their livelihoods, 
arguments that the local people were aiding the enemy were frequently used to justify 
extortion and mistreatment. There were certain groups who were more effectively immune, 
striking in their similarity to the ancient Greeks – the clergy (if not their lands) were usually 
spared, along with pilgrims (contingent on proof of their bona fides). Heralds enjoyed the 
most comprehensive protection, enjoying freedom of movement and immunity from arrest – 
perhaps thanks to their usefulness, along with their being bound to stand apart from the 
fighting itself. The duties of a herald included: 
 
bringing the summonses of captains to towns before a siege, and the challenges of 
princes to pitched battle; obtaining safe-conducts for ambassadors, and for soldiers to 
parley or joust with the enemy; and helping to negotiate ransoms for prisoners with 
their relatives at home.227 
 
Some of these duties hint at an attempt to render war into a constitutional process – 
quite often there were formal offers of battle on particular sites at particular times, the Battle 
of Crécy having been preceded by the French King’s offer of a number of such options to 
King Edward (who excused himself by claiming that he had not been able to cross the 
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Seine).228 Heralds also had a role to play at the end of battles, ostensibly as adjudicators of 
the result: 
 
When the king of England found himself master of the field of battle, and that the 
French, excepting such as had been killed or taken, were flying in all directions, he 
made the circuit of the plain, attended by his princes; and while his men were 
employed in stripping the dead, he called to him the French herald, Montjoye, king-at-
arms, and with him many other French and English heralds... He then asked 
Montjoye, to whom the victory belonged; to him, or to the king of France? Montjoye 
replied, that the victory was his, and could not be claimed by the king of France. The 
king then asked the name of the castle he saw near him: he was told it was called 
Agincourt. “Well then,” added he, “since all battles should bare [sic] the names of the 
fortress nearest to the spot where they were fought, this battle shall, from henceforth, 
bare the ever durable name of Agincourt.”229 
 
Monstrelet’s account belies the redundancy of this particular duty; the fact that the 
French had already fled, and Henry V’s men were busy looting the bodies of their fallen 
enemies, renders Montjoye’s verdict something of a foregone conclusion. The effective 
refusal of the offer of battle by King Edward again indicates the weakness and formal nature 
of the ritual challenge; such offers (and similar ones, like challenges to single combat 
between kings) were typically declined or ignored.230 
 
 The heralds, and the chivalric laws of which they were the arbiters, were clearly 
instrumental to the ‘war economy’ of ransom, and this factor perhaps best accounts for their 
privileged position. Sieges, Stacey’s third sort of war, required their services perhaps more 
than most. When invested, a town was given the opportunity to surrender unharmed; if it 
refused, then it was guilty of treason to its new lord and was liable to be plundered and its 
people massacred. Of course, admitting the enemy left the town open to reprisal from the 
erstwhile master, so in time contracts stipulating how long the settlement was expected to 
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hold out for were agreed in advance; these could form the basis of a negotiated settlement in 
the event of a siege.231 The extent to which this could be described as a constitutive conflict is 
doubtful, though it is worth noting that sieges did provide some of the benefits of a strong 
rule-system by dint of restricting combat to a particular space; battles, on the other hand, 
were risky affairs and were often actively avoided.232 The laws of war in the Middle Ages 
were neither strong, nor sets of constitutive rules – instead being principally concerned with 
the rights of the individual soldier regarding capture and financial reward, rather than being 
of any humanitarian or even religious concerns. Keen notes of the more commercially 
inclined soldiers of the Hundred Years’ War:  
 
If one was going to make a living out of the profits of war, as these men did, one 
needed to be sure that one's enemies were going to observe the rules of the game, and 
if they did not, that there would be ways of forcing them to do so. An enforceable 
code of chivalrous laws, acknowledged by all soldiers regardless of allegiance, would 
have met just this need.233 
 
The more influential medieval laws of jus in bellum were secular in nature, and very 
much concerned with the material interests of the individual combatant, and one type of 
combatant in particular – a member of the knightly class. Between 1050 and 1100, there 
arose an increased demand for knights – the massed cavalry charge dominated the battlefield, 
and as knights paid for their own equipment, they were afforded a growing degree of 
dominance over their own subjects. A pronounced divide between the armed knights – the 
nobilis, and the commoners, inerme vulgus, which had already been present, grew more and 
more pronounced as the Middle Ages went on.234 Increasingly, knights were seen as the 
legitimate ‘warrior’ class, the bellatores, as opposed to the oratores, the workers, who had no 
place in it. Naturally the distinction was something of an ideal, but when commoners did 
engage in conflict there was not much of an incentive to restrict one’s conduct to them. The 
economic relationship of the knight and his lord was at the core of the laws of war in the 
Middle Ages. Knights paid for their own arms, servants and horses (though occasionally the 
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lord would compensate him for the loss of one in battle), and although he was paid for his 
service, the sum was a nominal amount which did not begin to cover a knight’s costs – 
regular wages coming only in later centuries with the strengthening of the state. He fought 
not, as Stacey puts it, “as a salaried servant of the public interest”, but rather out of obligation 
to his lord and for the potential spoils of war, a point reflected in laws which were markedly 
concerned with the distribution of spoils, to the extent that “war was conceived in law as a 
kind of joint-stock operation; by serving in the war a soldier acquired a legally enforceable 
right to a share of its profits, gained chiefly through plunder and ransom”235 
 
Consequently the laws of war in the Middle Ages were not focused so much on 
humanitarian concerns, but rather on limiting the conduct of war for financial concerns and 
the broader self-interest of the knightly class. Commoners were not able to pay ransoms nor 
were able to take their social superiors captive in their own right; in consequence they could 
be killed with impunity – in the case of the Genoese crossbowmen at Crécy, by the knights of 
their own side. Such considerations occasionally cut the other way – as evidenced by the 
cheerful dispatching of the French nobility by the English archers at Agincourt. Swiss 
mercenaries were also noted for their propensity not to take prisoners, being politically and 
geographically isolated from the feudal system and its codes of chivalry (willingness to close 
to a decisive engagement being one of their notable selling points); for knights, however, the 
ransom system worked well enough – to the point where prisoners could appeal against their 
improper treatment when the captive of another.236 
 
 The nature of laws of war so far 
 
 Clearly, amongst the laws of war in ancient Greece and in the Medieval period there 
are many which are (exclusively) regulative, prohibiting and (though less often) compelling 
certain behaviours. Prominent among the rules and laws of war in these and other periods is 
the fact that they serve certain groups who share interests in common, specifically those who 
served as the central arm in their force. The almost ritualised pattern of phalanx warfare along 
with the restriction of fighting to before harvest, reflected the interest of the smallholding 
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hoplite – as did the chivalric code which regulated conflict between members of the knightly 
class. Whether these restrictions on the time, place and ‘format’ of the battle can or do 
amount to a ‘constitutional’ process is debateable. In both cases, the restrictions on the time 
and place of the battle are first of all much less firmly institutionalised than in other 
constitutional conflicts, generally taking the form of ad hoc agreements between combatants 
(this does not rule out the possibility of a ‘constitutional’ status, but certainly indicates that 
these rules are less strong than they might be). The adjudication of the contest by means of 
erecting a trophy, or by the proclamation of a herald is rather superfluous, being an ornament 
on the true victory – the destruction or surrender of one of the combatants. Nevertheless, this 
is a puzzling area – especially when we consider such things as duels and trials-by-combat. 
The palpably un-warlike nature of such mechanisms is instructive; perhaps the reductio ad 
absurdum of war as a constitutive process is to be found in the popular imagination of the 
wars fought by the condottieri of Renaissance-era Italy, of which it was said that battles were 
settled by elaborate manoeuvres and a positive avoidance of bloodshed to the point where, at 
the battle of Anghiari in 1440, only one man died – when he fell off his horse and was 
drowned in the mud. This is an exaggeration (around 900 men were estimated to have died in 
that battle),237 but the question begs an answer: would war fought in this way truly be war? 
Thinking along similar lines, Clausewitz scorned the ‘geometric’ military thinkers of his own 
day for seeming to promise a day when war could be reduced to calculations involving lines 
of communication and interior angles, when battle would cease to be necessary. The closest 
that wars seem to have approached constitutional conflicts was in cases of siege: the conflict 
was confined by nature to a specific place, and an agreement on time could be made between 
the two parties (this would be in part dependent on objective factors like food supply). This 
tendency reached an apogee in the age of the Enlightenment, when these factors were 
combined with the geometrically stylised fortifications most famously designed and built by 
Vauban – who also formulated tactics to be used against them: a fortified town would take 
roughly forty-eight days to capture, by means of parallel trenches.238 Anders Engberg-
Pedersen even goes so far as to characterise the sieges of the Enlightenment as a contributing 
factor to its rationalised conception of the world, which was later upset by the chaotic battles 
of the Napoleonic era.239 
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Modern laws of war 
 
 As time went on, the wars of the early modern period began to become more 
regulated; Parker notes four factors which combined to make war less vicious and brutal. 
Firstly, as discretionary power moved out of the hands of the individual soldiers (i.e. knights 
who provided their own equipment), their officers or petty lords and into those of the state, 
greater central control of the military forces engaged in war enabled a more consistent 
engagement with the laws of war – similarly, the increased ability of the growing state to 
supply its troops made previously necessary yet morally dubious behaviour, like systematic 
looting, an option rather than a requirement. Second, the decline of the perceived importance 
of confessional identities as a driving force for armies removed one of the most potent 
enablers of atrocity; this was related to a third factor, a sense of horror at the destruction 
brought about by the religious wars of the mid-seventeenth century led to an anti-war 
movement of sorts, and a feeling that war had come close to totally destroying society. This 
led not only to a more ‘limited’ form of war but contributed to a trend towards absolutism, 
which increased the power of states to control their soldiery. Fourth, an increase in 
reciprocity: conflict between different groups over time enables a web of expectations to 
arise, so long as each side has experience of the other and expects to meet again – when this 
is absent, in the case of combat between commoners and the knightly class on the battlefield 
in peasant uprisings (or as was often the case when Swiss mercenaries fought) or when 
European forces fought in the New World.240  
 
 The first properly codified document on the laws of war is generally acknowledged to 
be that drawn up by Francis Lieber in 1863. Lieber, a German-born American jurist had been 
asked to formulate a legal document covering the laws of war for the Union in the American 
civil war, which was published as Army Order 100. In its articles, Lieber set out the rules for 
the treatment of inhabitants of occupied areas (and their property),241 made provision for the 
swapping of prisoners on a man-for-man basis, and most notably clarified what treatment 
would be meted out to irregular fighters, ordered in a number of categories, from ‘partisans’ 
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to ‘war-rebels’, in order of increasing illegitimacy.242 Lieber’s rules became the foundation of 
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions and have shaped the Laws of Armed Conflict ever 
since. The motivations behind the Lieber Code were varied, focusing principally on providing 
consistent treatment of irregular fighters, who were a new factor in war and had certainly 
been neglected by the law of war previously,243 but also aimed to limit the physical harm of 
warfare by restricting indiscriminate violence. In his letters, Lieber himself indicates the 
rationale behind his code and its consistent implementation. First, there is the ‘containment’ 
of conflict; the code, which stipulates that prisoners should be exchanged (or executed) on a 
one-for-one basis would prevent a vicious circle of reprisal by both sides: 
 
in retaliation it is necessary strictly to adhere to… the elementary principle which 
prevails the world over – tit for tat, or eye for an eye – and not to adopt ten eyes for one 
eye. If one belligerent hangs ten men for one, the other will hang ten times ten for the 
ten; and what a dreadful geometrical progression of skulls and cross-bones we should 
have.  
 
Similarly, uncontained destruction has negative consequences in the long term, 
thinking to a time after war has ended: 
 
I know by letters from the West and the South, written by men on our side, that the 
wanton destruction of property by our men is alarming. It does incalculable injury. It 
demoralizes our troops; it annihilates wealth irrecoverably, and makes a return to a 
state of peace more and more difficult... [it provides] our reckless enemy with new 
arguments for his savagery. 244 
 
The next substantial step in the formulation of explicit laws of war came with the 
Hague conferences of 1899 and 1907, which drew heavily on the Lieber code. The 1899 
conference was called at the behest of Russia, which was concerned at the increasing 
destructive power of new weapons of war (or rather, such weapons as were the exclusive 
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preserve of the West and unavailable to Russia). The conference was especially notable in 
prohibiting several new weapons – the dropping of bombs from air balloons, expanding 
‘dum-dum’ bullets (unsuccessfully defended by Britain as being necessary to more 
effectively kill restive native populations), and “the use of projectiles the sole object of which 
is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases.”245  
 
 These attempts to regulate warfare were less successful than hoped, with perhaps the 
key factor being the rapid developments in military technology in the twentieth century. One 
of the more instructive cases of the modern law of war and the problems associated with it is 
the history of the formulation of maritime law and its failure in the World Wars. The 
Declaration of Paris in 1856 was perhaps the first formal international agreement on the laws 
of war. According to it, privateers were banned, belligerent cargo on neutral ships (and 
neutral cargo on belligerent ships), providing it was not classed as contraband (a clear 
definition of which was not provided), were immune from capture, and blockade was 
‘official’ only when ports were effectively blockaded by ships in their vicinity; this ensured 
the rights of neutral shipping. The question of whether blockade of the civilian population 
was acceptable was also a consideration. In a similar pattern to the decline of the Greek laws 
of war following Athenian strategic innovations, the Declaration of Paris, being formulated in 
the mid-nineteenth century, soon proved impractical as times changed and sailing ships made 
way for steam power. Close blockade of ports was made untenable by the use of mines and 
long-range coastal artillery,246 but above all the laws of war at sea were swept aside by the 
use of submarines and total war in the First World War. The logic of total war made civilian 
targets a priority, if not legitimate, and certain properties of submarines – their extreme 
vulnerability when carrying out inspections on ship cargoes, for example247 – made them 
unsuited to ‘traditional’ enforcement of blockade. Increasingly as the war went on, risks to 
the submarines had to be minimised as much as possible and surprise attacks on merchant 
shipping provided a means to cut these risks. The submarine continued to be used in the 
Second World War as it was the weak naval powers’ weapon of choice; increased risks of 
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detection thanks to improvements in technology again mitigated a more conventional anti-
military role for submarines. 
 
Similar factors were at play elsewhere. Whereas it seemed the golden age of the law 
of armed conflict which began in the 1850s looked set to continue (the 1907 Hague 
Conference was set to be followed by another), what actually transpired were two global 
conflicts which cast aside much of the apparent achievements of the movement. The First 
World War was opened in the west by the German decision to invade neutral Belgium, 
instantly revealing the relative importance of legality and realpolitik (in German eyes at 
least); a point which, along with the severity of German repression in that country, born out 
of fear of partisan activity, was made the most of by Allied propagandists. The use of 
‘asphyxiating and deleterious gases’ was another notable departure from the law, though the 
Germans could claim that, as the gas was released from cylinders and not from shells, they 
were not violating the letter of the law (the British were the first to make use of gas shells in 
September 1915 at Loos). The Second World War had even more egregious violations – 
‘strategic’ bombing of civilian populations, culminating in the use of nuclear weapons on 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. German atrocities on the Eastern Front were perhaps the most 
obvious examples of violation of the laws of war (though the German political leadership 
argue that the Soviet Union did not deserve to be considered a civilised foe, and could often 
point to their actions as anti-partisan operations), and the Japanese ill-treatment of Allied 
prisoners is well-known: when peoples from around the world with totally different and 
occasionally incommensurable cultures were thrown together, the results could be much the 
same as when Greeks fought barbarians or knights the infidel. The totalitarian states did not 
hold a monopoly on such behaviour, however – the case of Britain being an illuminating 
example. Unable for much of the war to risk a direct conventional military attack on 
Germany, it resorted to four means to strike at its enemy. One strictly military means was the 
use of commando raids on coastal targets; the other three were less conventional, and as 
Adam Roberts points out, “involved breaking down the distinction between soldiers and 
civilians which is at the heart of the laws of war”248: bombing of German cities; naval 
blockade; and the support of resistance movements in occupied territories. Similar to the 
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German use of U-Boats, the British made use of ‘illegal’ means out of inability to compete on 
the conventional level, and chose to do so and violate the laws of war as a consequence of a 
calculation of political expediency. 
 
Andrew Roberts concludes that the causes of ‘barbarism’ in the two World Wars were found 
in a number of factors: 
 
1. The opposition to liberal ideas of several early twentieth-century autocracies, and 
their positive belief in force. 
2. The general body of ideas known as Social Darwinism, especially in its peculiar and 
virulent forms which saw races, nations, and/or classes as species; believed in the 
inevitability of violent struggle for supremacy between them; and saw that struggle as 
of cosmic importance. 
3. Theories of war, derived from a shallow reading of Clausewitz, which saw battle and 
total war as being the essence of strategy. 
4. The development of conscription and of machinery for moving conscripts, which 
created a new momentum to total war. 
5. The development through the industrial revolution of a complex division of labor 
within and between countries, which made it hard to maintain a clear distinction 
between soldier and civilian, or between a neutral and a belligerent power. 
6. The growth of a popular press in many countries which was virulently nationalistic. 
7. The emergence of new weapons – machine gun, long-range artillery, aircraft, 
submarine – which took war to new environments, which increased man’s capacity 
for destruction, and which in some cases facilitated the posing of threats, not just to 
the adversary’s front line, but to its society as a whole, including its cities and 
civilians.249 
 
Roberts chooses to place new weapons technology last as it has been somewhat 
‘overrated’ as a cause of barbarism – he claims that much of the most horrific violence in the 
Second World War, particularly on the Eastern Front, was not particularly technologically 
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sophisticated, rather being shaped primarily by ideology.250 Restricting analysis to weapons 
technology perhaps obscures the truth of this matter – as we shall see later, it is not only 
weaponry which can bring about an intensification of war. In any case, there is clearly a 
tendency of the laws of war, both in the twentieth century and earlier, to be ineffective in the 
restriction of new weapons – as Best remarks, “the whole truth about the history of weapons 
innovations is that almost all of them, whatever the nature and strength of the objections at 
first encountered, slip into common use as soon as the objectors can acquire them for 
themselves, whereupon the law adapts accordingly.”251 The common factor in Roberts’ 
analysis is that states were newly able to commit to more ‘extreme’ forms of war, being both 
physically able to do more, and politically able to conceive of extreme objectives and 
mobilise state resources to those ends. Roberts elsewhere voices scepticism that laws of war 
could possibly cover the myriad variety of circumstances and situations to which twentieth-
century war can give rise252 – in itself a consequence of the lack of structure which 
constitutive rules would provide. 
 
 The more extreme cases of the regulation of war are easy to dismiss as ineffectual and 
contrived. Nevertheless, the universal appeal of the regulation of war cannot be waved away: 
there are clearly some deeply-felt desire, even a need, on all sides to conduct war in some 
kind of ordered manner. John Huizinga in Homo Ludens comments on the game-like or 
agonistic character of war, at least in its more formal aspects. War is very often made into a 
game or a ritual, and has frequently been tied to a higher order in that victory in battle is 
ascribed to God’s will (something which is often ascribed to the outcomes of other chance 
events);253 within war itself, rituals and rules are applied to render confrontations ‘legitimate’. 
Such an understanding is evidenced by the term “pitched battle”, which refers to a rule-bound 
battle (at least with regards to space), where the battlefield is officially delineated – like a 
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sports pitch. The brutal reality of war belies the tenuousness and artificiality of such 
conventions; indeed, Huizinga himself notes that the effort to sanitise war by transmuting it 
into an orderly contest is something of an impossibility: “even in archaic surroundings war 
with its grimness and bitterness offers but scant occasion for this noble game to become a 
reality. Bloody violence cannot be caught to any great extent in truly noble form; hence the 
game can only be fully experienced and enjoyed as a social and aesthetic fiction.”254 
 
The extremes of experience undergone in war require rules and customs of their own: 
Karl Marlantes, who served in the United States Marine Corps in the US Marines, has written 
in his book What It Is Like To Go To War of the need felt by soldiers to undergo rituals which 
enable them to overcome this, the traumatic and unsettling experience of war – the stress of 
combat and exposure to death and destruction, and the mixed feelings of triumph and guilt 
over the killing of enemies. Marlantes sees parallels with ancient myths and legends, from 
Achilles’ sulking in his tent after being deprived of his rightful spoils and recognition, to the 
rage of the Irish mythic figure Cuchulain who was calmed and welcomed back into peaceful 
society by the women of his lord.255 It is Marlantes’ belief that the neglect of these ritualistic 
ceremonies and processes – particularly those which govern the rehabilitation of the warrior 
into his community, and cleanse him of guilt associated with killing – has had lasting 
psychological damage, particularly in the case of the Vietnam war. Barbara Ehrenreich makes 
similar observations on the ritual aspects of war in her book Blood Rites. War, in her rather 
idiosyncratic analysis, has deeper significance than its ostensibly ‘political’ purpose: not only 
is it Clausewitz’s rational instrument, it is an “alternative realm of human experience, as far 
removed from daily life as those things which we call “sacred.””256 In this environment, 
ordinarily reprehensible actions are rendered permissible, even laudable; rituals such as 
Marlantes describes are necessary to return warriors to ‘normal’ life after engaging in such 
acts – and others (often with the help of mind-altering drugs of various kinds) are necessary 
to get him to engage in them in the first place.257 Rather than as a calculated, rational project 
(a view she incorrectly ascribes to Clausewitz, whom, as we have seen, was well aware of the 
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irrational passions which drive war),258 Ehrenreich speculates that the experience of war 
might be understood on a more primal level as a substitute for human competition with 
animals, citing mythic warriors (Gilgamesh, and ancient Greek heroes like Hercules) who 
were also characterised as mighty hunters. When prehistoric megafauna were made extinct by 
the early humans who had to turn to domestication of animals, the social role and status of 
men as hunters was threatened; as a consequence, the hunting drive was directed against 
other groups of humans as a means of maintaining a role for men. As Ehrenreich says, “war-
making… is an activity that has often served to define manhood itself – which is exactly what 
we would expect if war in fact originated as a substitute occupation for underemployed male 
hunter-defenders.”259 The contest for trophies of limited practical value (scalps, severed 
heads, ears) belies the use of war as a cultural institution in which social status can be won 
and identities enacted, and which might be fought for those reasons alone – the codes of 
chivalry could be seen in a similar light.260 
 
The benefits of rules we have already covered – to reduce harm, limit 
unpredictability, and preserve the distribution of power – are clearly in evidence in these 
cases, and those we have covered earlier, but what is perhaps most important is the desire of 
human beings to establish some kind of psychological control over their environment, 
whether real or imagined (the sense of ‘ontological security’ we met earlier). I believe that 
these ritualisations – whether ones which govern the conduct of the war between the two 
participants, or those which prescribe certain behaviours with regard to individual warriors – 
are attempts to cope with the stress of war, a state of existence which precisely due to the fact 
that it is not bound by inherent rules of its own, presents a uniquely stressful and discomfiting 
situation, exposing those who are party to it to an array of experiences which are far beyond 
those experienced in ‘everyday’ life. As regards the customs and rules that govern 
interactions between enemies, the construction of war – a brutally physical contest – as a 
‘higher’ form of human activity with rules and customs brings to mind Bourdieu’s 
observations on the function of rules as an insulation from the purely material nature of 
economic transactions. One might see in the rules and customs of war, not merely an attempt 
to limit danger or control unpredictability, but also a desire to maintain some kind of human 
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fellowship in a dehumanising setting where one if compelled to treat one’s opponent as an 
object to be destroyed. 
 
 That human nature seems to require these regulations and rituals suggests that some 
forms of rules will continue to bind the conduct of war in future; even if war does not have 
restrictions that are inherent to its nature, human beings are themselves by preference (or 
even by their own nature) rule-following creatures. The human desire for regulation and order 
will be an influence which shapes the conduct of war for as long as humans fight it – but the 
point remains that these rules, though they might well manifest in some form in every war 
ever fought, are not inherent to war itself. Two peoples who had not previously interacted 
could engage in war straight away, whereas they would need to build a shared ‘language’ of 
rules before engaging in symbolic interaction; violence is in a sense the universal language. 
Similarly, war may well have specific cultural significance in different cultures, even to the 
point of being ‘institutionalised’; however, this is again something which has been laid over 
war, and is not part of its own nature – though it might always be present when humans fight 
each other. We shall have to wait until Martians land before this aspect of my thesis can be 
put to the test. 
 
 In any case, the artificiality and non-binding nature of the various would-be 
constitutional laws of war has been shown up often enough: Athens’ refusal to engage in 
customary forms of war with Sparta did not – could not – disqualify them from the contest, 
though no doubt a few Lacedaemonians muttered about poor sportsmanship when they saw 
the walls of the Piraeus. Medieval knights, though scrupulous in their dealings with their 
peers, put down peasant revolts with extreme ferocity, and the favour was returned, as 
evidenced by the cheerful dispatching of the fallen French knights by the English commoners 
at the Battle of Agincourt. Swiss mercenaries of the time were in fact esteemed especially 
highly in large part because of their unbridled savagery (perhaps not entirely unbridled – after 
all a law was passed in Zurich in 1444 which forbade troops to cut out the hearts of dead 
enemies),261 a savagery exemplified by their disregard (or ignorance) of the code of chivalry 
which moderated knightly battles – in the battles of Morgarten and Morat, the Swiss 
slaughtered their knightly Hapsburg and Burgundian enemies without restraint, even when 
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offered heavy ransoms by fallen nobles.262 This was complete victory, which did not depend 
on the consent of the defeated, and which no adjudication could deny. 
 
Conclusions 
 
 It can be seen that the laws of war – as they have developed in Ancient Greece, the 
Middle Ages and the twentieth century – are particularly weak in their restriction and 
regulation of the conduct of war. Firstly, there is no enforcement of the rules by a higher 
authority, with reciprocity and mutual interest being the principal means of enforcement; as a 
result, they are often broken. The restrictions the various laws of war impose on the conduct 
of war are, moreover, weak, limited in the extent to which they restrict behaviour, and tend to 
reflect already extant material restraints, like the need for a certain type of battlefield or the 
need to cease fighting in harvest time. These material factors which place limits on the 
behaviour of armies are the true source of restriction on military action, and when it is 
materially possible to fight war in a different way, outside of the ‘rules’, armies can and tend 
to do so – whether in the case of Athens’ exploitation of naval power, built on its particular 
demographic foundations, or by means of new technologies – as with the case of submarines 
in the World Wars. This material aspect of the laws of war extends to those with a putatively 
constitutional nature: arbitration is not provided either by external judges with the power to 
enforce a verdict, nor by a clearly defined set of conditions which demarcate victory; rules 
concerned with the declaration of hostilities and the confirmation of victory serve more as a 
confirmation of a physical reality than a mechanism in their own right. Despite war’s lack of 
constitutive rules, which would transmute it into an abstract, symbolic contest, it is often 
hedged around by other regulations. These are limited in scope and effect, relying on mutual 
observance and tit-for-tat enforcement mechanisms rather than enforcement from a higher 
power – though shared material interests (such as similar class structures) can provide a firm 
foundation for cooperation between enemies. These are introduced into war to provide some 
of the benefits of rule-following, both material and psychological: however absolute it 
‘should’ be on paper, at the heart of war as it is carried out in the real world is a compromise 
between capitalising on the benefits that freedom from legal bounds brings, and insulating 
oneself from the dangers unleashed by that departure from civilised discourse. 
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 As mentioned, one of the most important consequences of war’s lack of rules is the 
absence of a system of arbitration. This deficiency is perhaps the most important aspect of 
our understanding of war as being defined by an absence of rules: without mutually 
understood criteria for victory, the resolution of war is essentially unique to every case, with 
no easy way for the strategist to identify the correct path to victory. It is this aspect of war 
which we shall examine in the following chapter on strategy, a subject which has always been 
associated with war – for this very reason.  
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THE PROBLEM OF STRATEGY – PLANNING IN UNCERTAINTY 
 
 So far, I have demonstrated that war, though its conduct can be made subject to rules 
and restrictions, does not have rules in of itself as other forms of competition do. In the 
following two chapters I will go on to explore the implications of this aspect of warfare, and 
show that the varied ways in which it is fought can be understood as responses to the unique 
problems and opportunities which this lack of an inherent regulatory framework presents. 
This chapter will focus on a concept closely associated with war, and one which I believe is 
defined (even called into being) precisely by war’s lack of rules: strategy. Strategy, as I 
define it, is the process of achieving an end with the means available, in competition with an 
opponent trying to do the same, in the context of a relationship which is not bound by (man-
made) constitutive rules. Strategy, along with the related concepts of tactics and operations, is 
central to the conduct of war because of its pervasive uncertainty and active opposition, but 
above all in its lack of rules which would explain how it can be won. In the absence of 
constitutive rules any warring power has to devise and apply a necessarily speculative theory 
of how the conflict will operate, particularly with regard to the effects of certain types of 
military action on the enemy – in other words, the task of the strategist is to identify the ‘rules 
of the game’ in a game which lacks them.  
 
There are a number of ways in which strategists have responded to this challenge, 
some being less successful than others. I identify two broad categories of strategic doctrine: 
deductive, and inductive. Deductive strategies seek to form and impose an ordered 
conception of reality onto war: this assessment can be based on ‘objective’ factors, such as 
geography, terrain, or the capabilities of military technology; on the conclusions drawn by 
‘scientific’ (or even, in the case of game theory, mathematical) reasoning; or simply by the 
application of habitual, purportedly time-honoured conceptions of “what war is like” and how 
it “should” be fought. These deductive approaches can be conceived (in a very broad sense) 
as answers to the problem of strategy, rather than an exploitation of its possibilities. Inductive 
doctrines, on the other hand, I characterise as implicitly – or even explicitly, in the case of 
‘irregular’ war – acknowledging war’s ruleless nature; by building upon this understanding, 
they embrace the opportunities afforded them by this lack of restriction and conduct war in 
innovative and creative ways. 
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Neither inductive nor deductive strategies exist in a ‘pure’ form in practice; every 
strategy will contain elements of each, though in varying properties. Here I will examine a 
number of strategic doctrines and approaches which I believe are especially representative of 
the two tendencies: first, I will examine deductive strategies, primarily exploring the concept 
of “strategic culture” – the habit of states to make war in a particular style. I will examine in 
particular Theo Farrell’s arguments regarding transnational military norms and Jack Snyder’s 
conclusions from The Ideology of the Offensive, both of which explain potentially 
counterproductive strategies through the prism of deductive strategic reasoning; the 
Enlightenment era’s geometric strategies are another example of this line of thinking. I will 
also examine the geopolitical/geostrategical thought of Halford Mackinder and others, which 
works in a similar way – a plan of action for especially ‘grand’ strategy which is based on an 
assessment of ‘objective’ factors of geography. Another such objective factor is technological 
capability; I will examine strategies based on this – nuclear strategy and the theory of 
strategic bombing – in the following chapter on technology in war. These strategies impose 
an artificial order on a chaotic reality, satisfying the commander’s need for a coherent 
conception of the world – in some cases, distorting the truth and operating to the detriment of 
effective military action. 
 
 One thinker who was all too aware of this problem was Clausewitz, who as we have 
seen was adamant that no theory of war could afford to ascend to rarefied heights of 
abstraction, war being too unpredictable and contextually specific a phenomenon to allow for 
elaborate theoretical models. In this he is contradicted somewhat by the ancient Chinese 
strategist Sun Tzu, who is more optimistic about the possibilities of planning and the use of 
creative stratagems, and is notably more enthusiastic about the utilisation of intelligence and 
deception than his German counterpart; though they apparently differ markedly, both 
approaches can be understood as perceptive responses to a conception of war as a ruleless 
form of conflict: I will examine two inductive strategic doctrines which explicitly drew upon 
the thinking of both strategists – maneuver warfare, and irregular war. Each has achieved 
great successes largely through an implicit acknowledgement of war’s lack of rules, 
exploiting the chaos of war and maintaining the initiative against opponents by denying them 
the ability to make sense of the strategic reality; however, even these inductive doctrines risk 
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defeat if used inappropriately. However finely tuned an instrument and however successful in 
one kind of conflict, crystallised strategic doctrine is always at the risk of obsolescence in 
such a fluid medium as war.  
 
The changing definition of strategy 
 
 Before I move on to the discussion of these varying forms of strategy, I will begin 
with a brief account of the changing definition of the concept – which has evolved greatly 
over the years. There are varying definitions of strategy, but they are in broad agreement in 
that the concept is concerned with the use of military means to achieve a desired end. 
Clausewitz, for instance, defines strategy as “the use of the engagement for the purpose of the 
war”263 – Basil Liddell Hart defines it as "the art of distributing and applying military means 
to fulfil the ends of policy"264 J.C. Wylie says strategy is a “plan of action designed in order 
to achieve some end; a purpose together with a system of measures for its accomplishment.” 
Bernard Brodie puts it more succinctly: strategy is “how to do it”.265 Some make explicit 
reference to the fact that ‘strategy’ is carried out against an uncooperative opponent: as we 
have seen, Clausewitz’s theory of war is based in part on the clash of two active opponents, 
and General Andre Beaufre similarly spoke of strategy as “the art of the dialectic of two 
opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute.”266 Williamson Murray and Mark 
Grimsley emphasise the pervasive uncertainty in which strategy is made, characterising it as a 
process, “a constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where 
chance, uncertainty and ambiguity dominate.”267 
 
According to Hew Strachan, the concept of strategy has evolved over time in an 
increasingly refined way. At first ‘strategy’ was not very precisely defined: it was simply 
what a general did, the business of a strategos. Only in the late eighteenth century was a 
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strong distinction made between the command of forces in battle (i.e. tactics) and the plane of 
strategy as it is now understood; this shift occurred because of the increasing size of armies, 
which (especially as the mass armies of the Napoleonic wars came to dominate European 
warfare) required much more specialised and dedicated coordination and logistic support than 
was previously the case. Coupled with this was the systematising influence of the 
Enlightenment; the urge to understand war in a scientific manner created an interest in the 
different ‘levels’ of war, especially the higher plane of strategy, seen as more amenable than 
tactics to the powers of reason.268 The trend of increasing complexity giving rise to a 
correspondingly complex strategy continued into the age of industrial war, where the concept 
of ‘Grand Strategy’ was formulated by theorists like Basil Liddell-Hart:  
 
The role of grand strategy – higher strategy – is to co-ordinate and direct all the 
resources of a nation, or band of nations, towards the attainment of the political object 
of the war – the goal defined by fundamental policy. Grand strategy should both 
calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to 
sustain the fighting services. Also the moral resources – for to foster the people's 
willing spirit is often as important as to possess the more concrete forms of power. 
Grand strategy, too, should regulate the distribution of power between the several 
services, and between the services and industry. Moreover, fighting power is but one 
of the instruments of grand strategy – which should take account of and apply the 
power of financial pressure, and, not least of ethical pressure, to weaken the 
opponent's will.269 
 
 Grand strategy was explicitly articulated in the industrial age as the challenges of 
industrialised mass warfare necessitated an even wider approach to strategic issues. 
Originally, the means by which strategy was conducted were held to be purely military; as it 
developed in the early modern era, strategy increasingly involved consideration of areas like 
logistics and supply, moving away from the battlefield. Later, grand strategy extended the 
strategic remit to the management of the wider war economy and drew upon all the resources 
of the state. The same pressures acted ‘downwards’ to gave rise to the concept of ‘operations’ 
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as an intermediate stage of warfare between the immediate conflict of battle and the strategic 
overview (operations being a string of planned tactical engagements). The concept was first 
developed by Soviet officers during the Russian Civil War, notably the generals 
Tukhachevsky, Frunze and Triandafillov. In a way, the concept can be explained as 
analogous to the earlier concept of a ‘campaign’, which similarly linked tactical engagements 
together; the concept of “Deep Operations” was, however, a specific product of the industrial 
age, its theorists recognising that the character of modern warfare required coordination over 
a greatly extended time and space – a campaign in this sense could involve a series of battles 
fought by a number of formations, the use of modern technology contributing to the increased 
material needs of modern warfare. In particular, supplies and their transport had to be handled 
in a more methodological way than previously done, and the enemy’s forces would have to 
be dealt with in a way in which individual engagements (of a size which would previously 
have constituted the climax of a war) would need to be coordinated with each other in order 
to bring about a decisive victory. The historical influence of this school of thought in the 
Soviet Union has been questioned,270 but it has had a great influence on doctrine since, and in 
many ways reflects the wider trend of increasingly elaborate and comprehensive strategy 
developing in responses to increasingly complex forms of social organisation. 
 
Despite the nuances of difference between the definitions of strategy, tactics and 
operations, I am inclined to agree with Colin Gray’s assessment that there is a fundamental 
unity behind them: “Strategy and tactics, and, one should say, policy, operations, and 
logistics, can be regarded more as distinctive points of view of a single complex phenomenon 
than as discrete subjects.”271 Ultimately, strategy, operations and tactics are different aspects 
of the same basic concept: they are the means, the process by which an actor seeks to achieve 
an aim in competition with an uncooperative antagonist (or antagonists), using the resources 
at one’s disposal. As Gray puts it, strategy is “the bridge that relates military power to 
political purpose… the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of 
policy.”272 There is, however, a problem with this definition of strategy – Hew Strachan has 
noted that in recent years the common understanding of strategy has been so vague as to be 
useless: there are now government ‘strategies’ for things such as housing provision, pensions, 
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education, and so on; even businesses have ‘advertising strategies’ (no doubt dreamt up by a 
high-powered executive after reading a business-themed adaptation of Sun Tzu’s Art of War 
– hopefully Sir Hew has not been informed that Clausewitz has been subjected to the same 
treatment);273 it seems to have floated free of military matters altogether.274  
 
 I would agree with Strachan that strategy is above all a military concept, with its most 
complete expression to be found in military affairs. However, I do not believe that it has no 
place in other areas of life, like policy and business; as an activity based in an uncertain 
environment, strategy has its natural home in war, but it also has a place in forms of conflict 
which are similarly not so strictly bound and defined by constitutive rules – business perhaps 
foremost among them (perhaps this is the underlying reason why adaptations of Sun Tzu are 
so beloved of CEOs). Strategy, in my view, is the process of achieving an end with the means 
available, in opposition to another trying to do the same, and specifically in the context of a 
contest which is not bound by constitutive rules. In a sense, all forms of conflict require 
strategy and tactics to some degree, as they are dialectical in nature; however, a game of 
chess or a football match has much less scope for strategic activity than does a war, where 
very little is provided for in the way of guidance and in which little can be taken for granted. 
There is little need, for instance, to identify the unique strengths and weaknesses of an 
opponent’s chess pieces, as they are constant from match to match – nor does one have to 
scout out the pitch before a football match to check if it has been mined. Likewise, surprise 
attacks are not possible in a courtroom where evidence has to be submitted according to due 
process. The constitutive rules which govern these contests provide many of the things which 
are otherwise within the remit of the strategist – as I noted earlier, such rules demarcate the 
time, place, tempo, and equipment for a contest, and most importantly for our purposes, they 
also provide rules of arbitration – standards for determining the winner of the contest. The 
strategist faces the singular challenge of determining how the war can be won – beyond the 
common denominator of the submission of one side or another. A great part of strategy is 
based on an understanding of the likely military, social, psychological and economic effects 
of action against the enemy, and the influences of differences in the variables of time, space 
and so on, which are unique in every case. 
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Deductive Strategy 
 
Strategy, as we can see, is potentially an extremely stressful activity. Planning and 
decision-making in the context of a non-abstract contest, i.e. one without rules to determine 
how it is to be fought and won, means that there are a near-infinite variety of potential 
courses of action open to the strategist. For many, the temptation is to consciously impose 
order on the chaos of war either by means of a concrete plan based on an assessment of 
‘objective’ factors, or on traditional understandings of what war ‘is’, derived from cultural 
and historical experience. In practice, the strategy chosen will most often be a mix of these 
two. To pick the latter course is potentially useful – there are good reasons to act on the basis 
of experience, and to build on techniques which have proved their worth in the past – but 
doing so in the context of war is especially dangerous, due to the great variety of potential 
threats one can face because of the lack of restrictions placed on action. Cruelly, there is great 
pressure on a strategist to choose a pre-made strategy resulting from the same dynamic – as I 
mentioned in the earlier discussion of the customs and laws of war, the lack of structure in 
warfare presents a chaotic environment, and the psychological need to impose order upon it is 
so pressing that a strategist will feel lost without some kind of concept or theory of how the 
war (and war in general) is likely to develop.  
 
 In my treatment of rules, I noted the arguments made by Kratochwil and Searle that 
they are present in practically every manifestation of social behaviour, from the most basic 
level of language, to areas of life which are more normally defined as being governed by 
‘culture’ than rules. Many of the rules of war which I have covered so far (particularly the 
conventions of war of the Greeks and the Middle Ages) were implicit rules concerning the 
appropriate (and effective) way to conduct war; in this sense, the conventions of warfare are a 
kind of construction of war as a particular form of cultural activity. These have overtones, but 
other constructions of war are based on more practical considerations – how war should be 
fought from a practical perspective. The notion that military decisionmaking is influenced by 
culture has been explored in some depth in the literature on ‘strategic culture’, of which I will 
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provide a brief overview here. It is important to note that the study of strategic culture is 
primarily concerned with the cultural aspects of the formulation of strategic decisions by one 
actor, rather than describing a wider culture of rules, laws and norms which bind the 
behaviour of two or more competitors as they go to war. I include this overview here as 
strategic cultures are an example of regulated behaviour – and because the tendency of 
human beings to limit their behaviour to what is conventional and familiar is of great 
significance in war, as I will go on to show in the next chapter on strategy. 
 
 Strategic Culture 
 
 The concept of strategic culture was first mooted by Jack Snyder in 1977, in his 
treatment of Soviet strategy for the RAND corporation; in contrast to the rational-choice 
analysis so favoured by other denizens of that institution, Snyder held that a country’s 
strategic culture – “the sum total of ideas, conditioned emotional responses, and patterns of 
habitual behaviour that members of a national strategic community have acquired through 
instruction or imitation”275 – was a formative influence on its strategic decision-making 
process. The “first generation” of strategic culture analysis not only opposed the assumptions 
which underlaid the ‘rational actor’ model-based strategic thought of the time, but also the 
apparent technological determinism of massively powerful nuclear weapons – instead 
positing that different societies had different national ‘styles’ of warmaking which were 
cultural in nature:  
 
Most of those who use the term "culture" tend to argue, explicitly or implicitly, that 
different states have different predominant strategic preferences that are rooted in the 
early or formative experiences of the state, and are influenced to some degree by the 
philosophical, political, cultural, and cognitive characteristics of the state and its 
elites. Ahistorical or "objective" variables such as technology, polarity, or relative 
material capabilities are all of secondary importance. It is strategic culture, they argue, 
that gives meaning to these variables. The weight of historical experiences and 
historically-rooted strategic preferences tends to constrain responses to changes in the 
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"objective" strategic environment, thus affecting strategic choices in unique ways. If 
strategic culture itself changes, it does so slowly, lagging behind changes in 
"objective" conditions.276  
 
 There followed a debate over the merits of the strategic cultural approach, notably 
between Alastair Johnston and Colin Gray. Johnston criticised the cultural approach as going 
too far in relegating ‘objective’ factors to the background: if everything – “technology, 
geography, organizational culture and traditions, historical strategic practices, political 
culture, national character, political psychology, ideology, and even international system 
structure” – is cultural, the term becomes meaningless; the model cannot not be tested against 
a non-cultural model because by definition a non-cultural model of strategy does not exist. 
Furthermore, it risks being overly deterministic.277 Snyder himself backed away from such a 
broad conception of strategic culture, arguing that it should only be used when analysing 
cases where cultural factors were being seen to exercise an outsize influence on strategic 
planning;278 Nevertheless, Gray argued in reply that – along the lines of Kratochwil, Searle 
and Bourdieu – all human action takes place in a context of culture. “strategic culture 
provides a context for understanding, rather than explanatory causality”279 Though objective 
factors measured by more positivist theories are undoubtedly important, “the strategic 
cultural context thus constitutes and gives meaning to the material variables that realist 
theories typically rely on for explanation.”280  
 
Strategic culture, although being concerned with the decision-making process of one 
actor as opposed to a number of competitors, has much in common with the general 
characteristics of rules as I have laid out above. Cultural beliefs as to what is appropriate or 
effective serve a similar function to other types of rules, in that they reduce the number of 
options an actor needs to choose from; in much the same way as Kratochwil describes the 
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function of rules as a way of simplifying choices, Alastair Johnston notes that “strategic 
culture simplifies reality”;281 cultural beliefs can also reinforce the social hierarchy and 
distribution of power within an organisation just as much as explicit laws can, as Gramsci and 
other critical theorists would attest (a point which I will go into greater detail shortly, with an 
examination of Snyder’s The Ideology of the Offensive). Theo Farrell notes the rule-based 
nature of strategic culture in his study The Norms of War, where he characterises those norms 
as “technical scripts and moral codes”282, which govern an actor’s perception of what is 
physically possible or likely to be successful in war, as well as what is morally permissible. 
Farrell pays particular attention to “transnational norms of military professionalism”, which 
contribute to a common understanding of how war should be fought and prepared for; he 
chooses the case of the the Irish Army in the period following the Irish Revolution as a 
particularly puzzling case of military decision-making, which can be explained principally 
with reference to this aspect of strategic culture. After two years of irregular warfare against 
Britain, Ireland had gained some degree of independence from the British Empire. It was 
beset by two strategic threats: the most important was naturally that of Britain, but the most 
immediate was that posed by IRA rebels who objected to the conditions of the peace the Irish 
Government had assented to. In these conditions,  
 
Lacking the time and expertise to invent their own system of organization, Irish 
officers decided to adopt a foreign system and after looking around they opted for 
Britain’s system. However, the British system was not chosen for its military success 
(after all, the British Army had itself failed to crush Irish rebellion), but for its 
familiarity… The Irish Army did need to quickly adopt a military system so it could 
get on with fighting the rebels, and the British Army was the most easily 
assimilated.283  
 
 The choice of a conventional armed force along the British model was a bizarre one, 
given the threat from the British in particular. A conventional defense against an expected 
British invasion (it was assumed that Britain would invade in order to control Ireland’s 
Atlantic ports in the event of a European war) would have been batted aside with little effort; 
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British troops and materiel outnumbered the Irish, and standards of training were much 
higher on the British side. The deployment of an irregular force which threatened to tie down 
a large number of British divisions sorely needed elsewhere would have been a much more 
promising strategy, but the Army chose a conventional force structure regardless.284 Farrell 
points to other small states which have chosen to invest in a Western triservice (army, navy 
and air force) model, one that is capital-intensive and unsuited for developing nations which 
might rather be expected to focus on their comparative advantage in labour-intensive force 
structures; nevertheless, the military norm of a conventional force structure persists.285 This 
choice can be interpreted as a consequence of the vast selection of options open to strategic 
planners; preconceived notions of how war should be done spares cognitive effort, and more 
importantly spares strategists from consciously addressing the uncertainty of war, and the 
implications this has for any planner who is trying to come up with a foolproof strategy. 
Adopting a preselected, ‘tried-and-tested’ force structure or strategic plan is naturally 
especially reassuring, despite whatever advantages an innovative strategy might have. 
 
 Another particularly well-examined example of inappropriate strategic doctrine 
leading to disaster was the choice of several of the great powers which fought the First World 
War – France, Germany and Russia – to opt for a strategy based on the offensive, one which 
was radically out of step with the prevailing technological conditions on the eve of that war – 
a thesis advanced by Jack Snyder in his book The Ideology of the Offensive.286 In the years 
preceding the First World War, a system of alliances had bound Europe into two armed 
camps, with the Entente powers of France, Russia and the United Kingdom pitted against the 
‘Central Powers’ of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. When Austria invaded Serbia in 
the July of 1914, Russia mobilised to defend the smaller state, provoking a German 
mobilisation in response; French mobilisation in support of Russia was met with a German 
invasion according to the pre-war Schlieffen Plan, which aimed to knock France out of a two-
front war (Russia being the other front). The invasion of Belgium as a means to this plan 
violated the Treaty of London which guaranteed Belgian neutrality, which brought the UK 
into the war. War on the Western Front became bogged down in the trench warfare for which 
it became notorious, while in the east German armies were able to manoeuvre more 
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effectively and defeat invading Russian forces which, though large, were poorly equipped 
and led.  
 
In the cases of Germany, France and Russia, each state had begun the war with an 
offensive plan of action, each of which resulted in problems. Snyder’s argument is that there 
were a number of motivations behind the choice of an offensive strategy in the case of these 
three countries, and that these were not exclusively based on a rational and objective strategic 
assessment. The relative advantages of the offensive and defensive depend on technological 
and geographical factors, and the political aims of the countries concerned; in the context of 
the First World War, there were a number of technological factors which greatly reinforced 
the strength of the defensive against the attack (the influence of which was, contrary to 
popular belief, widely understood from the examples of the Boer and Russo-Japanese Wars). 
Each of the three countries, Snyder argues, would have been better off fighting defensively – 
in the case of Germany, by invading Belgium and taking the offensive against France, its 
strategy brought the UK into the war – inviting a naval blockade it had consciously sought to 
avoid. Snyder argues that, despite some superficial evidence that suggests an offensive 
posture would be preferable, the choice of such strategies was not the result of detached 
strategic reasoning; instead, “the choice of offensive strategies by the continental powers was 
primarily the result of organisational biases and doctrinal over-simplifications of professional 
military planners.”287 Snyder points to two sources of bias which shaped the decisionmaking 
process of the countries’ strategists: “the first, biases rooted in the motivations of the decision 
makers, especially in their parochial interests, and the second, biases that result from 
decision makers’ attempts to simplify and impose a structure on their complex analytical 
task.”288  
 
France was the country whose strategy Snyder characterises as being most strongly 
influenced by the first sort of bias. Prior to the war, the French military establishment was 
striving to maintain independence from civilian control and the imposition of a reservist-
based force structure, which led it to advocate an offensive strategic doctrine which could 
only be carried out by professional soldiers who were trained and practised over many 
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years.289 Regardless of their importance, these narrow, ‘parochial’ interests are of course not 
exclusive to military organisations, being found in any corporate enterprise which relies on 
the cooperation of disparate sub-groups. More closely connected with the experience of war 
is the psychological role of doctrine and the needs it meets in this regard. In certain situations, 
what Snyder calls “decisional conflicts” are presented to the strategic decision-maker. These 
can take the form of a contradiction between preconceptions and reality; between the 
assumptions of a strategic plan and the realities of the unfolding war. Attaining an effective 
understanding of reality is a pressing psychological need for the commander; in war, there is 
a huge amount of information to process and is often confusing and inchoate; simplified 
doctrine provides a mechanism for making sense of the mass of perceptions and satisfies “the 
cognitive and organisational need for simplicity and stable structure.”290 
 
There are, Snyder postulates, five sources of bias from doctrinal simplification. The 
first is focus of attention – the fact that soldiers are preoccupied with fighting and war colours 
their perception of reality and blinds them to less violent and conflictual ways of settling 
disputes – as the saying goes, if all one has is a hammer, everything looks like a nail; the 
same could be argued to apply to armed force. From this perspective, the proactive use of 
offensive violence has an innate appeal prior to any situational reasons. The second source is 
the factors which shape the formation of doctrine – a small and potentially unrepresentative 
number of formative experiences, such as limited experience of past wars (and the repeated 
training based on those experiences), moulds the military mindset in a set way which is not 
updated to take into account changes which have occurred in the meantime, particularly with 
regards to technology. The third source is the dogmatisation of doctrine: “all doctrines are 
dogmatic in the sense that they are simple, narrow, deductive, and resistant to changes, but 
some are more dogmatic than others”291 and doctrines are likely to become dogmas in 
centralised organisations which can effectively disseminate them, and when they are not 
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tested against reality. Fourth, the economy of calculation – this is a consequence of the 
tendency of doctrine to function as a ‘rule of thumb’; when confronted with uncertain 
information, particularly in technical areas like logistics, calculations can be excessively 
optimistic; as Clausewitz would say, the strategist might not make adequate allowances for 
friction. Lastly, the need for reduction in uncertainty can push strategic planning along 
offensive lines: when one attacks, one has the initiative and imposes one’s plan of action 
upon the enemy, and by definition one knows what one is going to do (or at least try to do); 
however, when one defends, one is reacting to the unpredictable actions of the opponent. A 
defensive posture may not be so difficult to execute in the event of war – in fact, an attack 
always exposes one’s forces to a degree of risk as they move and are unable to fight properly 
– but in planning for a war, it is much simpler to take the active role rather than speculate as 
to the enemy’s potentially myriad plans.292 Though a number of these factors apply to other 
pursuits, here we can see the pressures on the strategist which are central to war, key among 
them the need to simplify the informational demands of war and the difficulty of formulating 
a plan in an environment which is in a state of constant change. Ultimately, though, there is 
always a pressure to hold to some kind of doctrine – “the advantages of “keeping an open 
mind” do not compensate for the lack of a theory of victory”293  
 
Geopolitics and geostrategy 
 
Strategy can also be constructed on more objective foundations; as we have seen from 
Snyder’s account, a key influence on German strategy was its geographic position between 
France and Russia, a factor which played a strong role in shaping the Schlieffen plan. This 
use of geography as a determinant of strategic planning has enjoyed a long career in the form 
of geopolitics, which has sought both to identify areas of key strategic significance on the 
basis of geographical properties (for instance, easily interdicted trade routes such as the 
Malacca straits), and to formulate general strategies based on theories of how geographic 
constants influence the distribution of power throughout the world. The most famous 
exponent of geopolitics was the British geographer Halford Mackinder. Mackinder believed 
that he had identified in world geography a strategic principle – even a law – in that control 
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of an area which he called the “Heartland” would determine who would dominate the entire 
world. This area was the vast expanse of land in Central Asia which stretched from Europe in 
the East to the Gobi Desert in the West, and from the Himalayas in the South to the Arctic 
Sea in the North. In past times, this land produced the steppe nomad tribes who occasionally 
burst onto their civilised neighbours; at the time Mackinder was writing, it was mostly under 
the control of the Russian Empire. Due to the invention of railways, the possession of such a 
large expanse of resource-rich land, with secure internal lines of communication and strong 
external barriers in the form of deserts, mountains and an unnavigable sea, would (so 
Mackinder claimed) enable the holder to dominate the rest of the world.294 As he put it, 
 
"Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; 
who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; 
who rules the World-Island commands the world."295 
 
Mackinder’s observations were ostensibly objective, identifying the seat of power in 
world politics and commenting on the power dynamics which would result from it - but from 
the perspective of a power which did not occupy the Heartland, such theorising was 
obviously pregnant with possibilities: denial of control of this area to a continental power was 
a key strategic necessity. Mackinder’s theory proved influential, appealing to a ready 
audience in two such powers, the United Kingdom and the USA (notably shaping Zbigniew 
Brezinzski’s own strategic vision for the United States in his book The Grand Chessboard), 
but other thinkers interpreted the same map of the world a little differently. Nicholas 
Spykman, for one, saw the ‘rimland’ – the coastal fringe of the world island (analogous to the 
“inner or marginal crescent” on the map below) – as the key geostrategic resource, based on 
factors like its industrialisation relative to the more backward interior of the Heartland.296 
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“The Natural Seats of Power” from The Geographical Pivot of History297 
 
Similarly, Britain’s unique geographical nature as an island nation (and its economic 
implications) has been posited as the source of a particularly “British Way of Warfare”, most 
notably by Basil Liddell Hart. Deriving its power from maritime trade, Britain’s interests laid 
in commerce rather than territorial domination of the continent of Europe; this geographical 
and economic position determined (or, ought to determine) its strategy, which should consist 
of the denial of that continental domination to its mainland rivals – the country coming to 
grief when this strategy was forgotten. Limited use of military force succeeded in frustrating 
the designs of those who sought to dominate Europe and threaten British commercial 
interests – from the Spanish in the days of Elizabeth I, to the Dutch in the time of Cromwell 
and Charles II, to the French, beaten by the Duke of Marlborough and later by Wellington. In 
these cases sea power played a central role and land warfare, when it occurred, was 
conducted with relatively limited numbers and a tendency to draw on the military resources 
of allies (such as the Dutch, in the War of the Spanish Succession).298 Such a strategy, Liddell 
Hart claimed, would serve Britain’s interests better than its uncharacteristic intervention into 
mass continental warfare in the First World War. Naturally Liddell Hart’s thesis has proved 
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controversial; Michael Howard argues in The Continental Commitment: the Dilemma of 
British Defence Policy in the Era of the Two World Wars, that British strategy in Europe had 
always relied both on naval power and the deployment of armies on the European mainland – 
a theme which continued to his own day, when the Cold War rivalry over Europe necessitated 
a strong British presence (that said, Howard does not deny the recurrent strategic theme of 
British efforts to prevent a territorial hegemon from controlling the continent of Europe).299 
Elizabeth Kier sees Liddell Hart’s theories as a reaction to the First World War, rather than as 
a disinterested account of genuine traditions; opposition to a repeat of the First World War 
experience both within the armed forces and in the political establishment found Liddell 
Hart’s analysis useful in pushing a limited military agenda.300 Yet another school of 
geostrategy was founded by the German Karl Haushofer, who played an influential role in the 
formulation of German Geopolitik; here the need for lebensraum was accorded a central role 
in determining the shape of strategy, with racial theories colouring the analysis... As might be 
noted, the profusion of different schools of geostrategy and geopolitics, and their varying 
interpretations of the same ‘objective’ conditions, gives the lie to the assumption that a truly 
objective strategy might be arrived at; like all other aspects of war, geographic reality is 
filtered through a mass of cultural assumptions which lend emphasis to some factors and 
downplay others. Technological change (as Mackinder notes with the importance of the 
railways in making the Heartland so significant) again complicates matters, changing the 
significance of certain features of geography and terrain. The formulation of strategy 
primarily on the basis of technological capabilities is another factor entirely – I will explore 
strategies based on this aspect of war in the next chapter. 
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Clausewitz on Strategy 
 
Clausewitz’s definition of war barely needs introduction: “a continuation of political 
intercourse carried on with other means.”301 But what are the means? Clausewitz is revealing, 
on the first page of On War: 
 
War is thus an act of force... Force – that is, physical force, for moral force has no 
existence save as expressed in the state and the law – is thus the means of war; to 
impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the 
enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the 
place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself.302 
 
 Nevertheless, the drive to pure destruction is modified by the object of the war, and 
political considerations have important implications for strategy. We have already seen from 
our previous study of Clausewitz that he had particular views on strategy and the limited 
possibilities of formulating principles which are both detailed and eternally valid. This is due 
in large part to the vast number of variables a strategist must take into account, and the 
historically specific characteristics of the war in question; this is especially the case regarding 
the political aim of war: 
 
To discover how much of our resources must be mobilized for war, we must first 
examine our own political aim and that of the enemy. We gauge the strength and 
situation of the opposing state. We must gauge the character and abilities of its 
government and people and do the same in regard to our own. Finally, we must 
evaluate the political sympathies of other states and the effect the war may have on 
them. To assess these things in all their ramifications and diversity is plainly a 
colossal task. Rapid and correct appraisal of them clearly calls for the intuition of a 
genius; to master all this complex mass by sheer methodical examination is obviously 
impossible. Bonaparte was quite right when he said that Newton himself would quail 
before the algebraic problems it could pose.303 
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 We may note that Clausewitz draws a distinction between war and peace on 
the basis of law and authority – two things he presumably sees as missing in war; 
nevertheless war is fought through physical force. In any case the means by which strategy is 
carried out is through the use of force. Once all has been said about mental calculation and 
subtleties of strategy in pursuing a desired end, Clausewitz is uncompromising about the 
means that can be used: 
  
There is only one: combat. However many forms combat takes, however far it may be 
removed from the brute discharge of hatred and enmity of a physical encounter, 
however many forces may intrude which themselves are not part of fighting, it is 
inherent in the very concept of war that everything that occurs must originally derive 
from combat.304 
 
That is not to deny the use of feints and ruses - 
 
[this theory] holds good even if no actual fighting occurs, because the outcome rests on 
the assumption that if it came to fighting, the enemy would be destroyed. It follows that 
the destruction of the enemy's force underlies all military actions; all plans are 
ultimately based on it, resting on it like an arch on its abutment. Consequently, all 
action is undertaken in the belief that if the ultimate test of arms should actually occur, 
the outcome would be favorable.305 
 
 Physical destruction of the enemy’s forces can give rise to a moral collapse,306 and 
indeed the moral disintegration of an army could be said to destroy it in a sense. Destruction 
of the enemy’s forces trumps other means, in that the changed physical capabilities of each 
side have a ‘ripple-down’ effect by dint of altering the raw material with which each side 
makes its calculations and estimates of future success or failure. There are obvious drawbacks 
to this means, however – as Clausewitz states, “the greater the success we seek, the greater 
                                                     
304 Ibid., 95 
305 Ibid., 97 
306 Ibid., 97 
133 
 
the damage if we fail”,307 and to engage in the vernichtungsschlacht is to court irrevocable 
defeat as well as decisive victory. Given the chancy nature of battle, with all its friction and 
danger, there is no guarantee that even a well-prepared side will win. “The advantage that the 
destruction of the enemy possesses over all other means is balanced by its cost and danger; 
and it is only in order to avoid these risks that other policies are employed.”308 
 
How this force is used can vary, however; a war can be fought in a totally ‘absolute’ 
fashion, aiming at the total annihilation of the enemy, or instead the general can prosecute a 
‘limited’ war. Influencing the enemy’s expectations of future success or failure can be 
achieved through political machinations – breaking apart an alliance or forming ones of our 
own309  and making the war more costly, by means of physical damage to the enemy. This 
can take two forms – the destruction of his armed forces, and the seizure of territory.310 
Modern parlance would define these as ‘counterforce’ and ‘countervalue’ attacks: the 
destruction of the armed forces destroys the enemy’s present power and the seizure of his 
lands destroys his ability to supply them. Economic blockade could be considered an example 
of the latter sort of strategy (the exclusive mention of ‘land’ is perhaps one area where 
Clausewitz could justifiably be accused of irrelevance to contemporary war, in an 
uncharacteristic instance of under-theorising); strategy can proceed on the basis of ‘centres of 
gravity’ which are so identified. In any case the outright defeat of the enemy is not required 
for victory, merely his submission having recognised that continuing the fight is no longer 
worth the effort. However, there is an advantage bestowed on whichever side is more willing 
to engage in a decisive battle; if one is pursuing another more ‘limited’ strategy, one’s 
resources and plans will be less adapted to the type of fight the opponent wants to engage in: 
by the nature of battle, initiative lies with the attacker, who can force the issue whether the 
opponent wants the fight or not.311 Clausewitz does not insist that there are no valid strategies 
in war other than the pursuit of decisive destruction of the enemy forces – if we are sure our 
opponent is unwilling to resort to a battle we can limit our own exertions312 – but the trump 
card of combat cannot be ignored:  
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If the political aims are small, the motives slight and tensions low, a prudent general 
may look for any way to avoid major crises and decisive actions, exploit any 
weaknesses in the opponent's military and political strategy, and finally reach a 
peaceful settlement. If his assumptions are sound and promise success we are not 
entitled to criticize him. But he must never forget that he is moving on devious paths 
where the god of war may catch him unawares. He must always keep an eye on his 
opponent so that he does not, if the latter has taken up a sharp sword, approach him 
armed only with an ornamental rapier.313 
 
Such considerations no doubt motivated the battle-averse generals of the ancien 
regime – whereas Napoleon, who was not risking the whole of France’s vast strength in each 
engagement, could take the boldest course of action and force a series of battles that his 
enemies would have rather avoided – the prize for such decisive use of destruction being 
near-total domination of Europe.  
 
The risks and dangers of battle are compounded by the inherently chancy nature of 
warfare – as we have already noted, Clausewitz had a heightened appreciation of the role of 
chance and uncertainty in war: danger and its effect on the psyche; physical effort; poor 
information; and the effects of ‘general friction’, all combine to frustrate the designs of the 
commander. It is instructive to note the physical element in most of these factors, just as 
Clausewitz defines war to be a physical exercise. Clausewitz is dismissive of attempts to 
build ornate theories and derive ‘principles of war’ in the fashion of his more geometry-
minded competitors, and his appreciation of the physical side of war is no doubt a reason for 
this; what, then, can be done to overcome the difficulties inherent in warfare? Firstly, 
Clausewitz places the greatest emphasis of all on the person of the commanding general as 
the key force in overcoming the difficulties inherent in war, whose genius overcomes the 
obstacles inherent in war. A general of ‘genius’ has presence of mind, boldness and 
perseverance in dealing with the pervasive uncertainty of war. There are other limited 
principles of war (again, as examined earlier) which the strategist can adhere to, like the 
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concentration of force and mastery of technical routines: essentially, Clausewitz’s most 
important qualifications are ‘bottom-up’ qualities which can be applied to any situation  
Clausewitz lists among other requirements of strategy the use of surprise; the superiority of 
numbers and their concentration in time and space in a way which reinforces their strength 
and exploits enemy weakness, and the maintenance of a strategic reserve – but only in such a 
way as it can reliably provide timely assistance.314  These last three headings he groups under 
the concept of economy of force315, which does not mean eking out military resources, but 
rather refers to the need to make sure that all resources are being used in the most efficient 
manner.  
 
Clausewitz does seem to argue that the strategic sphere is less uncertain than other 
levels of war. A potentially telling comment on the increasing influence of chance on military 
affairs is in Chapter 13 of Book 3 of On War, on “The Strategic Reserve”. Clausewitz makes 
the assertion that uncertainty becomes less of a factor as one moves from the tactical to the 
strategic level (“it practically disappears in that level of strategy which borders the 
political”)316 The risk of strategic surprise is much less than tactical surprise, as whilst in 
battle we are only aware of an approaching enemy when they are drawing near, in the realm 
of strategy “the direction from which he threatens our country will usually be announced in 
the press before a single shot is fired.” This, along with Clausewitz’s claims regarding 
intelligence, are rather extreme interpretations of a general truth. Strategic surprise was 
utilised on a number of occasions in the Second World War, such as the Allied invasion of 
Sicily (deception operations, notably Operation Mincemeat, hinted at an invasion in Greece), 
as well as Operation Overlord (here, the pas de Calais). Strangely Clausewitz discounts the 
human dimension in strategic surprise – the German Ardennes offensive of 1940, Operation 
Barbarossa, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour were all forewarned, but failure to act 
on intelligence made the obviousness of the threats irrelevant. He surely cannot have been 
unaware of Frederick the Great’s bold invasion of Saxony at the outset of the Seven Years’ 
War. 
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 Following the First World War, Clausewitz’s apparent avocation of destruction and 
‘total war’ above all else was blamed for the strategy of attrition which inflicted such 
slaughter in the trenches. One such critic was the British military theorist Basil Liddell 
Hart,317 who like many others in the inter-war years attempted to refine military doctrine and 
reintroduce manoeuvre to war in the West. Liddell Hart’s vision of strategy was opposed to 
the unimaginative and profligate use of forces in the First World War, which he (wrongly) 
blamed on the pernicious influence of Clausewitz, and sought to identify ways in which 
armed force could be deployed with maximum effectiveness. This he found in the ‘indirect 
approach’: the use of manoeuvre in time and space to engage with the enemy on superior 
terms, magnifying the effect of the forces used. The ‘indirect’ aspect refers to the fact that 
manoeuvring in this way takes time and effort; attacking in the easiest and most predictable 
way is in Liddell Hart’s model a direct approach; an attack from an unexpected direction, 
like Lawrence’s assault on Aqaba from the Nefud Desert, is unexpected because the terrain it 
is launched from is (rightly) considered difficult (the same goes for other factors, like the 
time of day or year – for instance the 1944-5 Ardennes offensive, launched in winter); the 
payoff to the preparation comes when a comparatively small force is able to achieve results 
out of proportion to their numbers, achieving victory at a stroke. 
 
 To achieve this end Liddell Hart’s strategy aims at what he calls dislocation, which is 
to say to break the cohesion of the enemy’s forces, and not their destruction per se.  
 
How is the strategic dislocation produced? In the physical, or ‘logistical’ sphere it is 
the result of a move which (a) upsets the enemy’s dispositions and, by compelling a 
sudden ‘change of front’, dislocates the distribution and organisation of his forces; (b) 
separates his forces; (c) endangers his supplies; (d) menaces the route or routes by 
which he could retreat… In the psychological sphere, dislocation is the result of the 
impression on the commander’s mind of the physical effects which we have listed. 
The impression is strongly accentuated if his realisation of being at a disadvantage is 
sudden, and if he feels he is unable to counter the enemy’s move. Psychological 
dislocation fundamentally springs from this sense of being trapped. This is the reason 
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why it has most frequently followed a physical move on to the enemy's rear… In 
contrast, to move directly on an opponent is to consolidate his equilibrium, physical 
and psychological, and by consolidating it to augment his resisting power.”318 
 
 In many ways Liddell Hart resembles Sun Tzu, the author of The Art of War. Sun is 
supposed to have been a Chinese general in the service of the King of Wu, around the mid to 
late 6th Century BC. His book is held up by many manouvreists as presaging their own 
theories, not least Liddell Hart, who wrote a glowing foreword to a 1963 translation.319 Sun’s 
philosophy of warfare is centered around his advocacy of the ideal victory, one which is won 
before battle is joined – as Sun famously remarked, “a victorious army wins its victories 
before seeking battle; an army destined to defeat fights in the hope of winning”.320 The means 
of doing so are several: acquiring intelligence whilst deceiving the enemy; dividing the 
enemy’s forces (whether in terms of strategic alliances or on the battlefield) whilst 
maintaining the cohesion of one’s own; engaging in battle only under favourable conditions, 
both physical and moral; and acting in accordance with changing circumstances.  
 
Intelligence and deception are the two areas in which Sun is markedly different from 
Clausewitz, who as we have seen, was rather circumspect about the possibilities of military 
intelligence, which he considered inherently unreliable. Sun almost takes the opposite 
extreme: “of all those in the army close to the commander, none is more intimate than the 
secret agent.”321 He describes various techniques through which intelligence may be gathered 
– identifying the composition of an enemy army by the height of the dust thrown up by their 
approach, and identifying supply problems through similar observations (troops leaning on 
their weapons indicates that they are hungry, and if water-carriers are spotted drinking at the 
source before carrying water back to camp, then one can assume the army is thirsty);322 the 
use of secret agents is also advised, with intelligence-gathering made down to the level of 
discovering the names of garrison commanders, staff officers, gatekeepers and so on.323 
Deception – furnishing the enemy with false information and concealing one’s own intentions 
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– is the counterpart to this, denying the enemy the advantages of good intelligence and 
hindering his own efforts. “war is based on deception. Move when it is advantageous and 
create changes in the situation by dispersal and concentration of the forces.”324 Sun exploits 
to the full the possibilities of conflict unbound by a constitution: “the enemy must not know 
where I intend to give battle. For if he does not know… he must prepare in a great many 
places.”325 
 
Sun’s focus on unpredictability similarly has two aspects, the need for one’s actions to 
remain unpredictable, and the necessity of coping with an unpredictable environment: “as 
water has no constant form, there are in war no constant conditions.”326 Despite Sun’s 
optimistic view on how a commander can plan his way to victory, there is a strong 
acknowledgement that every situation in war is unique, and that there are no set ways to do 
things – in a rather poetic turn of phrase, “Thus, one able to gain the victory by modifying his 
tactics in accordance with the enemy situation may be said to be divine. Of the five elements, 
none is always predominant; of the four seasons, none lasts forever; of the days, some are 
long and some are short, and the moon waxes and wanes.”327 Naturally one must do one’s 
utmost to make this task as difficult as possible for one’s enemy, altering tactics even after 
(or even, especially after) a victory so as to remain unpredictable,328 and attacking when 
unexpected and when the enemy is unprepared.329 “Speed” writes Sun, “is the essence of 
war.”330 This applies both on the tactical and strategic levels – rapid manoeuvring brings 
advantage on the battlefield, facilitating unpredictability, but avoiding the dangers of a 
prolonged conflict is also a recurrent theme in The Art of War.331  
 
Though Clausewitz and Sun take different perspectives, their respective approaches to 
war are both based on an appreciation that in war anything is possible. Sun and Liddell Hart 
seem to be more optimistic about the possibilities for innovative strategies, whereas 
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Clausewitz (despite acknowledging the possibilities of war) appears to be more circumspect 
regarding the difficulties inherent to war I will now examine two ‘inductive’ doctrines which 
strongly bear the influence of both thinkers: maneuver warfare, and irregular war. 
 
Maneuver Warfare 
 
“Speed is the essence of war. Take advantage of the enemy’s unpreparedness; travel 
by unexpected routes and strike him where he has taken no precautions”332 
 
As can be seen from Sun’s aphorisms, manoeuvre has been a part of war for a long 
time. Perhaps the earliest recorded instance of it was the battle of Leuctra in 371 BC, fought 
between Thebes and Sparta; the Theban general Epaminondas arranged his troops to achieve 
local superiority of numbers on the Spartan flank, causing a rout which infected the rest of 
the Spartan army. The enlightenment era was particularly noted for the use of manoeuvre on 
the strategic level, where generals sought to avoid decisive (and risky) battles – either by 
trying to wage more predictable sieges, or by making elaborate marches which threatened to 
cut lines of supply, occupy advantageous ground, and so on – to the point where some 
military theorists aspired to uncover mathematical principles of strategy which would almost 
avoid the need for battle altogether. Both Clausewitz and Machiavelli were particularly 
damning of practice, whether carried out by cowardly condottieri or by risk-averse ancien 
regime armies, and since those days, ‘manoeuvre’ has been tarred with connotations of 
indecision and timidity. 
 
The mass armies of the Napoleonic era brought about an increased emphasis on the 
decisive encounter and the clash of arms; this trend reached new heights in the slaughter of 
the First World War, as we have seen. Various manifestations of manoeuvre were born out of 
the experience of that war; the main focus of this chapter is the American response, 
‘maneuver warfare’. Despite its origins as a non-establishment theory and one seen as 
antithetical to an ‘American way of war’ characterised by attrition and overwhelming 
firepower, over a number of decades the doctrine exerted a profound influence on American 
military theory and practice, reaching its apotheosis in the lightning campaigns in the Gulf in 
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1991 and 2003333 and contributing in large part to the development of the ‘AirLand battle’ 
doctrine developed in anticipation of war with the Warsaw Pact countries in Europe. The 
doctrine was especially influential in the US Marine Corps, whose manual Warfighting is 
essentially a digest of Clausewitz’s On War, combined with an exposition of the principles of 
maneuver. Maneuver warfare as a military doctrine grew out of theories developed by 
outsiders in the Pentagon in the late 1970s and early 1980s – notably the Air Force Colonel 
John Boyd, and the civilian theorist William Lind, author of the Maneuver Warfare 
Handbook.334  
 
John Boyd began his military career as a fighter pilot in the Korean War, and later a 
flight instructor. Having flown F-86 Sabre jets in Korea, he was puzzled as to why they had a 
superior combat performance over the Soviet-built MiG-15s. Afterwards he spent time at the 
Pentagon developing his “Energy-Maneuverability theory” – a mathematical model which 
quantified the performance of a given plane, based on a calculation of its thrust-to-weight 
ratio, wing loading and other technical details. Boyd found the reason that the Sabre was 
better than the MiG was due to the fact it could transition from one manoeuvre to the next 
more quickly, and that its bubble canopy allowed better visibility and situational awareness 
than the MiG’s more restricted cockpit.335 The E-M theory went on to become the basis for 
US fighter training, and the design of new fighter aircraft, specifically the F-15 and F-16 (in 
which Boyd himself had a hand); it also provided the foundations of Boyd’s own theories of 
war.  
 
Boyd’s theoretical work was never written down as a whole; he instead disseminated 
it through long lectures. The longest written part of his work is his essay Destruction and 
Creation, written in 1976. Boyd’s views on war are nested within a very wide-ranging 
philosophy of life in general: in order to achieve our ends, human beings need to make 
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decisions on what actions to take – and in order to make these decisions, we need accurate 
‘concepts’ or ‘theories’ of the objective (and changeable) reality in which we live. A useful 
theory of reality can be arrived at by aggregating smaller concepts, on the basis of their 
“common qualities, attributes or operations” (Boyd implicitly likens this to Kuhn’s theory of 
paradigms); however, Boyd noted, a perfect correspondence between a static model and the 
ever-changing reality it describes is an impossibility – we must constantly destroy and create 
new concepts of reality to keep up with the changing situation. Boyd argues this with an 
appeal to three scientific theories: the incompleteness theorem of Kurt Gödel; Heisenberg’s 
uncertainty principle; and the second law of thermodynamics. Gödel’s theorem states - 
 
that any consistent system – that includes the arithmetic of whole numbers – is 
incomplete. In other words, there are true statements or concepts within the system 
that cannot be deduced from the postulates that make-up the system.... even though 
such a system is consistent, its consistency cannot be demonstrated within the 
system.336 
 
 In other words, the assumptions upon which a theory is based cannot be proved to be 
true by the theory itself (for instance, the scientific method cannot itself prove the validity of 
empiricism – this has to be assumed) – a new theory will be needed to explain the 
assumptions, itself based on assumptions of its own. Any theory of reality will therefore 
ultimately be based on unproven assumptions: 
 
Likewise, our observations of reality must be incomplete since we depend upon a 
changing concept to shape or formulate the nature of new inquiries and observations. 
Therefore, when we probe back and forth with more precision and subtlety, we must 
admit that we can have differences between observation and concept description; 
hence, we cannot determine the consistency of the system—in terms of its concept, 
and matchup with observed reality—within itself.337  
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 Heisenberg’s Indeterminacy Principle states that we cannot know both the velocity 
and the position of a subatomic particle simultaneously – due to the ‘observer effect’, by 
which the observation of a process affects its outcome. The more involved the observer, the 
more uncertain the outcome; therefore (and here Boyd makes something of a logical leap, 
Heisenberg’s principle being concerned with subatomic phenomena), when we are actively 
participating in the reality which we are conceptualising, our presence introduces uncertainty. 
The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that in a closed system, entropy (disorder) 
increases; our theories of the world become less useful:  
 
Accordingly, whenever we attempt to do work or take action inside such a system – a 
concept and its match-up with reality – we should anticipate an increase in entropy, 
hence an increase in confusion and disorder. Naturally, this means we cannot 
determine the character or nature (consistency) of such a system within itself, since 
the system is moving irreversibly toward a higher, yet unknown, state of confusion 
and disorder.338 
 
 Whether these rather esoteric theories are completely applicable to the kind of 
military decisionmaking processes Boyd analyses is debatable; certainly, they provide a 
compelling argument that the achievements of total accuracy, in our perception of reality, and 
certainty, in our theories of how reality ‘works’, is impossible. Somewhat ironically, for all 
his appreciation of the fallibility of such theoretical constructs, Boyd himself was inclined to 
believe the implications of his models over real life experience: on giving a lecture on his 
Energy-Maneuverability theory to a group of US Navy pilots, Boyd was insistent on the 
theoretical impossibility of American F-4 fighter beating a MiG-17 in a dogfight, despite 
disagreement from his audience, more than one of whom had done so themselves.339 
 
 How are we to cope with such pervasive uncertainty? Boyd held that by constantly 
updating our theories of reality, we could escape the accretion of errors and inaccuracies 
which ultimately overwhelm ‘fixed’ theories; this process of destruction and creation (after 
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which the essay is named) underlies his most well-known intellectual tool, the OODA loop. 
The loop gets its name from the four stages in the decisionmaking cycle – Observe, Orient, 
Decide, and Act. ‘Observation’ is the process whereby information is gathered – the evidence 
of the senses, information communicated by others, orders from superiors and so on. 
‘Orientation’ is the analysis of this raw information according to various conscious and 
unconscious processes – theories of how the world works, whether explicitly formulated or 
more unconscious and norm-based. ‘Decision’ (naturally) is the process of deciding a course 
of action based on the orientation stage; ‘action’ is the process of carrying it out. At each 
stage, feedback occurs – our own actions and thought processes having their own influence 
on events (vide Heisenberg’s Principle), they are incorporated into another ‘observation’ 
stage. 
 
Figure 1. The OODA Loop340
 
 
 Boyd believed that the process of combat could – and would – be dominated by the 
actor who was able to carry out the cycle faster than their opponent. Given a fast enough 
cycle, a slower opponent would end up acting on observations which were effectively out of 
date; for example, in jet fighter combat between the Sabre and MiG, the Sabre’s hydraulic 
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control system enabled a faster transition between manoeuvres from a turn into a dive, say – 
and the MiG, despite its other mechanical advantages, would be lag behind the Sabre in the 
decisionmaking ‘tempo’ as Boyd called it. The same process applies at various levels of 
tactics and strategy; the actor able to ‘get inside’ the opponent’s OODA loop will present to 
them an increasingly disordered perception of reality, useless as a guide to action. Boyd 
states, in lecture slides for his presentation, Patterns of Conflict:  
 
Operate inside adversary’s observation-orientation-decision-action loops, or get inside 
his mind-time-space, to create tangles of threatening and/or non-threatening 
events/efforts as well as repeatedly generate mismatches between those events/efforts 
adversary observes, or imagines, and those he must react to, to survive;  
thereby 
Enmesh adversary in an amorphous, menacing, and unpredictable world of 
uncertainty, doubt, mistrust, confusion, disorder, fear, panic, chaos … and/or fold 
adversary back inside himself;  
thereby 
Maneuver adversary beyond his moral-mental-physical capacity to adapt or endure so 
that he can neither divine our intentions nor focus his efforts to cope with the 
unfolding strategic design or related decisive strokes as they penetrate, splinter, 
isolate or envelop, and overwhelm him.341  
 
In Boyd’s view, war is a chaotic and uncertain environment; however, we can take 
advantage of this and ‘funnel’ the uncertainty toward our opponent. Whether Boyd 
considered this to be a special characteristic of war is unclear – though others have adapted 
his theories to other forms of conflict, such as business and litigation – certainly, such a 
technique is less immediately feasible in turn-based conflicts as described earlier. Boyd 
himself was concerned with military matters, and spent his career alongside other reformers – 
the ‘fighter mafia’ and the proponents of Maneuver Warfare – trying to shape the way the US 
military thought about war. It was on this latter theory that Boyd had a great deal of 
influence. 
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Principles of Maneuver Warfare 
 
Many years ago, as a cadet hoping some day to be an officer, I was poring over the’ 
Principles of War,’ listed in the old Field Service Regulations, when the Sergeant-
Major came up to me. He surveyed me with kindly amusement. ‘Don’t bother your 
head about all them things, me lad,’ he said. ‘There’s only one principle of war and 
that’s this. Hit the other fellow, as quick as you can, and as hard as you can, where it 
hurts him most, when he ain’t lookin’!’342  
 
The tenets of Maneuver Warfare are essentially as Field-Marshal Slim’s old Sergeant-
Major puts it – attacking the enemy on advantageous conditions. There is more to it than that, 
of course; what follows is a collection of principles derived from various ‘maneuvrist’ 
publications – principally the US Marines manual MCDP 1 – Warfighting, and William 
Lind’s (another reformer) Maneuver Warfare Handbook. Maneuver warfare, as Boyd’s 
theories suggest, is primarily concerned with perception – presenting the enemy with a 
confusing and chaotic situation, changing rapidly in front of their eyes. Warfighting puts it 
thus: 
 
Rather than wearing down an enemy’s defenses, maneuver warfare attempts to bypass 
these defenses in order to penetrate the enemy system and tear it apart. The aim is to 
render the enemy incapable of resisting effectively by shattering his moral, mental, 
and physical cohesion—his ability to fight as an effective, coordinated whole—rather 
than to destroy him physically through the incremental attrition of each of his 
components, which is generally more costly and time-consuming... Even if an 
outmaneuvered enemy continues to fight as individuals or small units, we can destroy 
the remnants with relative ease because we have eliminated his ability to fight 
effectively as a force.343  
 
The alternative is a strategy of attrition:  
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Warfare by attrition pursues victory through the cumulative destruction of the enemy's 
material assets by superior firepower. it is a direct approach to the conduct of war that 
sees war as a straightforward test of strength and a matter principally of force ratios. 
An enemy is seen as a collection of targets to be engaged and destroyed 
systematically... The attritionist tends to gauge progress in quantitative terms: battle 
damage assessments, "body counts," and terrain captured.344 
 
Maneuver Warfare aims to bring about a breakdown in order among the enemy’s 
forces – cohesion is undermined and an effective, coordinated response is (hopefully) made 
impossible. The way this is achieved is by identifying and attacking the enemy centre of 
gravity. This is a term borrowed from Clausewitz (the German term being schwerpunkt). A 
centre of gravity is, broadly speaking, whatever gives the enemy strength: 
 
We ask ourselves: Which factors are critical to the enemy? Which can the enemy not 
do without? Which, if eliminated, will bend him most quickly to our will? These are 
centers of gravity. Depending on the situation, centers of gravity may be intangible 
characteristics such as resolve or morale. They may be capabilities such as armored 
forces or aviation strength. They may be localities such as a critical piece of terrain 
that anchors an entire defensive system. They may be the relationship between two or 
more components of the system such as the cooperation between two arms, the 
relations in an alliance, or the junction of two forces. In short, centers of gravity are 
any important sources of strength.345  
 
A common characteristic of many of the ‘centers of gravity’ given above is their 
function as something that maintains the enemy as a cohesive force. A lone signalling station 
or field headquarters which coordinates the movements of an army group is an obvious centre 
of gravity, whose capture or destruction would radically diminish the enemy’s capacity for 
resistance – as Antulio Echevarria puts it, “Centers of Gravity are focal points that serve to 
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hold a combatant’s entire system or structure together and that draw power from a variety of 
sources and provide it with purpose and direction.”346  
 
Another key feature of Maneuver Warfare is an emphasis on decentralisation of 
command. Reliant as they are on speed, maneuverist tactics require rapid reaction to 
changing circumstances and the exploitation of fleeting opportunities. To this end, command 
decisions and responsibilities are entrusted to lower levels of the military hierarchy. Junior 
officers are expected to take the initiative, but equally must consider the implications of the 
situation from a vantage point at least two ranks above their position.347 This is facilitated by 
the dissemination of the commander’s intent to subordinate officers; these are expected to 
carry out the mission given to them, which is explained in the context of the commander’s 
plan; therefore, if the situation on the ground changes, the subordinate can adapt to the new 
circumstances and act accordingly. All that is required is that the junior commander keeps his 
superior informed.348 This is explicitly modelled around the need to maintain a fast OODA 
loop;349 as soon as new information is received, it should be acted on as soon as possible to 
achieve the greatest effect. As George Patton noted, “A good solution applied with vigor now 
is better than a perfect solution applied ten minutes later.”350 
 
A corollary to rapid exploitation of new developments is the denial of the same 
capacity to the enemy; if the opposing commander cannot make sense of a rapidly changing 
environment then by definition he cannot keep up with the OODA cycle of his opponent. Key 
to this is the avoidance of recognisable patterns; Lind quotes the German General Hermann 
Balck: 
 
There can be no fixed schemes. Every scheme, every pattern is wrong… never do the 
same thing twice… by the second time the enemy will have adapted… you can’t be a 
great military leader just by imitating so-and-so. It has to come from within.351 
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This avoidance of formulaic action, along with the preoccupation with operating at a 
faster tempo to the enemy, are both outgrowths of maneuver warfare’s recognition of war as a 
form of conflict without constitutive rules. The exploitation of the lack of restrictions placed 
on movement in space and time is the most obvious area in which maneuver warfare takes 
advantage of this fact – manoeuvre, in its most basic sense, is defined as movement in these 
dimensions. There being no ‘set’ time or place for a confrontation, maneuverists can choose 
to launch their attacks from favourable ground and at a time which suits them (or at least 
from a time and place which is more inimical to the enemy) and to take advantage of enemies 
who have – by accident or design – fallen into a formalised doctrine. The unregulated tempo 
of the contest is, as we have seen, another area where maneuverists like Boyd consciously 
seek to take advantage of the possibilities of war, whether through conceptual tools like the 
OODA loop or by doctrinal emphasis on decentralised command. The strategy of dislocation 
and identification of centres of gravity, which is maneuver warfare’s strategy developed in 
the absence of constitutional rules. 
 
Such an approach has much to commend it; a strategy (or tactics) based on maneuver 
warfare makes efficient use of the resources at a commander’s disposal to achieve the end of 
defeating the enemy, exploiting the possibilities of war in a way that avoids the high costs of 
a strategy of attrition. Maneuver warfare has an impressive intellectual pedigree, drawing on 
Clausewitz in its acceptance of chance and uncertainty as an integral part of war, whilst at the 
same time taking inspiration from Sun Tzu’s more optimistic teachings on the use of surprise 
and deception – not to mention deriving instruction from a great variety of military thinkers 
and their campaigns throughout history. It is in many ways a doctrine of warfighting which in 
its design implicitly recognises and acts according to an understanding of war as a form of 
conflict unstructured by rules. However, maneuver warfare – for all its acknowledgement and 
internalisation of these principles regarding the uncertainty of warfare, is not a doctrine which 
can win any war. Maneuver warfare is, like all strategies, a tool for a particular type of 
conflict, with its origins in a certain military context. The ability of irregular war to frustrate 
the aims of maneuver-minded armies has been noted by one of the founders of maneuver 
doctrine, William Lind, who acknowleged that its techniques are not suited to opponents 
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playing to a different script, undermining the public support of their enemies rather than 
eroding their material capabilities.352 It is to this type of war we now turn. 
 
Irregular War 
 
 Irregular war, broadly interpreted, is another form of ‘doctrine’ which, like maneuver 
warfare, embraces the possibilities provided by war and exploits its lack of constitutive rules. 
This chapter will unpack the concept of irregular warfare (its various manifestations as 
guerrilla war, people’s war and so on) and explain how its techniques and strategies are based 
on the implicit understanding of war – indeed, the explicit understanding – as a conflict not 
bound by rules. The term ‘irregular war’ presupposes the existence of ‘regular’ war; 
somewhat counterintuitively, this latter concept is a fairly recent development dating from the 
early modern period, when European states began to be able to monopolise control of 
military power within their own territories; irregular war, on the other hand, has been around 
for as long as war itself. Some of the earliest mentions of what we would recognise as 
irregular and guerrilla tactics can be found in Caesar’s wars in Gaul, marked by the Gallic use 
of irregular tactics under Vercingetorix; Roman campaigns in Judea and Spain were similarly 
characterised by hit-and-run methods employed by Rome’s enemies. The term ‘guerrilla’ of 
course dates from another Spanish war, that against Napoleon’s forces, the 1807–1814 
Peninsular War. Partisan activity in Spain and Russia was in this context a novel 
development, though irregular tactics and the use of troops like Croatian pandurs and Native 
American light infantry were becoming increasingly prominent from the time of the Seven 
Years’ War onward. It was around this time that theoretical interest in irregular or ‘small’ 
wars began in earnest; Clausewitz wrote of irregular tactics in the context of a ‘people’s war’ 
which served as an adjunct to a regular campaign, and in response to irregular conflicts in a 
colonial setting, British Colonel Charles Calwell’s book Small Wars: Their Principles and 
Practice was published by the British War Office in 1896. Gérard Chaliand characterises the 
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would-be rebellions against the British in Burma (1824-1825, 1852, and 1885) and that of the 
Boers in the 1899-1902 as ‘irregular’.353 
 
 During the early twentieth century, irregular war remained a complement to regular 
campaigns in various theatres of war, from T. E. Lawrence’s campaigns in the First World 
War to the use of partisans in the Balkans and on the Eastern Front in the Second. However, 
irregular war increasingly began to be associated with particular kind of campaign for 
national liberation against colonial powers, distinct from previous iterations of small wars in 
its incorporation of an overarching political strategy which used irregular tactics not as a 
supplement to a ‘regular’ strategy but as the basis of a strategy in their own right. This was 
revolutionary ‘people’s war’, most famously fought by the Chinese communists under Mao 
Zedong and the Cuban revolutionaries of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. Mao and Guevara 
themselves furnished the seminal theoretical and instructional texts of this form of warfare, 
which provided the blueprint for many revolutionary movements in the Cold War; to counter 
such efforts, colonial powers developed their own counterinsurgency doctrines, with varying 
levels of success. 
 
 Mao is credited with the theorising of guerrilla war, particularly with regards to its 
rural setting. Marxist-Leninist theory held that the urban proletariat was the class which 
would be mobilised to overthrow bourgeois regimes, but Mao’s experiences led him to 
believe the peasantry of China were a more viable revolutionary class. Mao and Che both 
implore their readers to ‘serve’ the local inhabitants, before going on to win them over to the 
revolutionary cause. Whether this is true is one thing; the main advantage a rural guerrilla 
force has is that the territory in which it operates is far from the reach of the state – indeed, a 
guerrilla base is in the first instance best sited in areas unsuited to habitation, whether through 
isolation or difficult terrain. In its most essential respects, guerrilla war is the weapon of the 
weak against the strong, fought according to the advantages of the former – “the war of the 
flea”, as Robert Taber puts it. Whereas conventional war usually has a ‘front’ where the 
antagonists face each other, each occupying a certain territory, guerrillas instead take up 
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residence within territory under the nominal control of their enemy, and do not ‘hold’ land in 
the conventional sense.  
 
 There are broadly two strategies of irregular warfare, the first being an adjunct to a 
regular campaign, and the second an independent guerrilla war (though the latter will 
ultimately involve the formation of a regular force). Both strategies rely on the use of low-
level skirmishes, ambushes and raids, carried out only under conditions advantageous to the 
guerrilla force. Such attacks are carried out as part of the overall strategy to acquire weapons 
and ammunition, inflict casualties and sap morale, and to invite the enemy to overextend 
himself and risk further reverses. In combination with a regular force, for instance the 
Spanish guerrillas’ cooperation with the British and Spanish armies in the Peninsular War, 
irregular fighters force the enemy to devote a great deal of manpower and effort into securing 
lines of communication and maintaining control over what in earlier times would have been a 
relatively quiescent occupied territory, hindering the enemy’s ability to concentrate his 
resources on the ‘regular’ foe. Historical examples of this use of irregular war include the 
francs-tireurs in the Franco-Prussian war, partisans of both sides in the American Civil War, 
and the resistance movements in occupied Europe and partisans in the occupied areas of the 
Soviet Union in the Second World War. 
 
In Mao’s model, the guerrilla war is carried out in a number of stages: the first is a 
process of “organization, consolidation, and preservation” of the initial guerrilla force; the 
second, an expansion into new areas; and the third, the transition into a more regular force 
which openly confronts the enemy with a view to its destruction.354 In the first stage, the 
guerrilla forces inhabit an isolated territory difficult for the central power to get at, and use it 
as a base for recruitment and occasional attacks on the enemy. Once the base area is secure 
and the local population won over, adjacent territories are infiltrated in the same way. Again, 
as with the above strategy, attacks on the enemy are carried out only made under very 
advantageous conditions and at the discretion of the guerrillas, but are primarily made to 
acquire weapons and ammunition, at least in the initial stages. In a revolutionary war this 
activity exposes the pretence of control by the central power and erodes its authority, along 
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with providing the guerrillas with more material benefits and diminishing the morale of the 
enemy soldiers. The cost of dealing with such activity is exorbitant: according to Taber, who 
was present in the country at the time, in 1961 in (post-revolutionary) Cuba, 600 anti-Castro 
guerrillas carried on an insurgency in the Escambray mountains, supplied with American 
airdrops but without popular support, which took almost three months to be suppressed by 
more than 60,000 Cuban militia. Certain regimes will be more vulnerable to this pressure 
than others; ones in which popular grievances, social divisions, economic problems and an 
exploitative, oppressive ruler are present are likely cases,355 and even the effective defeat of 
the insurgency’s military capability is  Eventually – a point which Mao and Che share, but 
which has been obscured by the example of the Vietnam war – the irregular forces are 
moulded into a regular army capable of destroying the now-weakened central power in a 
decisive ‘conventional’ campaign or battle. 
 
Despite the unpromising nature of their settings, weak in materiel and manpower, 
guerrilla forces see themselves as sitting on a vast, unexploited political resource – the rural 
peasantry. In the Chinese case, as well as in many others, the peasant had previously been 
economically exploited by the landowning gentry, being politically disenfranchised and 
coerced into serving the empowered social classes. Mao’s guerrilla strategy sought to 
mobilise the peasants as a political force by instilling a sense of class consciousness (often 
subsequently tied to nationalism) which enabled the guerrillas to utilise an untapped reserve 
of manpower much as the French Revolution had done in the early 19th Century. In order to 
win the peasants over, guerrillas were to behave towards them in a courteous manner, paying 
for goods and not openly exploiting them, and ultimately winning them over to the guerrilla’s 
cause by means of political instruction. Famously, Mao made a specific mention of the need 
to replace the door of a peasant’s house in summer, after it had been used as a bed.356 It is fair 
to point out, however, that many irregular armies resort to intimidation and forced 
contributions as a means to getting the people onside. Nevertheless, the orthodox strategy, as 
espoused by Mao and Che, is for the people to be educated and be made conscious of their 
ability to act as a political class.357 According to Mao, while guerrillas can do without an 
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armoury and use the enemy as a source of weapons and ammunition, a printing press and 
materials for propaganda are essential. 
 
In Mao and Che’s experience, rural areas, unlike urban settlements, were attractive 
prospects because they were effectively only nominally under the central government’s 
control. As a (possibly apocryphal) Chinese proverb has it, “The mountains are tall, and the 
emperor is far away”. Cities and towns, being geographically compact, are more easily 
policed, and have indeed been remade precisely in order to negate the advantages of urban 
insurgency and to facilitate the movement of troops (Haussmann’s renovation of Paris being 
at least in part motivated by such considerations). However, there have been very few 
governments which could be said to have had complete control of their countryside, and 
probably none which have had sufficient military resources to maintain an effective presence 
in all areas of their territory. Inhospitable and inaccessible territories which do not have any 
particular strategic or economic importance will be neglected most of all, and setting up base 
areas in these places exploit the effective political vacuum on the margins of the state or in 
areas under-occupied by an invading army. 
 
 The individual guerrilla has to be extremely well-motivated, internally motivated. 
Mao insisted on volunteers – conscripts would be useless for guerrilla war, given the harsh 
conditions, and commitment to a higher ideal, a revolutionary cause, must be what sustains 
the individual fighter through the privations which come with an irregular war. If the guerrilla 
fighter has much demands placed upon them, the leader is even more so; coercive discipline 
is counterproductive, and the guerrilla low-level leader derives authority from the example he 
sets to his followers, whose hardships he shares. According to Mao, “All these must have 
leaders who are unyielding in their policies – resolute, loyal, sincere, and robust. These men 
must be well educated in revolutionary technique, self-confident, able to establish severe 
discipline, and able to cope with counterpropaganda.”358 Essentially, they must be good at 
maintaining order in extremely trying circumstances. In addition, leadership in a guerrilla 
struggle demands that the leader be intelligent, alert and capable of adapting to and exploiting 
changing circumstances in the course of his duties, as Che Guevara notes: “Another 
fundamental characteristic of the guerrilla soldier is his flexibility, his ability to adapt himself 
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to all circumstances, and to convert to his service all of the accidents of the action. Against 
the rigidity of classical methods of fighting, the guerrilla fighter invents his own tactics at 
every minute of the fight and constantly surprises the enemy.”359 Mao speaks in similar 
terms: “Guerrilla commanders adjust their operations to the enemy situation, to the terrain, 
and to prevailing local conditions. Leaders must be alert to sense changes in these factors and 
make necessary modifications in troop dispositions to accord with them”360 
 
Initiative is key to guerrilla war; confrontations with the enemy happen only when the 
guerrilla wants them to, and they occur at a speed too fast for the enemy to properly respond 
to. Equally quickly, the guerrilla must be ready to extract a squad from an engagement if it 
loses the initiative.361 Guevara describes a typical attack: 
 
At the moment in which the enemy is detained in some chosen place, the rearguard 
guerrilla forces make an attack on the enemy's rear. Such a chosen place will have 
characteristics making a flank maneuver difficult; snipers, outnumbered, perhaps, by 
eight or ten times, will have the whole enemy column within the circle of fire. 
Whenever there are sufficient forces in these cases, all roads should be protected with 
ambushes in order to detain reinforcements. The encirclement will be closed 
gradually, above all at night. The guerrilla fighter knows the places where he fights, 
the invading column does not; the guerrilla fighter grows at night, and the enemy feels 
his fear growing in the darkness. 
 
In this way, without too much difficulty, a column can be totally destroyed; or at least 
such losses can be inflicted upon it as to prevent its returning to battle and to force it 
to take a long time for regrouping. When the force of the guerrilla band is small and it 
is desired above all to detain and slow down the advance of the invading column, 
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groups of snipers fluctuating between two and ten should be distributed all around the 
column at each of the four cardinal points. In this situation combat can be begun, for 
example, on the right flank; when the enemy centers his action on that flank and fires 
on it, shooting will begin at that moment from the left flank; at another moment from 
the rearguard or from the vanguard; and so forth. With a very small expenditure of 
ammunition it is possible to hold the enemy in check indefinitely.362 
 
Here, exploitation of the lack of constitutive rules governing military engagements is 
clear to see – the guerrilla attacks on ground with which he is familiar, and at a time of his 
choosing (in this case, at night, when the guerrilla force’s relatively small numbers are 
disguised). The character of the ‘tools’ used in the ambush – snipers who are hidden from 
sight – are another aspect of the total lack of cooperation, for want of a better word, between 
the guerrilla and the stronger opponent. This is most clearly manifested in the seizing of the 
initiative by the irregular fighters – Mao’s writings on guerrilla tactics with regards to this 
topic seem to owe a great deal to the teachings of Sun Tzu: “When guerrillas engage a 
stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him 
when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.”363 Mao has a similar approach as regards 
defeating the enemy before battle is joined, and shares Sun’s confidence in preparation and 
planning, though he does acknowledge that only limited plans are possible.364 The point of 
maintaining the initiative is effectively to put the enemy in an uncertain position, whereas the 
guerrillas set the ‘rules of the game’. Against an army utilising conventional tactics not 
expressly designed for the situation, their actions are illegible whilst those of their opponents 
are predictable and dependable. Mao goes so far as to say that if initiative is lost then the unit 
must either regain it or disengage from the fight.365  
 
 It is worth noting that the guerrilla tactics of local superiority owe something to the 
overall strategic situation – the central power is nominally in charge, but is spread too thinly 
over its territories to deal with the insurgent threat in any one of them. In an already 
undermanned province, the guerrilla army will have a strategic local superiority as only a 
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fraction (in Mao’s model, locally recruited militia) are tied up with controlling the area, 
leaving a portion of troops free to invest in dedicated military operations. The guerrilla’s 
insistence on attacking only under conditions which favour them amplifies this effect, and 
their refusal to fight over a territory and instead melting back into the hills makes a central 
response very difficult (in this sense, the viability of a given guerrilla campaign is to an 
extent determined by geography). Nevertheless, victory cannot be won by isolated ambushes; 
common to most kinds of irregular warfare is the expectation of the final defeat of the enemy 
army by a conventional force of one’s own. Mao was quite clear that he did not consider 
irregular warfare the be-all and end all of strategy: 
 
In sum, while we must promote guerrilla warfare as a necessary strategical auxiliary 
to orthodox operations, we must neither assign it the primary position in our war 
strategy nor substitute it for mobile and positional warfare as conducted by orthodox 
forces.366 
 
 Irregular war is incapable of bringing about the final decision in war, the conclusive 
defeat of the opponent’s military power;367 this could be achieved by the withdrawal of the 
enemy armies (as in the cases of Vietnam and the Soviet war in Afghanistan) but in the 
original theoretical conception of irregular war, this would be won by a regular campaign, as 
in the Chinese Civil War and the expulsion of the French at Dien Bien Phu. The 
revolutionary strategy which Mao and Guevara described and advocated is one of the aspects 
of irregular war which most clearly illustrates the possibility of innovative strategies in war, 
which exploit the unique strengths and weaknesses of the combatants, with the weaker 
combatant refusing to fight to a pattern desired by the stronger. But the political strategy of 
people's war and other revolutionary projects is not unique to war. In 'normal' politics, 
identification of potential constituencies is a big part of overall political strategy, as is market 
research in business. As economic and demographic shifts occur within a democratic state, 
political parties and individuals will alter their political strategies based on their interpretation 
of these shifts. This is possible due to this area of politics not being bound to rules (though 
certain pieces of information will be provided by the mathematics of the competition – 
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'swing' seats or states will identify themselves as valuable targets). The difference with war is 
the form of the conflict between the actors. In democracies this is typically a vote – in the 
most general case, an election, but voting on a bill-by-bill basis is another form of democratic 
conflict. Here, each side enters into the contest agreeing to the mechanism by which the 
conflict is resolved and already agreeing to abide by the result. In war (including irregular 
war) the conflict goes on until one side or the other decides to submit to a regulated 
interaction or is destroyed. In this sense the political strategy of irregular/revolutionary war is 
not so unique as it first appears, but is nevertheless necessitated by war’s lack of constitutive 
rules.  
 
Conclusions 
 
 Understanding war as being defined by its lack of rules gives us a new insight into the 
task of strategy, and the roles it needs to perform in war. Indeed, as a concept strategy itself 
can be more accurately defined as the process of planning and decision-making in 
competition with another actor, in the absence of rules which would otherwise govern the 
course of the contest; the fact that the route to victory in any given war is not mapped out in 
advance necessitates strategy (so defined) to a qualitatively greater extent than in any other 
form of conflict. War’s lack of rules makes strategy especially important in other ways, too; 
the exposure to uncertainty in war, the lack of information which would otherwise be 
provided directly or indirectly by rules, the danger of combat and the high political stakes of 
war all contribute to a heightened psychological need for order and control. This order can be 
provided by strategies and doctrines which consist of a collection of preconceived notions of 
what war ‘is’ and how it should be fought, or by the construction of a plan which addresses 
the particular needs of a given war. Strategies can vary in how far they innovate, too – that is, 
how far they push the boundaries of what can be done in war, which as we have seen has 
imposes no inherent limits. In this, the role of the strategist is something like that of an 
architect or an engineer, but rather one who works in a constantly changing environment. The 
opportunities presented to a strategist may be great, but the challenges are immense: there is 
of course no guarantee that a novel strategy will succeed, and success in one war is similarly 
no assurance that the same strategic principles will hold true in the next. 
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One of the greatest challenges in this regard is the exposure of war to a myriad of 
extraneous factors, the source of Clausewitz’s ‘friction’ - the physicality of war. Not only is 
this physicality naturally a potent source of the unique challenges which face the strategist; it 
is also the source of some of the most idiosyncratic aspects of war, from its chance and 
uncertainty, to the prominent role played by technological innovation, to the political 
implications of material change brought about by unrestrained conflict. The physical aspect 
of war is intimately connected to many other aspects of its nature, and an examination of it 
will serve to highlight how complex and significant an activity war truly is. It is to such an 
examination which we now turn. 
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THE PHYSICALITY OF WAR AND THE MEANS OF DESTRUCTION 
 
 
If the uniquely important role of strategy in war is a consequence of the lack of 
arbitration which a system of rules would otherwise provide, then the subjects of this chapter 
– the physicality of war, and the tools used to fight it – are consequences of a lack of 
restrictions on other areas of its conduct. It is impossible to deny that one of the most 
idiosyncratic features of war is the central role played by the tools with which it is fought: 
throughout human history vast sums have been spent on increasingly complex and deadly 
technologies, which even if ultimately left unused will be wheeled out as a show of power on 
ceremonial occasions – a state of affairs which probably dates to the Bronze Age. Weaponry 
is only the most obvious example of military technology – transport, communications and 
other ‘support’ services are just as integral a part of the material panoply of warfare as rifles 
and artillery – the individual soldier, too, is an instrument of war, along with the unit in which 
he fights. Perhaps most significantly, over the course of history various forms of social 
organisation have developed in response to the challenges of warfare, with the modern state 
the latest in a long line of bureaucratic adaptations to armed conflict. The ways in which 
these tools are used, along with their technical limitations and requirements, shapes the 
conduct of war. The central role of materiel in war is due to its lack of constitutive rules; 
other forms of conflict are played out either wholly or in part in an abstract space with strictly 
limited means, but war is a physical phenomenon unbound by restrictions as to where, when, 
or how it is to be fought. Attempts at regulation may discourage the use of certain weapons or 
tactics, but in the last resort there is no limit on what tools can be used to fight a war; 
accordingly, warfare has been a constant source of technological innovation as each side 
escalates to ever-more complex and effective technologies. 
 
The ruleless nature of war not only enables the proliferation of military technologies, 
but, as I have previously discussed, is the primary reason for the singularly chancy and 
uncertain nature of warfare. We have already revealed a number of the mechanisms by which 
this uncertainty is generated; in this chapter I will go on to show how the physical nature of 
war in general, and the development of technology in particular, further amplifies this trend: 
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not only do new military technologies introduce novel threats and opportunities which are 
incompletely understood, but their adoption also brings about social and political changes 
within the societies which make use of them, adding a new source of change and 
unpredictability. I will first describe the broader implications of war’s physicality with 
reference to Clausewitz, before going on to explore the various ways in which the tools of 
war 
  
The Physicality of War 
 
 Firstly, and most importantly, the fact that restrictions on location are absent in war 
necessitates that it be fought in a physical space – in the countryside, a town, in forests and so 
on. However, no such physical space is set. This has long been understood to be a natural 
aspect of war – practically taken for granted – but it is Clausewitz who once again appreciates 
the theoretical implications of war’s various characteristics better than any other military 
thinker: 
 
Now we must address ourselves to a special feature of military activity – 
possibly the most striking even though it is not the most important – which is not 
related to temperament, and involves merely the intellect. I mean the relationship 
between warfare and terrain.  
 
This relationship, to begin with, is a permanent factor – so much so that one 
cannot conceive of a regular army operating except in a definite space. Second, its 
importance is decisive in the highest degree, for it affects the operations of all forces, 
and at times entirely alters them. Third, its influence may be felt in the very smallest 
feature of the ground, but it can also dominate enormous areas.  
 
In these ways the relationship between warfare and terrain determines the 
peculiar character of military action. If we consider other activities connected with the 
soil – gardening, for example, farming, building, hydraulic engineering, mining, 
game-keeping, or forestry – none extends to more than a very limited area, and a 
working knowledge of that area is soon acquired. But a commander must submit his 
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work to a partner, space, which he can never completely reconnoiter, and which 
because of the constant movement and change to which he is subject he can never 
really come to know. To be sure, the enemy is generally no better off; but the 
handicap, though shared, is still a handicap, and the man with enough talent and 
experience to overcome it will have a real advantage. Moreover it is only in a general 
sense that the difficulty is the same for both sides; in any particular case the defender 
usually knows the area far better than his opponent.368 
 
 As he points out, this is easier said than done, and requires a quality of mind which is 
hardly a common quantity. As Clausewitz points out above, war is not tied to one place; 
armies march and fight through a variety of locations through the course of a campaign, and 
the physical characteristics of each of these locales will have particular implications for the 
armies which operate there, as we will go on to see later in the chapter. So important is the 
role of terrain in war, that Clausewitz claims that the commander must possess a talent, honed 
through experience, of recognising the various regularities which occur in terrain, and must 
internalise the local geography to a high degree: “a commander-in-chief... must aim at 
acquiring an overall knowledge of the configuration of a province, of an entire country. His 
mind must hold a vivid picture of the road-network, the river-lines and the mountain ranges, 
without ever losing a sense of his immediate surroundings.”369 Even when a commander finds 
himself revisiting a battlefield upon which he has fought before, the contrast to the 
preordained ‘level playing field’ of an abstract contest is easily appreciated; the promise of 
some predictability and familiarity can be dashed by changes in the physical environment, 
such as the results of a landslide or a flooded river, or as a consequence of changed different 
weather conditions – a blizzard, sandstorm or heavy fog can obscure vision. 
  
 This of course invites discussion of the lack of restrictions around when war can be 
fought. As there is no set time for engagements in war, they can occur whenever the 
commander feels able and willing to commit to action – and attacks can likewise be launched 
against him at any moment. This has obvious tactical (and strategic) implications, in that 
different times effectively have different physical properties: as we have seen with maneuver 
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and irregular warfare, surprise attacks commonly take place at times (and places) which 
actively discourage effective military action, and are therefore assumed to be safe. Night 
attacks have a long history in warfare, perhaps most famously being used by Vlad Tepes 
(“the Impaler”) in 1462, which took the form of a raid and an attempted assassination of 
Mehmet II in his camp. Similarly, the “Battle of the Bulge” of 1944-1945 was an ambitious 
attempt by the German armed forces to launch a winter offensive, predicated on the belief 
that the western Allies would assume that offensives would not (rather, could not) occur in 
the depths of winter. The timing of a surprise attack need exclusively exploit the physical 
properties of a certain time of day or year; there may be cultural reasons an attack is 
unsuspected or otherwise unfeared. The classic example of an attack launched on such an 
occasion is the Tet Offensive of 1968, where North Vietnam launched coordinated assaults 
on targets throughout the South after previously announcing that it would observe a week-
long truce over the period.370 As we have already seen in our earlier discussion of John 
Boyd’s OODA loop, the tempo of war is not set either; there is no turn-system imposed and 
the operational tempo is restricted only by the physical and organisational abilities of the 
armies in question. 
 
 The physical nature of war presents a number of difficulties to the commander, and 
contributes a great deal to the idiosyncratic character of warfare, as noted by Clausewitz and 
others. Indeed, it is perhaps telling that Clausewitz uses the physical concept of ‘friction’ as a 
metaphor for the influences which combine to generate war’s pervasive uncertainty. Physical 
effort itself is identified as a source of friction (due to its unquantifiable nature);371 
Clausewitz’s famous comparison of war to a carriage journey is yet another case where war’s 
nature as a physical process is acknowledged as a source of difficulty: 
 
Imagine a traveller who late in the day decides to cover two more stages before 
nightfall. Only four or five hours more, on a paved highway with relays of horses: it 
should be an easy trip. But at the next station he finds no fresh horses, or only poor 
ones; the country grows hilly, the road bad, night falls, and finally after many 
difficulties he is only too glad to reach a resting place with any kind of primitive 
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accommodation. It is much the same in war. Countless minor incidents—the kind you 
can never really foresee—combine to lower the general level of performance, so that 
one always falls short of the intended goal.372 
 
 As Alan Beyerchen might note, this description is an account of a nonlinear process, 
where small influences have outsized effects, rendering the activity unpredictable by 
conventional means;373 it is clear that if war is an especially nonlinear phenomenon, it is so in 
large part because it takes place in the physical world, exposing the combatants to a host of 
potentially important influences – a point seemingly not lost on Clausewitz, even down to the 
mathematics of the situation:  
 
Circumstances vary so enormously in war, and are so indefinable, that a vast array of 
factors has to be appreciated – mostly in the light of probabilities alone… Bonaparte 
rightly said in this connection that many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-
chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or an Euler.374 
 
Furthermore, not only is war fought in the physical world, it takes the form of 
physical action – i.e., combat, with its ultimate aim being the destruction of the enemy (to be 
achieved as the enemy attempts to do the same to you). As Clausewitz notes, this aspect of 
war brings about its own friction – the unquantifiable effects of mortal danger and the 
attendant psychological stress which disorders our thought processes, particularly if we are 
unfamiliar with war.375 In addition to its psychological effects, this friction wears down the 
mechanisms with which war is fought and changes the environment it is conducted in; absent 
a system of rules which enable disputes to be carried on through symbolic channels, physical 
combat (or the threat thereof) is the instrument of warfare, which brings with it a whole host 
of implications which must be appreciated. 
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The Tools of War 
  
I have a rather broad definition of the tools of war – the ‘means of destruction’, as I 
call them. Broadly speaking they are of two types: technology (physical tools) and techne 
(the ways in which they are used). Naturally, the concept of techne intrudes on the realm of 
tactics and strategy; I will focus on the more immediate use of technology in this section. The 
most obvious form of military technology is of course weaponry – objects or machines which 
inflict destruction upon the enemy. Generally weapons work on the principle of applying 
energy to a target376 – focusing the power of an arm’s thrust onto the tip of a spear, 
transferring chemical energy in the form of gunpowder into the flight of a bullet, or using 
nuclear fusion to explode a hydrogen bomb. The earliest weapons involved mostly muscle 
power provided by the soldier, but modern armaments draw on a number of sources of 
power. These weapons are matched by ‘defensive’ weapons such as shields and armour 
which absorb or disperse the energy of the offensive weapon; an evolutionary dynamic 
occurs as a result, with armour advancing in step with ever more destructive threats – 
reaching the contemporary state of affairs where tanks are somewhat counter-intuitively 
covered in explosive panels, which, when detonated by anti-tank munitions, deflect the 
incoming blast. There are other approaches to avoiding damage; increased speed is another 
answer to the challenge of enemy attack, and enables effective shock action in its own right. 
This is provided by another of the most recognisable technologies of war, weapons platforms. 
For most of human history the horse was the preeminent weapons platform, first serving as a 
means of transport to the battlefield, later being used in battle as part of a chariot team and 
then ridden on horseback; a similar role was played by ships, used as transport before being 
employed as dedicated military vessels. New platforms have been developed to great effect 
since the age of industrial warfare: airplanes and submarines rapidly came to exert a powerful 
influence over war since their comparatively recent invention; in our time, unmanned aerial 
vehicles (or ‘drones’) have come to characterise contemporary warfare like no other weapon. 
 
Military technology and its associated techne exploit the possibilities of acting in 
ways which rules usually prohibit. For instance, there is no set space in which war must be 
fought: technologies are invented to exploit new spatial dimensions can be found from which 
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to attack the enemy – land, (under)sea, and air, even from outer space (and now cyber-space). 
One can engage the enemy from whatever angle one wishes, as long as you can get there. 
There are no ‘turns’ in war; the tempo is not determined by mutual agreement but by the 
actors’ physical capabilities. Frequency of attacks can be increased by drill and practice, or 
by the introduction of new technology – barrel-loading muskets were replaced in time with 
magazine-fed breech-loading rifles, later supplanted by machine guns – each new 
development enabling more attacks to be carried out in the same time; as we have already 
seen, Boyd’s recommendations for fighter design were based on the facilitation of a faster 
tempo, the ability to transition from one manoeuvre to another faster than the enemy. We can 
understand each of these technologies as ways of exploiting the possibilities provided by war, 
and at the same time being compelled by its lack of binding rules. Many of the laws of war 
are concerned with restricting the use of weapons; however, in all but a few cases the 
pressures to adopt new military technologies are too great to be resisted. Even if efforts are 
made to ban certain weapons as at the Hague Conferences, there is no disqualification for an 
actor who uses one; to an extent it does not matter whether the victors used poison gas on 
enemy troops (as in the First World War) or massed bomb drops on civilian targets (as in the 
Second), so long as they win. Furthermore, explicit laws of war can hardly regulate entirely 
new weapons; sometimes the use of especially deadly technology is not so much a case of 
breaking the rules, as there being no rules to break. 
 
Weapons and their platforms are only the most salient forms of military technology; 
there are a host of other, less glamorous examples. Indeed, in the modern day the proportion 
of ‘teeth’ arms to support services tends to be weighted towards the latter, with one estimate 
of the proportion of combat units in the American forces in the Iraq War as low as 25% of the 
total strength.377 One support arm (though sometimes considered a combat service) is 
engineering, one with a long history in warfare and which is hardly needed in other forms of 
conflict. Compare Hannibal’s transportation of elephants across the Rhone on rafts – and his 
subsequent crossing of the Alps, where boulders and other obstacles had to be removed from 
the path of his army – to the relatively minimal preparations required for a court case or a 
quiet game of chess. As the space for conflict is not provided for, the combatants must make 
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their own ‘infrastructure’ for the contest; whether it takes the form of building (or blowing 
up) bridges or the construction of logistical bases, roads, and fortifications, engineering 
effectively serves to remake the physical environment to the advantage of oneself and to the 
disadvantage of the enemy.  
 
Logistics and supply is another vital aspect of military techne. The weapons of war 
and those who use them require constant provisioning, and these supplies (along with the 
soldiers themselves) require transportation to where they are going. In all ages, individual 
soldiers have taken on some of these duties themselves (the Roman legionaries being the 
classic example), and have been helped by the use of beasts of burden. Supply needs of 
armies were met locally until comparatively recent times, where the growth of mass armies 
required a more predictable and consistent supply system – as I will go on to cover in greater 
detail later; this was especially the case in industrial warfare, with railways providing 
transport of food, clothing and materiel as well as men. Some of this provisioning was 
technologically advanced itself – canned food being one of many inventions born out of 
military necessity (the canning process being the winner of a competition by the Napoleonic 
French government calling for a method to preserve food for its armies). The power of supply 
was proved most conclusively with Allied victory in the Second World War, as the vastly 
better-provisioned Allied forces in the West were able to defeat a German enemy which was 
arguably its superior in war-fighting.378 
 
The need for information and intelligence is another important driver of military 
technology, which as we have seen is necessitated by the lack of information which would 
otherwise be provided for by the rules. If we take the various dimensions of regulation in 
turn, the scope for intelligence technologies can be appreciated. As there is no set space for 
force to be deployed, there is no automatic knowledge of the physical properties of the 
environment which can be taken for granted. In response to this, military establishments 
invest a great deal in technologies related to navigation – whether hi-tech GPS systems, or 
maps on paper: the British Ordnance Survey maps began as an attempt to map the Highlands 
of Scotland following the Jacobite Rebellion of 1745, particularly with reference to which 
roads and bridges could be used to transport heavy guns (i.e. ordnance). Similarly, the 
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location of the enemy is not a given, technologies have been developed for increasingly 
thorough intelligence-gathering in this respect, which range from the use of scouts ahead of 
the main army, to U-2 spy planes, to satellite photography (to say nothing of more traditional 
spycraft). The counterpoint to this phenomenon is of course the use of camouflage and 
concealment, which again is a possibility provided for by war’s lack of rules. A lack of 
restriction in physical space is not the only factor which encourages increasingly 
sophisticated intelligence-gathering technology – as there is no restriction on the time in 
which war can be fought, there are certain information deficits which this aspect of war can 
present: attacking at night or through a thick fog may be a potent source of surprise, but doing 
so obscures the view of the battlefield and the enemy. In the case of night attacks, technology 
has developed over the years from Verey lights and flares which enabled surprise attacks 
after dark – but illuminated the battlefield for the enemy as well – to more sophisticated night 
vision and infrared technologies, which enables vision but denies it to the enemy.  
 
We can note that the peculiarities of the physical, technological side of war can 
ultimately be attributed to war’s lack of rules, which necessitates it be fought outside of an 
abstract space. Lack of rules also contributes to a number of dynamics which escalate its 
conduct to ever more complex and expensive levels.  Most obviously there is the 
evolutionary arms race between offensive and defensive weapons technologies, with 
developments in one responded to by improvements in another, and so on; equally important 
is the trend towards increasing complexity within the armed forces of an individual actor. As 
technology advances, soldiers and their weapons systems require an increasing amount of 
logistics, maintenance and so on. Not only does this development prompt the invention of 
other military technologies which serve combat arms in a support role, but in a wider sense 
the increased complexity and ‘baggage’ of war creates a need for coordination, organisation 
and other forms of management.   
 
Increasing levels of sophistication and complexity naturally apply to materiel, but this 
trend is evident in the case of one particular tool of warfare – the human being. The human 
element is of course one of the chief sources of uncertainty in war, as Clausewitz noted, and 
the psychological qualities of each individual are of a variable quality. Not only that; 
practically every aspect of ‘human capital’ is equally uncertain. The training a soldier 
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receives will improve their effectiveness in many regards, but can leave them unable to adapt 
to new situations; battle-hardened veterans might be expected to fight more effectively than 
raw troops, but they may turn out to act more cautiously (as was the case with the British 8th 
Army in the Second World War, who having ‘done their bit’ did not exhibit the same daring 
in Normandy as they had in North Africa).379 Cultural influences, along with other 
environmental factors, will give some nations a comparative advantage when it comes to 
fighting wars; Machiavelli and Ibn Khaldun, amongst others, note the tendency of urban 
populations to be lacking in soldierly qualities. Interestingly, it has been noted that rural 
populations are more suited to war than urbanites, and miners in particular have been noted to 
make good soldiers – possibly as a result of acquaintance with physical exertion and exposure 
to hazardous conditions.  
 
The ways and means by which bodies of men are organised and led are a particularly 
important aspect of military techne – more important than the qualities of the individual 
soldier, is his use along with others in a larger formation. The coordination of a relatively 
small number of individuals, even under the most favourable circumstances, is an 
administrative challenge – to do the same with hundreds of men under the conditions of war 
is nothing short of a nightmare. As Clausewitz notes of soldiers, “each part is composed of 
individuals, every one of whom retains his potential for friction… A battalion is made up of 
individuals, the least important of whom may chance to delay things or somehow make them 
go wrong.”380 Out of this fact of life has grown another of the most distinctive elements of 
military life – discipline. It is somewhat ironic that war, though itself defined by rulelessness, 
for compelling extremely regulated behaviour in those who fight it; that soldiers are ‘ordered’ 
by their commanders is perhaps revealing in its etymology. I speculate that this emphasis on 
strictly rule-bound behaviour is a response to the fact that soldiers operate in a disordered 
environment, the effects of which would otherwise be particularly corrosive to organisational 
structures and hierarchies (which ultimately consist of rule-systems): constant engagement in 
ordinarily deviant acts such as killing, looting and so on can lead to contempt for order and 
authority in general. We have already seen that war can have corrosive effects on domestic 
politics, as in Thucydides’ account of the revolution in Corcyra. More obviously, the threat of 
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physical harm and violent death are powerful incentives to detach oneself from the 
collective;381 the stress of being in combat for extended periods of time is immense, with 
combat exhaustion typically setting in around 30 days of continuous activity.382  
 
There are other ways to make soldiers function more effectively as a fighting whole; 
if discipline is an example of a set of rules obeyed in an instrumental fashion, then efforts to 
instil cohesion aim to internalise a sense of group identity within the individual soldier and 
generate that centripetal force from within. The importance of strong cohesiveness has been 
noted for many centuries; Ibn Khaldun’s notion of Asabiyya is perhaps the earliest 
manifestation of the concept to Machiavelli’s virtu Shil and Janowitz’s seminal analysis of 
German cohesiveness in the Second World War.383 According to William Darryl Henderson, 
 
cohesion exists in a unit when the primary day-to-day goals of the individual soldier, 
of the small group with which he identifies, and of unit leaders are congruent – with 
each giving his primary loyalty to the group so that it trains and fights as a unit with 
all members willing to risk death to achieve a common objective.384 
 
A shared identity and esprit de corps distinguishing the most successful formations, 
and a priority of military training is to break the individual down and produce a soldier who 
thinks and acts as an integral part of a greater whole. The regimental ethos of the British 
Army is one example of this effort, where pride in one’s unit is assiduously cultivated; the 
Army as a whole promotes “core values” of Loyalty, Integrity, Courage, Discipline, Respect 
for Others, Selfless Commitment (all of which exhort the soldier to behave as an integral part 
of a greater whole).385 As we have already seen, the inculcation of revolutionary zeal is 
another tool which can be used to reinforce cohesion in a military force – particularly 
necessary given the physical challenge presented to irregular fighters operating in extreme 
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environments, exposed to a great deal of danger and exertion, and engaged in an interminably 
long struggle against a stronger foe. However, cohesion is necessary in any environment; as 
we have seen in our study of strategy, the dislocation of an enemy force and the breaking of 
its cohesiveness is a key aim of maneuver warfare.386  
 
Not only do soldiers need to be conditioned to act in unison with each other in their 
own units, but they must also be coordinated with other formations in the wider context of a 
strategic mission. As mentioned in our earlier discussion of maneuver warfare, this can be 
brought about by dissemination of the commander’s intent throughout the army, so lower-
level commanders act in accordance with a wider plan; in other cases, communications 
technologies are instrumental in enabling rapid coordination of effort. Armies have proven to 
be early adopters or innovators in this field of military technology, but like other sources of 
strength can prove to be a vulnerability, being a key target for espionage and for any force 
pursuing a maneuverist strategy of ‘dislocating’ the enemy. Improving the security of 
communications nodes, or decentralising communications as much as possible, is one 
adaptation to this challenge – indeed the internet began as just such an attempt to ensure 
communications networks remained operable in case of a nuclear war, when centralised 
relays could easily be destroyed. This is only to speak of the most immediate forms of 
coordination – cohesion is most often analysed in the context of small groups, but it is 
equally applicable to the larger and more impersonal social organisations which prosecute 
war. With armies of an increasing size and complexity, there is above all a need for 
administrative technologies and techne which can facilitate coordinated strategic action, 
including the management of a domestic war economy which can ensure the physical 
maintenance of the forces themselves. 
 
The state as military technology 
 
                                                     
386 Most casualties occur when order breaks down, as Thucydides could tell us: “[the Ambraciots] 
were set upon by the rest of the Arcananians, and it was only with great difficulty that they managed 
to get back to Olpae. Many of them were killed, since in trying to break through they kept no order 
and showed no discipline – all, that is, except the Mantineans, who kept in a compact body and 
preserved better order than any other part of the army during the retreat.”  (Thucydides, 3:108) 
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The next form of military technology is one of the most important – the state (or 
indeed, whichever institutional form is taken by the collective which fights the war). That the 
state and its institutions grew at least in part as a response to the problems of war has been 
covered by a literature on state formation (notably the works of Tilly and Mann);387 Mancur 
Olson is one of a number of scholars who posit that monarchical states were founded by 
‘bandits’ who wished to prey off the people they exploited in a more institutionalised 
manner.388 We have already seen in our examination of the Greek laws and customs of 
warfare that the Greek city-states were ultimately beaten by larger entities which were able to 
effectively invest in siege weaponry; it is the modern state, however, which is particularly 
illustrative of the state as a military technology – specifically with regard to its bureaucratic 
and administrative apparatus which is is increasingly necessary in complex wars where 
strategic coordination of resources to achieve a political aim requires a great deal of 
organisation. As we shall see, this form of military technology is itself greatly shaped by 
innovation in other forms of military technology. 
 
The argument that military technologies and organisation have wider political 
ramifications is not a new one – it was perhaps most famously advanced by Michael Roberts 
in his lecture on “The Military Revolution, 1560-1660” in Belfast in 1955.389 Roberts argued 
that advances in musketry in the early modern period prompted the emergence of large 
standing armies (particularly the Swedish), which were composed of conscripted soldiers 
who were increasingly armed with firearms. These soldiers were trained to a higher level than 
previously, with clothing and food supplied by the state, and due to the tactical advantages of 
massed musketry armies grew in size, with important political consequences. The reason 
behind the increase in the size of armies was due to a number of developments; firstly was 
the development and refining of ‘linear’ tactics, which had found their earliest form in the 
armies of Gustavus Adolphus. These operated on the principle that with a greater ‘frontage’, 
                                                     
387 Charles Tilly, Capital, Coercion, and European States, Oxford: Blackwell (1990); Mann, Michael 
"The Autonomous Power of the State: its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." European Journal of 
Sociology 25.02 (1984): 185-213 
388 See Mancur Olson, Power and Prosperity (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 
389 Roberts was not the earliest to do so, however – the Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter had in 
1918 noted the connection between the rise of the ‘tax state’, as he called it, and the military demands 
of the Hapsburg Empire as it struggled against the Ottomans in the Balkans. See his chapter “The 
Crisis of the Tax State” in Richard Swedberg, The Economics and Sociology of Capitalism, (Princeton 
University Press, 1991), p.99-140 
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an army of muskets could direct more firepower upon the enemy;390 Maurice of Nassau is 
credited with discovering that with multiple ranks of musketeers, a continuous rate of fire 
could be maintained – provided they were able to carry out their drill effectively. One rank 
would fire, then move behind the others to reload, to return to the front after the other ranks 
had taken their shots. To carry out these tactics to good effect, large numbers of men would 
be needed, and these would need to be paid on a regular basis. More than that, all would need 
to be well trained in their drill and manoeuvres. Geoffrey Parker noted another contributing 
factor to the growth of these armies, developments in siege warfare (specifically the new 
trace italienne fortresses with earth and brick outworks, which could effectively resist cannon 
fire) which necessitated large besieging armies: a city’s defences could no longer be 
obliterated with cannon fire as stone walls were; instead, large numbers of troops would have 
to encircle the fortress and work their way past the earthen outworks before they could 
assault the inner walls.391 Such pressures, the revolutionists claimed, resulted in an arms race 
where European states attempted to field ever-bigger armies. Prussia was a particularly 
extreme example, at some times employing one Prussian in 13 as a soldier in wartime; in 
1692, Spain numbered more than 495,000 troops on its militia rolls,392 with the cost of 
maintaining its army rising from £200,000 to almost £900,000 a year between 1547 and 
1598.393 Armies were not the only expense which was laid out by early modern states; the 
fortresses which Parker studied were extremely expensive in their own right. Some states 
(particularly in Italy) were bankrupted by the cost of their fortifications; the Dutch spent 
£100,000 on fortifying Antwerp alone, and from 1529-1572 spent £1 million on the 
construction of fortresses.394 Added to this (for some states at least) came the considerable 
costs associated with building a navy. This is not only in terms of the capital costs associated 
with building a ship (which were considerable – it took the British £63,174 to build a 100 gun 
ship of the line in 1765) – but as Nicholas Kyriazis points out, while armies can supply 
                                                     
390 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, in Essays in Swedish History (University of Minnesota 
Press, 1967) p.18-19. 
391 Parker FIND 
392 Michael Duffy, The Military Revolution, (University of Exeter Press,1980) p.3-4 
393 Roberts (1967), p.61-62 
394 Ibid., p.12  
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themselves relatively easily in the field, naval forces needed to lay in a considerable supply of 
provisions before undertaking a campaign, and furthermore required regular maintenance.395  
 
In order to maintain these new military forces, new forms of administrative machinery 
were needed – bureaucracies that could collect the taxes to pay for the increased cost of war 
being among the most important. Even this was not always enough – increasingly 
sophisticated financial institutions and instruments such as central banks and war loans. 
Along with bureaucracies, increased demand for the supply of material provisions contributed 
to the growth of nascent industries. As Michael Howard notes: 
 
It was not any superiority in weapons systems, neither the fieldpiece nor the musket, 
that set eighteenth-century Europe on the road to world conquest. Rather it was these 
disciplined professional armies with their volley firing, their capacity for maneuver in 
the battlefield, and their steadiness under fire. Their adversaries had to imitate them or 
go under… and they had to imitate not just the weapons, which was easy, and the 
discipline and the drill, which was harder, but the administrative efficiency that 
produced the regular pay making both drill and discipline possible.396 
 
The theory of a military ‘revolution’ has attracted criticism, but primarily in that the 
wording implied a sudden, instantaneous change; the pattern of incremental adaptations 
which occurred were more accurately described as an evolutionary dynamic.397  The 
pressures of war, combined with the lack of restriction on the tools with which it is fought, 
contributes to an escalation in development of forms of social organisation, just as much as it 
does with regards to mere ‘arms races’, and this tendency took on an even greater importance 
after the early modern period with the rise of industrial war and the need to coordinate 
globally enmeshed economies to meet its needs.398 The increasing complexity and expense of 
                                                     
395 Nicholas Kyriazis, “Seapower and Socioeconomic Change”, Theory and Society, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(Feb., 2006), p.80-81 
396 Michael Howard, “Tools of War: Concepts and Technology”, in John Lynn (ed.) Tools of War, 
(University of Illinois Press, 1990), p. 240 
397 Clifford Rogers, “The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War”, in Clifford Rogers, (ed.) 
The Military Revolution Debate: Readings on the Military Transformation of Early Modern Europe 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1995), p.55-78 
398 For an informative study of this phenomenon, I highly recommend David Edgerton’s Britain’s War 
Machine (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 
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the most advanced military technologies requires ever-more sophisticated and complex forms 
of social and economic organisation, and as societies change to meet these needs, they 
introduce a new source of uncertainty into the realm of strategy.399  
 
This uncertainty is not only generated by the effects the new technological adaptations 
exert on war itself; the development of new technologies and new forms of social 
organisation have important implications with regard to the internal dynamics of the societies 
which use them. As we already explored in our discussion on the nature of rules, from a 
broadly Marxist, materialist perspective the cultural, legal, and political structure of society is 
determined by material factors at its base. The “ownership of the means of production” is, in 
this analysis, the factor which grants power in society; those who control capital, the supply 
of inputs or raw materials, labour, land (or those who control a bottleneck in one or more of 
them) have the power in their society, and can shape its institutions to reflect their dominant 
material position and serve their interests. But there is another form of material power, 
alongside the ability to create wealth – the ability to destroy. A monopoly of the control of 
violence within a given territory was of course Weber’s definition of what made a state – 
control of the ‘means of destruction’ (weaponry, ammunition, soldiers) enables the owner to 
seize power or otherwise exercise political influence within a given society – the state 
formation literature, as already mentioned, points to the central role of a military group in the 
establishment of institutionalised state structures, with ‘bandits’ using them to extract 
resources from producers.400 
                                                     
399 Norman Augustine, an aerospace businessman, made a celebrated observation on the implications 
of the increasing complexity of military technology in the 1980’s: “In the year 2054, the entire 
defense budget will purchase just one tactical aircraft. This aircraft will have to be shared by the Air 
Force and Navy 3½ days each per week except for leap year, when it will be made available to the 
Marines for the extra day.” Norman R. Augustine, Augustine’s Laws (American Institute of 
Aeronautics, 1983) 
400 As mentioned, the means of destruction can take a variety of forms depending on the 
circumstances: on an Bronze Age battlefield, the soldiers and their metal weapons in particular would 
be a ‘means’ (the soldiery perhaps corresponding to ‘labour’ in the classical understanding of the 
means of production), whereas in the eighteenth century control of depots and supply infrastructure 
(in other words, “military capital”) would decide the course of the conflict. In the modern day, the 
communications technology which enables the coordination of the separate parts of the varied and 
complex military system would perhaps be the crucial factor. The means of production can also 
include individual armies, leaders, the political basis for alliance – any bottleneck in the use of force, 
the seizure of which would significantly weaken the military effort.  
The theoretical concept of the ‘means of destruction’ has obvious potential, being applicable to the 
same areas which have been studied with reference to the means of production. This is a potentially 
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That this control has been jealously guarded is a commonplace; the civil military 
relations literature focuses on the threat inherent in the military establishment, which can be 
used by ambitious military leaders to mount coups. Likewise, political literature dating back 
at least to Machiavelli acknowledges the link between military and political power. Ruling 
castes throughout history have been noted for their tendency to monopolise control of the 
means of destruction; to bear weapons, specifically swords, was the exclusive privilege of the 
knightly class in Europe and the Samurai in Japan, for instance. The problem of 
praetorianism – soldiers using their access to the leader to interfere in politics – was a 
concern of many imperial leaderships. In the Middle and Near East, individual rulers often 
tried to ensure the loyalty of their most intimate armed followers by recruiting them from a 
foreign race, so as to avoid empowering a group already enmeshed in court politics – the 
Byzantine Varangian Guard (Norsemen), Ottoman Janissaries (Christian slaves from the 
Balkans) the Egyptian Mamluks (Circassian slaves) are particular examples. Even this 
conscious recognition of the problem was not enough – the latter two groups eventually 
began to exercise power themselves, the Mamluks establishing a dynasty which was 
ultimately destroyed by Napoleon. The use of mercenaries posed similar problems – Seljuk 
Turks, the Catalan Company, the Italian condottieri all posed grave threats to the powers 
which nominally ‘controlled’ them. The involvement of the wider population in the 
Napoleonic Wars was for similar reasons a source of great concern to the ruling elites of the 
ancien regime; as mentioned earlier, Clausewitz’s career troubles stemmed not only from his 
principled resignation from the Prussian service, but also from his advocacy of the politically 
                                                     
vast area of research; I also speculate as to some potential uses of the concept in military theory and 
practice. One potentially useful utilisation of the concept is in the identification of a ‘centre of 
gravity’, as defined by Clausewitz and the maneuver warfare theorists. The centre of gravity is most 
intuitively thought of as a physical thing, and is often identified with a physical object – a piece of 
terrain, or a military formation – despite the fact that it can take immaterial forms such as leadership 
or morale. The concept of a ‘centre of gravity’ is perhaps given to this physical association, being a 
term derived from the physical sciences; however, making use of the more economic conception of 
the ‘means of destruction’ (i.e. ‘that which enables the use of destructive force') is a better way in 
which to frame one’s thoughts on the matter. War, being physical, is often described using physical 
terms (“kinetic operations”, “momentum”, “mass” and of course “friction”) despite the fact that the 
discipline of physics is generally concerned with action exerted on inanimate or otherwise passive 
objects – rather than with active opposition, as one sees in warfare. The vocabulary of economics 
may, therefore, be a more appropriate conceptual tool upon which less experienced commanders can 
rely in order to deconstruct and understand their task: the identification of ‘bottlenecks’ in the 
processes of the opponent’s war machine is perhaps an easier task than to think in terms of the 
interaction of physical objects. 
176 
 
problematic Landwehr, an institution which threatened the Junker aristocracy’s hold on 
military power.  
 
That this dynamic injects a certain amount of uncertainty into politics is obvious; a 
host of independent actors (or actors with the potential to become so) are present, adding new 
variables in the already chaotic political dynamic. Technological improvements to weaponry 
and other warmaking paraphernalia are not automatically welcomed by those who control the 
means of violence; as is the case with those who control the means of production, new 
technologies pose a threat to established interests who are not in the best position to exploit 
new developments, and who have ‘sunk costs’ invested in the old technologies and 
techniques401 (a knight who had spent his life learning to fight from horseback would be loath 
to take up a crossbow, however effective it was). Institutions which seek to regulate and 
restrict new technologies (and techne), such as guilds, are commonly seen in the economic 
world, and as we have seen from the development of the laws of war, there is a similar 
tendency operating in warfare; a notorious example of military conservatism is the case of the 
Mamluks, whose adherence to previously successful military techniques and contempt for 
gunpowder weapons became a byword, 402 and the attempts made by the medieval church to 
ban projectile weapons are similarly motivated by a desire to retain a status quo which 
favours the dominant group. When opposing groups which both make use of the same means 
of destruction meet, there will be some incentive to cooperate – smallholder hoplites who all 
need to go back to gather the harvest and whose weapons are most effectively used in a 
similar way (in a phalanx). However, despite the occasional attempts which have been made 
to control war’s means, and despite its similarity to commerce in many respects, there is 
much less scope for this kind of regulation than in economic behaviour – being a matter of 
life and death, the incentive to introduce new tools once exposed to them is much more vital 
in wartime, and the lack of trust and common norms and expectations in wartime make 
cooperation a less likely prospect overall. War exposes societies to new weapons and forms 
of social organisation which must be adapted to and often copied in order to avoid defeat, 
                                                     
401 One of the best known examples is the case of Kodak, which dominated the camera film market 
and whose research and development department developed one of the first digital cameras. 
Unwillingness to upset their established business model ultimately resulted in the company’s collapse. 
402 James Riddick Partington, A History of Greek Fire and Gunpowder. (Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1999), p.208 
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even at the risk of politically empowering previously disenfranchised elements of society; 
war’s inherent lack of restriction makes it particularly corrosive to established political 
orders. 
 
Carles Boix makes this point in an extended analysis of the development of major 
military technologies and their political implications in his book Political Order and 
Inequality. One of the earliest military technologies was bronze, used for armour and 
weaponry; the control of deposits of copper and in particular the more geographically limited 
tin gave certain groups the ability to monopolise control of weaponry and form a military 
caste, dominating their societies403 – strong state institutions in the form of absolute 
monarchies and the early empires of Middle East and in China date from the same time as 
bronze weapons.404 Iron weapons, made from much more easily accessible ores, enabled a 
decentralisation of military technologies and an according democratisation of politics – 
around 1200 BC, practically every bronze-age city in the eastern Mediterranean collapsed, 
with Mycenaean palace cultures falling at the hands of Dorian invaders, who were armed 
with iron weapons and organised in a more decentralised political structure.405 Perhaps one of 
the most important military technologies with political consequences was that of cavalry. 
Horses enabled rapid movement, intimidation, a high platform from which to attack infantry 
and after the introduction of the stirrup, added the mass of the charging horse to the tip of a 
lance. So effective was the horse as a military technology that those with access to it reshaped 
the political and economic systems of their societies in their interest; a small cavalry class 
developed in many societies which were able to make use of horses as a military asset, and 
various ranks of nobility explicitly reference the animal: chevalier, caballero, equites are all 
examples of such (the German equivalent ritter meaning ‘rider’).  
 
To use a horse as a military technology was extremely expensive, both in terms of 
time taken to learn how to ride and fight from horseback and in terms of the financial costs 
needed to outfit and maintain the cavalryman and his equipment – one aspect of which was 
                                                     
403 Carles Boix, Political Order and Inequality, (Cambridge University Press, 2015), p.132 
404 Boix, p.132-133. Boix notes that in China, bronze appears to have been used exclusively for 
weapons and ritual objects, rather than agricultural tools – state formation was therefore not driven by 
technological improvements in farming. 
405 William H. MacNeill,  The Pursuit of Power. University of Chicago Press, 1982, p.12-13 
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owning land on which the horse could be raised. This combination of a small class of horse-
owners with a need for land and an ability to dominate the rest of society shaped the politics 
of the feudal system.406 The range of the horse as a military technology was effectively 
restricted to flat country – mountainous regions and swampy ground rendered it less effective 
(along with large areas of Africa rendered inhospitable due to the presence of the tsetse fly) – 
and it was at these boundaries that feudalism gave way to other forms of political 
organisation. It is no accident that the Swiss, living in a mountainous country where horses 
could not dominate the terrain, developed a democratic political structure, and the same was 
true for in Sweden, where heavy forests militated against cavalry and whose free peasants 
who took part in regional assemblies.407 Urban populations with republican political 
structures, it is true, could also mount a decent defence against cavalry armies – as at the 
Battle of Courtrai, where Flemish militia were able to beat a French army of knights. 
However, this applied more to large populations which were able to field with particular 
advantages in terms of being based in terrain unsuitable to horses (marshes and so on) and the 
urban populations, though rich, needed to work for their wealth and could not devote their 
lives to war as an exclusively military caste could. As we have already seen, the introduction 
of gunpowder weapons allowed for the possibility of fielding large armies of men who did 
not need extensive training, a development which empowered not a specific warrior caste but 
the larger states which had the financial and demographic resources to field large armies. in 
the modern day, with war (at least in the west) being dominated by increasingly complex 
military technologies, the need for a strong state with advanced economy is all the more felt, 
with military-industrial complexes wielding a great deal of political power, as well as a 
degree of political representation of the population of the state – the logic behind granting the 
vote to all men in the UK after the First World War. 
 
                                                     
406 Boix, p.158 
407 Boix, p.156. More quantitative approaches have found that the theory of state formation as a 
function of exposure to intense warfare holds weight in computer simulation; by reconstructing a 
model of the Old World with appropriately distributed resources (specifically cavalry technologies, 
and fertile or rugged ground), Turchin et al. were able to map the emergence of complex societies in a 
way which closely corresponds to the historical record. See Peter Turchin, Thomas E. Currie, Edward 
A. L. Turner, and Sergey Gavrilets, "War, space, and the evolution of Old World complex societies." 
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 110.41 (2013): 16384-16389. 
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The mechanisms by which this political change can be effected have been varied; the 
act of providing weapons obviously has the potential to empower those who receive them, 
but this is hardly the only means by which this is achieved. More often we can find that the 
increasing complexity of military technologies and the subsequent need for specialisation in 
their development requires the input of various groups who provide funds, expertise and 
labour (i.e. those who controlled the means of destruction), and who are subsequently 
accommodated in the political system; Nicholas Kyriazis, in his article “Seapower and 
Socioeconomic Change” points out that naval states such as Britain and the Netherlands had 
particularly strong democratic political systems (if not in terms of widespread suffrage, then 
at least regarding property rights)408 for this reason, due to the economic needs imposed by 
the cost of maintaining fleets. Empowerment can be even more direct – we have already seen 
that organisation and coordination is a vitally important part of military techne – Saumitra Jha 
and Steven Wilkinson have speculated that non-elite groups can even be empowered by their 
acquisition of organisational skills, which enables them to more effectively engage in 
collective action once they have left the battlefield.409 
 
Technological change newly empowers certain groups in society, and in so doing, 
reshapes the superstructure of the wider group. This aspect of war, that it is fought between 
actors which are products of a unique process of historical development, introduces another 
element of uncertainty – particularly when the practice of war itself introduces ever more 
changes which reshape the society or state concerned. Different societies will, as Clausewitz 
noted, go to war in different ways. The variability of these forms of social organisation 
precludes (or at least militates against) certainty, which would require detailed knowledge of 
the political, economic, sociological nature of one’s own society and that of the enemy; the 
alternative being adherence to more generalised principles and theories which would by 
necessity be unable to make specific predictions. The influence of technology and war’s 
physicality does not stop at its reshaping of political institutions and the introduction of more 
sources of chance; it also has important implications when it comes to the making of strategy. 
                                                     
408 Nicholas Kyriazis, “Seapower and Socioeconomic Change”, Theory and Society, Vol. 35, No. 1 
(Feb., 2006), p.71-108, p.81 
409 See Saumitra Jha and Steven Wilkinson. "Does Combat Experience Foster Organizational Skill? 
Evidence from Ethnic Cleansing During the Partition of South Asia." American Political Science 
Review 106.04 (2012): 883-907 
180 
 
 
Technology and Strategy 
 
 Technological change influences strategy in a variety of ways. As technology 
develops, the necessity for new material inputs needed for the exercise of armed force has 
strategic consequences; previously unimportant resources and the places in which they are 
found become strategic priorities: the Royal Navy’s shift away from coal to oil made the 
Middle East an area of great geopolitical importance, and present-day French intervention in 
African states has at least some connection to uranium deposits.410 Physical changes brought 
about by war have their own effects. As certain elements of society take damage faster than 
others, the political balance of power begins to shift; the same goes when certain groups 
benefit disproportionately from war. The classic case of such a development is the fall of the 
Roman Republic; victories in war brought about an influx of slaves who dispossessed lower 
class citizens who became a potential power base for a would-be dictator. Caesar was such a 
man, who also effectively controlled his own means of destruction in the form of his legions 
– in part because geographical distance (brought about by repeated conquests) inhibited 
effective central control of Rome’s armed forces. The Republican system had been based on 
physical foundations – demographic, economic and spatial – which shifted as a result of 
military expansion, and the ones which had developed were much more favourable to 
imperial rule. 
 
New technology requires new techne – new ways of using these tools. This applies 
both at the level of the individual soldier and the statesman; innovations in technology, 
particularly since the industrial revolution, have transformed the making of strategy, from the 
Schlieffen plan (which was enabled, and constrained by, the capabilities of the German 
railway system) to the nuclear strategy of the Cold War. The nature of strategy – the process 
of planning a course of action without the guidance of constitutive rules – is made ever-
clearer by its constant reinvention on the emergence of new technology. New tools 
exacerbate the violence and uncertainty of war firstly by introducing the promise of increased 
destruction (or protection from it) and secondly by presenting would-be strategists with tools 
                                                     
410 Andrew McKillop, “What’s Really Behind France’s Sudden Scramble to “Save Central Africa”?” 
Global Research (December 6, 2013), http://www.globalresearch.ca/whats-really-behind-frances-
sudden-scramble-to-save-central-africa/5360522 <accessed 04/10/15> 
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whose effects are essentially unknown. This is compounded by the fact that no information is 
automatically provided in war as it is done in other conflicts where rules provide information 
which can be taken for granted. Therefore, intelligence must be gathered and analysed – put 
into the context of the purpose of the war. The unique nature of each of the war’s combatants 
means that this process will require a huge amount of information beyond merely military 
factors like troop movements; the enemy policy may be unclear, the likely reaction its society 
will have to certain types of attack is uncertain, especially when new technologies are 
involved (bombing of population centres in the Second World War did not have the effects 
military planners anticipated).  
 
These pressures and possibilities are why war has been a perennial source of 
technological innovation; effective tools are in demand and there are relatively few barriers to 
their introduction. Military technologies are intimately bound up with war’s nature as a 
physical contest, either enhancing physical capabilities or facilitating their use. The central 
role of technological advances in the last hundred years has bewitched many theorists, with 
the power of modern technologies leading some to believe that such advances can guarantee 
victory, evaporate the fog of war, and enable complete control of one’s own forces. A notable 
example of such technological enthusiasm came with the development of air power – Guilio 
Douhet’s theories and the widespread notion that “the bomber will always get through” 
portrayed air power as an irresistible force which would totally revolutionise warfare, 
expectations which were not entirely borne out by reality. More recently, advances in 
precision munitions, the “revolution in military affairs” have held out the possibility of 
‘surgical strikes’ and risk-free warfare (at least from the attacker’s point of view); “Network-
centric Warfare” similarly promises the total control of one’s forces and fully integrated 
intelligence feeds. 
 
There are of course obvious criticisms of such optimism; the casualty-free campaign 
in Yugoslavia was less than perfect in crippling the Serbian armed forces who camouflage 
their military equipment, and although the 2003 Iraq war was won with relative ease, when 
faced with insurgent tactics the US military was at a disadvantage. New technologies are 
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invariably adapted to.411 Criticism of such attitudes has been advanced from modern-day 
acolytes of Clausewitz, who make his point that war is inherently uncertain and aspirations to 
complete control and certainty are ephemeral. I wish to contribute to this argument by 
pointing to the ways in which technology itself contributes to uncertainty in warfare, 
reinforcing the trend engendered by the rulelessness which gives the means of war such a 
prominent role. The performance of new technologies has always been uncertain – there are 
limits to the human imagination, and the effects of new weapons are often other than what 
their creators imagined: for instance, poison gas did not have the revolutionary effects some 
had guessed at in the First World War, while at the same time some weapons have exceeded 
their potential – the German 88mm anti-air cannon proved to be an excellent improvised anti-
tank weapon. What obscures our prognostication is the intrusion of interest, a lack of 
intellectual foundation in our understanding of society and human nature, the inherent 
unpredictability of non-linear domains, and in part a lack of imagination. Unintended 
consequences of new technology are hard to anticipate. Technological capabilities are an 
obvious basis for strategic calculation, but constant change and uncertainty inherent in 
innovation have important implications for the strategist. 
 
Nuclear Strategy 
 
The clearest examples of this problem are to be found in the technological advances 
of the twentieth century, particularly air power and nuclear weapons. Even before the First 
World War, H. G. Wells had written The War in the Air, speculating in lurid detail the 
possibilities of aerial combat, and aerial bombardment seemed so unstoppable that politicians 
despaired of the possibility that it might be guarded against, Stanley Baldwin making his 
famous pronouncement that “the bomber will always get through” in 1932. Air power 
theorists like Guilio Douhet and Sir Hugh Trenchard rhapsodised over the possibilities of 
their new arms, being able to strike at the industrial base of the enemy without having to go 
through his armed forces first; this, they held, would bring about moral collapse in the 
civilian population. Wars would begin, it was speculated, with a counter-air power strike, 
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one’s own airplanes bombing airfields and shooting down enemy planes en masse,412 with 
subsequent attacks breaking civilian morale – even before a physical collapse. The focus on 
civilians was in part a reaction to modern ‘total war’, where civilians had increasingly 
become central to the war effort – and partly based on an assumption that, for a variety of 
reasons, civilians were promising targets for raids. They were less inured to hardship and 
danger than soldiers, and were presumed to be alienated from their leaders; bombing 
population centres would cause mass hysteria, and calls for peace would be inevitable; as 
Douhet speculated, “a complete breakdown of the social structure cannot but take place in a 
country being subjected to… merciless pounding from the air.”413 That these claims were not 
borne out in reality was due to a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the obviously 
self-serving nature of the predictions; it was in the professional interest of the proto-airmen to 
exaggerate the capabilities (especially, the strategic capabilities) of their new technology – all 
the better to achieve independent strategic responsibilities, and the budgets and ‘turf’ that 
come with them. Laurence Freedman another of the reasons – the uncertain intellectual 
foundations of air strategy, a tool which had never been used on settled populations: 
 
Much advocacy of strategic bombardment was immoderate and simplistic, relying on 
intuition more than analysis. In part, this was because it was propaganda for a new 
branch of the armed services. But even the most detached writers on this subject were 
working in the realm of speculation. They could not be sure what changes new 
technological advances would bring; they could only guess at the impact of 
bombardment on modern social structures. (In Britain, for example, much of the 
RAF's confidence in strategic bombing derived from its apparent efficiency in 
controlling wild tribesmen in Somalia and Iraq.) Under the influence of these theories, 
military writers were straying beyond their area of competence. It might be hard to 
challenge military expertise on the tactics of battle; but now they were commenting 
on the ability of civilians, indeed whole societies, to withstand a certain sort of 
pressure.414 
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As it turned out, air power did not have the overwhelming impact its advocates had 
promised. However, its impact on strategy was less than the next great technical advance of 
the century – nuclear weapons. On reading a newspaper headline about the dropping of the 
atomic bomb on Hiroshima, the naval strategist Bernard Brodie said to his wife “everything I 
have done up till now is obsolete.”415 As Brodie (later to become one of the most prominent 
nuclear strategists of the Cold War) noted, the introduction of nuclear weapons represented a 
sea change in strategic thought. Old assumptions about the conduct of strategy, and of the 
very utility of war, could no longer be relied on. The prospect of nuclear annihilation served 
to focus the minds of strategic planners on the possibilities of nuclear war, and how these 
weapons might be used (or not) in pursuit of policy ends. New methods of modelling strategy 
were introduced in order to give greater certainty to the understanding of human behaviour 
(game theory being particularly popular).  
 
Could nuclear weapons be used in a conventional war? Basing forces in cities or other 
fixed positions would invite the use of nuclear weapons against them and their hosts; an army 
with no fixed base or static front line would be better able to survive nuclear combat. Henry 
Kissinger at one time imagined land warfare could transform into something more like war at 
sea, with mobile units roving around Europe, less reliant on lines of supply, engaging each 
other with tactical nuclear weapons.416 Even if the reality did not turn out to be quite so 
extreme, the potential use of nuclear weapons for conventional tactics – concentrating troops 
in a mass, tactically advisable in earlier times, would invite nuclear bombardment. Doctrine 
would have to change accordingly – introducing yet another source of change and 
uncertainty, as the enemy would be forced to adapt, and so on. The possibility of fighting a 
limited war with nuclear weapons was speculated; Colonel Richard Leghorn’s concept of 
‘graduated deterrence’ postulated that by restricting nuclear attacks to military targets, and 
inflicting damage proportional to the threat they posed (whilst unilaterally refraining from 
escalation and in particular attacks on civilian population centres) nuclear weaponry could be 
used without risking a general conflagration.417  This supposed that the enemy would return 
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the favour; indeed, much nuclear strategy involved the possibility of a kind of communication 
between both sides. Thomas Schelling spoke of the possibilities of the “diplomacy of 
violence” wherein force could be used as a bargaining chip.  
  
All of these questions were particularly difficult to answer because of the completely 
unsettling effects nuclear weapons would have on warfare, which thanks to their limited use 
existed almost entirely in the minds of theorists. Beyond the findings of nuclear tests and the 
cases of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, all of the hard evidence on which to base nuclear strategy 
was uncertain – there were simply no precedents for this phenomenon. This nuclear planning 
would rely on speculation as to the great variety of effects of a nuclear exchange: the 
likelihood a counterforce strike could wipe out the enemy nuclear capability; its effects on 
civilian morale; even the environmental effects of a nuclear exchange, all were potentially 
relevant. Nuclear strategy was something of a growth industry after the Second World War, 
and there were a number of notable theorists who worked on nuclear strategy, particularly the 
American strategists who worked at the RAND corporation. Three of these merit particular 
consideration, reflecting as they do a variety of approaches to the problems of strategy in the 
age of nuclear weapons: Albert Wohlstetter, who devised strategy based on an assessment of 
the objective technological capabilities of nuclear weapons and their associated weapons 
systems; Herman Kahn, who speculated as to a great variety of  the potential effects of 
nuclear weapons use; and Bernard Brodie, who was most conscious of the unique 
implications of nuclear technology as regards the use of war as a political instrument. 
 
Albert Wohlstetter was one of the most influential strategists of his time, particularly 
in regards to his influence over policymaking and the practice of ‘systems analysis’ which for 
good or ill formed the intellectual foundation of much of American strategic thinking in the 
Cold War. Wohlstetter made two principal contributions to nuclear strategy;418 the first was 
his application of systems analysis to an assessment of the vulnerability of Strategic Air 
Command bases – the so-called “base study” series which first began in 1951. The SAC, then 
under the command of the pugnacious Curtis LeMay, was primarily concerned with their own 
capacity to deliver an attack on the Soviet Union, being rather more ignorant of its own 
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vulnerability to Soviet attack. Wohlstetter and his colleagues, after making an assessment of 
the technical capabilities (i.e. the range and firepower) of the Soviet Union’s own bomber 
fleet, and accounting for the locations of the American bases relative to the Soviets’s own, 
concluded that by 1956 the Soviet Union could wipe out 90% of the United States’ bombers 
and tankers.419 A particular problem was posed by the SAC’s use of air bases in allied 
countries which were closer to the Soviet Union; American bombers therefore needed to use 
the foreign airbases irregularly – and only to refuel – as the Soviet Union would presumably 
not expend resources attacking the bases if it could not guarantee that there would be 
bombers there to destroy. Such specific conclusions of course depended on accurate data on 
the armed forces of the Soviet Union (and of course, on those of America itself – figures 
which, though easier to come by, again required a deal of administrative effort). Furthermore, 
these base studies had to be repeated420 as new developments, such as the invention of 
intercontinental ballistic missiles and more destructive hydrogen bombs, made the old 
studies’ conclusions obsolete, and allowances for future technological developments had to 
be incorporated into current strategy (bombers had to abandon forward air bases entirely and 
be refuelled mid-air in order to avoid the threat of ICBM strikes, for instance). Despite these 
inherent difficulties of a strategy based on physical capabilities, the use of such data 
nevertheless did provide a useful intellectual foundation to the technical (if not political) 
strategic choices which had to be made in the nuclear age.  
 
This approach was of course paralleled by the emerging mathematical science of 
game theory, which (like the geometric strategies of the Enlightenment before it) sought to 
base military decision making on supposedly firm mathematical grounds. The use of such 
behavioural models to calculate the trade-offs of different strategic choices was a key part of 
the study of deterrence, the second area in which Wohlstetter made a principal contribution. 
Wohlstetter observed that deterrence required not only the possession of a powerful nuclear 
arsenal, but rather the possibility of carrying out a successful ‘second strike’, i.e. a nuclear 
strike which could be delivered after being hit oneself.421 There were six requirements for 
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such a strategy to be effective: military forces used for deterrence had to be maintained 
through peacetime, ready to act, on an acceptable budget; these needed to be able to survive a 
first attack by the enemy forces, either by receiving and acting on early warnings, or by being 
protected in durable bases; and furthermore, they required the ability to receive an order to 
attack (which required a communications system that could survive a nuclear attack). The 
retaliatory forces finally needed to be fuelled to the extent that they would be able to get to 
their targets, be able to penetrate Soviet air defences, and deliver firepower sufficient to 
defeat the ground defences of their targets. This presented a whole range of challenges, and 
the danger was that a Soviet first strike would be able to knock out even a superior American 
force before it was able to retaliate – such an occurrence could result in a Third World War in 
which the Soviet Union sustained fewer casualties than in the Second. The disposition of 
nuclear forces should therefore be based around their potential use as second-strike weapons 
– basing missiles close to the Soviet Union, for instance, was inadvisable in that it made them 
very vulnerable to a first strike.  
 
Here Wohlstetter was grappling not only with the physical capabilities of technology 
but of their unique strategic implications, an exercise which required a great deal of 
speculation and imagination. Another of the nuclear strategists, Herman Kahn, was similarly 
given to speculation about the possibilities of nuclear war, to an especially florid degree. 
Reputedly the inspiration for the character of Dr Strangelove, Kahn’s remorseless pursuit of 
the line of his reasoning led him to alarming conclusions, which he would present in a 
deliberately shocking way. His idiosyncratic thought experiments on the subject of 
hypothetical “doomsday machines” which would destroy the world if triggered by the 
detection of a set number of nuclear blasts are a good example, but even in his more concrete 
analyses of more probable nuclear wars, Kahn was unique in his tendency to explore the 
horrific implications of nuclear strikes in a detached, matter-of-fact manner. Moral qualms 
over the use of nuclear weapons did not factor into his analysis, and he explored the 
possibilities of strategic action after a nuclear exchange as if they were just another weapon 
of war.  
 
The uncertainties of nuclear life among the general population was one such area 
which provided him with material for his musings: for instance, he posited that the fear of 
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radiation sickness (which manifests first as nausea, followed by an apparent recovery lasting 
two to three weeks) would be a threat to the morale of survivors; the government should 
therefore lay in a stock of radiation detectors which could be used to reassure radiation 
hypochondriacs that they had only a small dose of exposure, and were merely nauseated by 
other factors (presumably not hard to come by in such an environment)422 The effects of 
specific radioactive isotopes also excited his imagination; Strontium-90, for instance, 
accumulates in the bones, and would contaminate a large amount of the food supply. Kahn 
drew up a plan to sort food into four categories, allocating the most isotope-free foods to 
pregnant mothers and children, with a category for over forty-year-olds (whose bones were 
growing at a slower rate). Cancers would of course result from eating such food, but this 
system would ameliorate the worst effects (with Kahn cheerfully pointing out that in any case 
“most of these people would die from other causes before they got cancer”).423 His flippant 
treatment of such grave subjects such as these and his glib remarks on aspects of nuclear war, 
like casualty figures which would number in the millions, was a habit for which Kahn 
received a great deal of criticism from members of the public and from others in the strategic 
establishment (Bernard Brodie objected in particular to the levity implied by Kahn’s rather 
Freudian term for unrestrained nuclear war, the so-called “wargasm”). However, of all the 
nuclear strategists he was perhaps the most appreciative of the myriad effects that a nucleatr 
exchange would bring about. As J. C. Garnett comments, “Instead of righteous indignation, 
condemnation and despair at the folly of war, there was, in his writing, a clinical acceptance 
of thermonuclear war as a fact of life like other facts of life. Whereas most people have a 
mental block when it comes to nuclear war, Kahn didn’t, and the fact he didn’t gave his 
writing a chilling flavour of immorality.”424 In this sense, his work represented an 
appreciation of war’s inherent lack of restriction, which enables it to drive itself to greater 
and greater levels of violence; war had no moral rules in itself, and Kahn decided not to be 
anachronistic in applying them to his speculations.  
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Kahn was heavily criticised, however, for a number of his conclusions – and more to 
the point, the way in which he reaches them. For instance, in On Thermonuclear War, Kahn 
provides a table which contains a list of estimates as to the time needed for a nation’s post-
nuclear recovery, given set levels of casualties;425 Philip Green has asserted that Kahn’s 
methodology in compiling the list (presented as fact) was in fact completely unscientific, and 
in fact was completely speculative.426 Similarly his conclusions regarding post-exchange life 
were based on very flimsy evidence, given the confidence with which he makes his 
pronouncements. This speculation differed from other assessments in its scale, if not its 
scope; whether or not Kahn’s conclusions were correct, he was certainly right to cast his net 
so widely. In any case, hard evidence of the effects of a nuclear war was largely unavailable. 
Nuclear weapons (and only relatively weak fission ones at that) having only been used on 
human targets twice, there was a great deal of information which was unavailable to the 
nuclear planners which might have turned out to be strategically relevant in a post-exchange 
world; this is particularly so with regard to the social effects of nuclear attack, the area in 
which the earlier assumptions of strategic bombing were so badly disproven. 
 
 Kahn’s lack of a historical approach was perhaps an extreme case of the capabilities-
based and ‘scientific’ treatment which was particularly popular in the American strategic 
establishment. Being a physicist by training, he had a very limited ability to put the events of 
his own time in a wider historical perspective – such an approach was the opposite of perhaps 
the most intellectually distinguished of the nuclear strategists, Bernard Brodie. Brodie began 
his academic career studying under Quincy Wright, who authored the magisterial tome The 
Study of War, a wide-ranging approach to the subject which explored it in its various aspects 
and historical manifestations, and Brodie’s own graduate dissertation was a study linking 
military technology with politics, concerned with the influence of naval technology on 
diplomacy in the nineteenth century.427 Brodie continued to work on naval strategy and other 
aspects of strategy in general, and as mentioned earlier he instantly recognised the 
transformative effects of the introduction of atomic weapons on his subject. This manifested 
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in his editing and co-writing of the book which was the earliest comprehensive treatment of 
nuclear strategy, The Absolute Weapon, published barely half a year after the bombing of 
Hiroshima. Brodie made eight conclusions on the realities of war in the nuclear age in The 
Absolute Weapon:  
 
1. The power of the present bomb is such that any city in the world can be effectively 
destroyed by one to ten bombs; 
  
2. No adequate defence against the bomb exists, and the possibilities of its existence in 
the future are exceedingly remote; 
  
3. The atomic bomb not only places an extraordinary military premium upon the 
development of new types of carriers, but also greatly extends the destructive range of 
existing carriers; 
  
4. Superiority in air forces, though a more effective safeguard in itself than superiority 
in naval or land forces, nevertheless fails to guarantee security; 
  
5. Superiority in numbers of bombs is not in itself a guarantee of strategic superiority in 
atomic bomb warfare; 
  
6. The new potentialities which the atomic bomb gives to sabotage must not be 
overrated; 
  
7. In relation to the destructive powers of the bomb, world resources in raw materials 
for its production must be considered abundant; and 
  
8. Regardless of American decisions concerning retention of its present secrets, other 
powers besides Britain and Canada will possess the ability to produce the bombs in 
quantity within a period of five to ten years hence.428 
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In the book, Brodie also made his most famous observations on the effect of nuclear 
weapons on strategy, in a statement that has practically become cliché:  
 
“Thus, the first and most vital step in any American security program for the age of 
atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in case of attack the 
possibility of retaliation in kind. The writer in making that statement is not for the 
moment concerned about who will win the next war in which atomic bombs are used. 
Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From 
now on its chief purpose must be to prevent them. It can have almost no other useful 
purpose.”429 
 
Despite this conclusion, Brodie continued to work on areas of nuclear strategy such as 
target selection (including, for instance, the idea of keeping certain cities unbombed as 
‘hostages’ for future behaviour), enduring an unsuccessful attempt to influence the thinking 
of SAC chiefs away from their preferred technique of ‘city-busting’. However, shortly after 
his move to RAND in 1951 Brodie was faced with a problem presented by the development 
in nuclear technology: the introduction of hydrogen bombs, which greatly increased the 
destructive potential of nuclear strikes. The shift from fission to fusion as the source of 
explosive power increased the potential of nuclear firepower from a mere 15 kilotons of TNT 
equivalent of the ‘Little Boy’ bomb dropped on Hiroshima to the range of megatons (that is 
thousands of tons, to millions) for hydrogen weapons. For Brodie, the invention of these 
weapons definitively shifted the foundations of nuclear strategy; whereas before he had 
entertained the possibility that nuclear war might be possible to conduct with restraint, the 
presence of such destructive new weapons rendered war unusable as an instrument of policy 
and threatened the realisation of Douhet’s prediction of the weapon which could not be 
defended against.430  
 
In 1959 Brodie published Strategy In The Missile Age, which proved a landmark in 
the nuclear strategy literature, and which was rather pessimistic in its conclusions. He was 
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particularly anxious about the possibilities of deterrence; in the book, Brodie frequently took 
a pessimistic view of the strategic future, based in no small part on his understanding of 
human nature. One of the central problems that Brodie identified was “the ever-widening 
disparity in accomplishment between man’s military inventions and his social adaptation to 
them.”431 Old ways of thinking about the use of force were no longer effective or safe in the 
new environment of nuclear strategy, and the human factor was to him as much as it was to 
Clausewitz a source of uncertainty: “It is also impossible for us to predict with absolute 
assurance our own behaviour in extremely tense and provocative circumstances… The wrong 
kind of prediction in this regard might precipitate that total nuclear war which too many 
persons have lightly concluded is now impossible.”432 Brodie dabbled in more scientific 
methods of strategy, but though he saw its use he was soon sceptical about the possibility of 
making strategy a scientific endeavour. Strategy in The Missile Age closed with a chapter 
entitled “The Uncertainty of the Outcome” which reflected his Clausewitzian concern with 
chance and uncertainty: 
 
However, our experience thus far with scientific preparation for military decision-
making warns us to appreciate how imperfect is even the best we can do. Those of us 
who do this work are beset by all kinds of limitations, including limitations in talent 
and in available knowledge. Where the object is to predict the future, for the sake of 
appropriate action, we simply cannot wait until all the relevant facts are in. Besides, 
we can make progress only as we cut off and treat in isolation a small portion of the 
total universe of data and of problems that confront us, and every research project is 
to that extent “out of context.” In addition, we are dealing always with large 
admixtures of pure chance.433 
 
Brodie’s final book, War & Politics, was extremely Clausewitzian in its stress on the 
connection of war with politics more generally, and in his discussion of the unpredictability 
and sometimes uncontrollable nature of military activity. Brodie included in his analysis 
irrational influences on strategy, like passion and subconscious drives, along with the 
influence of individual personalities – factors which would already be familiar to 
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Clausewitz’s readers. In the book Brodie also voiced a critical attitude to the ‘experts’ in the 
military establishment, who were overly concerned with ‘winning’ in a narrowly militaristic 
sense; civilian control of armed forces was therefore imperative if war was to be properly 
used as a political instrument.434 Brodie was himself a keen reader of Clausewitz, providing 
an introductory essay and a commentary to the Paret-Howard translation of On War, and 
indeed it is interesting to note the similarities between the two theorists. Like Clausewitz, 
despite a degree of professional success Brodie was frustrated in his career, and had a limited 
impact in policymaking circles; his involvement with SAC was abortive, presenting a paper 
on target selection which was ignored by less sophisticated thinkers who had won their 
laurels with the ‘city-busting’ strategy (in particular Curtis LeMay, whose firebombing 
campaign destroyed most of Japan’s cities in the Second World War), who were unreceptive 
to his more nuanced approach.435 This was but one episode of a recurring theme in Brodie’s 
career – frustration at translating his strategic thinking into policy. His professional 
frustrations resurfaced in particular on the occasion of John F. Kennedy’s presidency, as he 
was passed over for a role in the administration; instead, systems analysis strategists were 
invited into the McNamara Pentagon to directly shape American policy.436 Nevertheless, 
Brodie’s theories, like those of Clausewitz, have stood the test of time – precisely because 
they incorporate the timeless aspects of war, particularly its inherent unpredictability. This 
aspect of war, combined with the destructive capability of nuclear weapons, pointed to a clear 
conclusion: 
 
“What we have done must convince us that Thucydides was right, that peace is better 
than war not only in being more agreeable but also in being very much more 
predictable. A plan and policy which offers a good promise of deterring war is 
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therefore by orders of magnitude better in every way than one which depreciates the 
objectives of deterrence in order to improve somewhat the chances of winning.”437 
 
 Much like the previous approaches to strategy outlined in the previous chapter, 
nuclear strategy is an exercise in devising a plan of action on how to win a war, without being 
able to refer to a clear set of constitutive rules. Some strategists, such as Wohlstetter, dwell 
narrowly on the capabilities of weapons and the physical execution of the war in a strictly 
military sense; others, like Brodie, think more widely of the political goals of the war, and 
how these influence (and are influenced by) the means with which it is carried out. Nuclear 
strategy is perhaps the clearest example of the extent to which this task of strategy is an 
inherently uncertain activity, and expresses a number of phenomena in their clearest form. 
Firstly, the effects of nuclear war were uncertain; though this is true of any war, the physical 
and social effects of the wide-scale use of nuclear weapons could only be guessed at, due to 
their limited use, and the fact that their destructive power increased over time. This leads to 
the second point, the fact that the material with which the nuclear strategists made their 
calculations was ever-changing; even if a ‘perfect’ nuclear strategy was arrived at, it would 
quickly become obsolete with changes in technology. Lastly, there was the human element – 
the behaviour of decision-makers in situations of extreme stress has always been a factor in 
war, and in the case of a potential nuclear exchange, the fate of all life on the planet would 
hang in the balance. Most of these implications and conclusions are ultimately traceable to 
the fact that war is not bound by rules; the threat of nuclear war has been (so far) the highest 
expression of the dynamics of war as violent conflict without rules, with the lack of an 
abstract framework of rules and the absence of effective restriction on its tools driving on to 
new and ever-more destructive forms. This process reached a qualitatively new stage in 
nuclear warfare, where the tools of war greatly exceeded in destructive power their utility to 
prosecute anything but the most extreme of political ends.  
 
Conclusions 
 
In conclusion, we can find that the lack of an abstract mechanism for conflict and the 
subsequent conduct of war in the physical environment has a number of important 
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implications for our understanding of war. Exposure to the vast number of potentially 
relevant variables in the physical world is, as Clausewitz noted, a potent source of chance and 
uncertainty, and a lack of restriction on the tools with which war can be fought similarly 
contributes to this – enabling and compelling opposing sides to develop and produce a 
bewildering variety and array of military technologies, each presenting a more-or-less 
unknown element into war. Some weapons have a more unsettling effect than others in this 
respect – as we have seen, the development of airpower and nuclear weapons in the 20th 
century had a particularly destabilising influence, introducing new dimensions to war which 
were so unprecedented that new schools of strategy had to be developed to conceptualise 
their possible uses. 
 
Perhaps the central aspect of the physicality of war, and its chief contrast with rule-
bound conflicts, is its connection with change. In other forms of conflict, the space is set and 
remains constant; in war, anywhere is a potential battlefield. Furthermore, the physical 
properties of even the same location can change over time, either through the effects of 
weather or other natural phenomena; man-made changes brought about by military 
engineering; or, in a more abstract sense, by the introduction of new technologies which alter 
the significance of a given piece of terrain; a flat plain may be excellent ground for the 
manoeuvres of a cavalry army, but its lack of cover proves deadly with the introduction of 
machine-guns and dive-bombing aircraft. The constant movement of war into new areas 
brings with it new sources of uncertainty, not only in the sheer novelty of new technological 
developments, but also through the transformative effect that technological change and 
physical combat has on the actors themselves. This can be as simple as the physical wastage 
of armies – the constant depreciation of what might be called ‘military capital’ – but can also 
be manifested in the opposite direction. As can be seen from the literature on the so-called 
‘Military Revolution’, new forms of administrative and political organisation are one of the 
most vital tools of war, necessitated by the need to supply and coordinate the constantly 
expanding material needs of warfare; this increasing complexity of social arrangements has 
obvious strategic implications, with the economic capabilities of the state being factored into 
‘grand strategy’; furthermore a host of new (and potentially unknown) weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities can result from this rise in social complexity. The political implications of 
technological and material change are another important aspect of warfare; changes in the the 
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distribution and control of the means of destruction within a society have important political 
consequences, and again change the nature and aims of the actors who fight wars in a manner 
which, if not unpredictable, is at least unique to every circumstance. 
 
The contrast with rule-bound conflict is clear to see – whereas the conduct of 
regulated contests is tightly controlled, the open-ended nature of warfare and its 
manifestation as a physical phenomenon introduces a vast array of variables (in the form of 
physical objects and technologies) which have to be taken into account; as a consequence an 
equally vast number of potential courses of action are presented to the soldier. Because of this 
aspect of war’s nature, the “complexity of the choice-situation in which the actors find 
themselves”438 is extremely pronounced, adding to the huge cognitive burden of the 
commander. Naturally, the other benefits which rules provide are also absent – physical harm 
is not guarded against, and there is no ‘ceiling’ to the conduct of war which would otherwise 
be provided by rules governing the limits to the scope of conflict. Finally, war has 
particularly corrosive effects on the material foundations of the status quo, a process which 
rules (in their constitution of symbolic rather than physical conflict) seek to limit as far as 
possible. 
  
                                                     
438 Kratochwil, p.10 
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CONCLUSIONS – THE MEANING OF WAR 
  
I began this thesis seeking to provide an answer to a research question concerned with 
the theory of war: is it possible to develop a more ‘basic’ theoretical understanding of war’s 
nature than is currently provided by the Clausewitzian paradigm; and could such an 
understanding help us to explain aspects of war which have previously been left unexamined 
and taken for granted? I believe that the theory of ‘war as violent conflict which is not bound 
by rules’ satisfies both of these conditions. Though this understanding of war does not 
replace – and should not be taken as an attempt to replace – the Clausewitzian understanding 
of war, it addresses the nature of warfare at an even more basic level; this understanding 
complements and enables a more intuitive understanding of other, more developed 
conceptualisations of warfare and is, as far as I am aware, the most parsimonious description 
of the essence of war. Moreover, by conceptualising war as a form of conflict which is not 
structured by rules, we can quickly grasp the fundamental differences between it and other 
forms of conflict which are bounded by them. This is especially with regard to the pervasive 
chance and uncertainty which besets military activity – but we can also understand the unique 
implications of war’s physical nature when we explicitly compare war to ‘abstract’ contests 
played out with symbolic interaction, ‘safe’ and predictable contests which are insulated from 
exogenous influences and enabled by the rules which war lacks. War has been characterised 
by various thinkers as uniquely uncertain, stressful, destructive, violent, unpredictable and 
varied: these qualities are ultimately explainable as consequences of war’s ruleless nature, as 
I have attempted to show. Furthermore, as we appreciate the various roles played and benefits 
provided by rules and laws, we can better understand what features war lacks and how it 
differs from other forms of conflict; and in particular, we can appreciate the mechanisms by 
which war is able to brings about momentous political changes – not merely as a result of the 
victory of one side or the other, but by provoking material changes in technology which have 
important implications for the social structure of the societies which fight war themselves. 
Here I will briefly summarise the arguments and findings of my thesis before going on to 
speculate on the potential uses of this theory of war, and in particular as to what sorts of 
studies and practitioners of war could best make use of such an understanding. 
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Firstly, it can be shown that Clausewitz’s theories of war can be more fully explained 
by (or at least can be shown to be compatible with) the idea of war as a form of violent 
conflict which is not bound by rules. The escalatory dynamic tending toward absolute war, 
which is enabled by the fact that war is not moderated by anything inherent to itself, is 
perhaps the clearest case – indeed, that this is due to war’s lack of regulation was identified 
by Clausewitz himself. Though his own explanations of other aspects of war are perfectly 
adequate (particularly his claims that each age has its own form of war, and that theories of 
war should not – indeed, cannot – go beyond certain fundamental principles), these again can 
be understood as consequences of the fact that war is unbound by rules and restrictions – 
things which would otherwise produce more pronounced regularities across time, and provide 
the basis for relatively more elaborate theoretical models than we can construct. However, it 
is perhaps most significant that Clausewitz’s characterisation of war as an inherently chancy 
and uncertain activity – rather, the most chancy and uncertain – which can be most fully 
accounted for by this understanding of war (his own explanations, and even more 
sophisticated appeals to nonlinearity theory, being inadequate to make such sweeping 
claims). The simplicity and parsimoniousness of the theory of war as ruleless conflict means 
that it can be more easily understood than Clausewitz’s theories, which require a laborious 
extraction from his writings. Because of this, I believe the theory of war as conflict without 
rules could conceivably serve as a primer to Clausewitz’s own thought, drawing together the 
different strands of his writing and showing how each aspect can be explained with reference 
to war’s lack of inherent regulation; this would have the benefit of presenting the kernel of 
the concept before exposing the reader to the difficulties of the text of On War; forearmed 
with the ‘common denominator’ of war, misunderstanding will hopefully be less likely. 
  
Recognising that war is not a rule-bound form of conflict affords us a new perspective 
on its nature; understanding the properties and purpose of rules, allows us to appreciate what 
war is not. Rules provide a number of benefits, particularly security – both in the sense of 
security from physical harm and violence, but also so-called ‘ontological’ security, a 
psychological sense of safety which results from operating in an environment which is 
perceived to be understandable and predictable (even if only in the sense that certain 
occurrences can be ruled out, and their ‘impossibility’ taken for granted). Indeed, this sense 
of order and predictability can even extend to the “construction” of reality, where actors 
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mistake the artificial framework of rules and strictures governing what is possible and 
permissible for that which is actually possible. Along with bestowing predictability, rules 
restrict the scope of physical harm. This has the effect of reinforcing and maintaining existing 
power dynamics within a society (domestic or international), maintaining the social status 
quo and otherwise reflecting the interests of the materially powerful – who often make the 
rules in the first place. The ‘strongest’ variety of rules, those which war lacks, are the 
“constitutive” rules which structure a distinct form of competition and allow for conflict to be 
carried out either wholly or in part in the form of a symbolic contest (where actions, whether 
physical, verbal or otherwise, take on certain meanings in the context of the rule-system). The 
absence of such mechanisms has profound implications for those who fight war, as do the 
other provisions of ‘constitutive’ rules: typically, a specific time and space for a conflict is 
demarcated, with the tools with which it can be prosecuted being subject to strict regulation; 
furthermore, a specific tempo or turn-system moderates the pace of interaction in rule-bound 
conflict. 
  
Its lack of rules means that war lacks many of the characteristics of a rule-bound 
conflict, which are provided even in superficially similar physical contests like combat sports 
and duels. In war, mental stress is occasioned by the insecurity of operating in an 
environment where nothing can be taken for granted; physical damage and bodily harm are 
similarly much more likely when there are no definitive rules against them. The political and 
economic status quo of a society at war is also at risk; the ideational superstructure of a 
society is profoundly influenced by its material base, and rules which limit the scope of 
material change accordingly have a conservative influence in this regard. To say that war 
lacks constitutive rules does not mean that it lacks all forms of regulation, however; indeed, 
war’s very lack of order, and its subsequent exposure of those who fight it to heightened 
levels of danger and uncertainty, is a strong incentive to the development of other, 
‘regulative’ rules agreed between parties to a war. These include explicit regulations of what 
is ‘permissible’ in war, whether in terms of weaponry or tactics used, or with regards to the 
treatment of prisoners and noncombatants. The universal appeal of avoiding harm and 
cognitive stress means that some forms of regulation and restraint can be found in practically 
wars, and there are particularly strong incentives to the development of such rules when the 
combatants have similar material or class interests, as can be seen in the laws of war which 
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governed hoplite- and knight-based battles. However, as these rules are not innate to war 
itself, the precise character of this regulation will differ from war to war –  in any case, it 
cannot meaningfully be said to have a ‘constitutional’ function. In this respect, perhaps more 
significant than the regulation of behaviour in war is our cultural understanding of what war 
‘is’ – our intellectual and cultural construction of war as a particular type of social institution, 
imbued with various levels of cultural significance. War can, for instance, be understood as a 
rite of passage, a quintessentially ‘male’ activity, or as a religious or spiritual endeavour; this 
treatment of war as something other than a one-dimensional ‘ruleless conflict’ is again found 
in most wars to some extent. Human beings’ psychological needs for predictability and 
regularity are so universal, and war in its ‘raw’ form so unsettling and corrosive, that any 
warring parties are likely to overlay the conduct of war with meaning and significance 
beyond its basic nature, in order to escape some of its more unsettling implications. 
Nevertheless, these constructions are external to war in its ‘pure’ theoretical sense – after all, 
it is perfectly possible to imagine a war being fought between two groups which have had no 
previous knowledge of each other, whereas any other form of meaningful interaction would 
require the existence of mutually understood rules. 
  
The imposition of order on the chaos of war is also manifested in the conduct of 
strategy, the practice of identifying and prosecuting a plan of action to win a war. The need 
for strategy, though not exclusive to war, has its clearest expression in warfare; this is 
because of war’s lack of rules, particularly with regard to the arbitration of its result. In every 
other form of conflict, rules stipulate conditions which are required for victory, and provide 
either a clear set of such criteria which can be used to determine victory, or an external 
arbitrator which interprets the result. The lack of arbitration and structure in war means that it 
is up to the actors concerned to identify how it can be won – a course which (beyond the 
lowest common denominator of military victory, the total destruction of the opposition) is 
unique to each case. The fact that war has no rules which would insulate it from the wider 
political, geographical and historical context exacerbates this problem, presenting an 
immensely complex, multifaceted problem to the strategist. There are two broad approaches 
to addressing this challenge of strategy: firstly, we can impose a sense of order on reality by 
means of ‘deductive’ theories of war, including culturally constructed understandings of what 
war is, and how it should be fought, along with more consciously-derived doctrines which 
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draw on calculations involving objective factors like terrain, technology, or mathematical or 
scientific theories as were postulated by Enlightenment-era military thinkers. These have the 
benefit of reducing the complexity of war (and the stress associated with it) to a manageable 
level by imposing a cognitive filter on the variables the strategist should consider relevant. 
The other approach to strategy is to embrace the possibilities of innovation afforded by a 
mode of behaviour in which ‘anything goes’: the two doctrines of maneuver warfare and 
irregular warfare exemplify the exploitation of this aspect of war’s nature, taking full 
advantage of the freedom of movement it provides in both time and space; war’s lack of a 
turn-based dynamic, in particular, explains the validity of John Boyd’s theories on the 
importance of outpacing the enemy’s tempo. Neither the deductive or inductive approach is 
invariably superior; effective strategies have been produced both by adhering to traditional 
understandings of war (operating within the paradigm of ‘normal’ war, as Thomas Kuhn 
might say); by calculating on the basis of physical capabilities (as systems analysts were able 
to do to an extent in the realm of nuclear strategy); or by innovating new strategies which 
actively exploit the freedom of movement which war provides. However, the ruleless nature 
of war presents special challenges to the strategist which must be taken into account 
whichever approach is chosen. 
  
The understanding of war as a form of conflict which does not have rules inherent to 
itself, is also useful in helping us to understand the physical character of war, and the wider 
implications of this aspect of warfare. Not being fought in an abstract space, war is 
prosecuted in the physical world – and this physicality exposes it to innumerable influences, 
such as inclement weather, changing terrain, and a myriad of near-imperceptible factors 
which can potentially have ‘non-linear’ effects, in that each have the potential to influence 
the course of the conflict in totally unpredictable ways. The physical tools with which war is 
fought are also in a constant state of change, there being no inherent restrictions on their 
development and use. This fact has important consequences for any attempts to theorise war, 
as the continued introduction of new (and therefore incompletely understood) technologies 
will defy any attempt to construct a conceptual understanding of war which is both specific to 
a given conflict, and applicable to war in all ages. Indeed, the influence of even individual 
technological developments can be so pronounced that entirely new theoretical models are 
required to address them, a point best illustrated by the development of nuclear strategy, 
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whose creators had to conceptualise the likely course and effects of nuclear war on the basis 
of a very limited base of evidence. 
  
Not only does the physical nature of war and the lack of restrictions on the 
development of military technology directly add to war’s uncertainty – these aspects of war 
also have ‘secondary’ effects which contribute to the unpredictability and changeability of 
warfare. Different forms of social organisation have developed through history as responses 
to the problems of war, from the feudal system to the modern state; war’s inherent escalatory 
tendencies, unrestrained by regulation, require an increasing complex and costly war effort 
which requires ever-more sophisticated organisational techniques to supply and coordinate it. 
These novel forms of social organisation, like other technologies, have uncertain 
implications, and this is especially the case with regard to their internal dynamics. Control of 
the ability to exercise violence (or ‘the means of destruction’) is a source of material power 
which, when redistributed by technological and organisational innovation, has the potential to 
change the political and social character of the community concerned. As we have noted, the 
structure of society is one of the most important sources of the ‘rules of war’, which often 
restrict the right to participate in armed conflict to certain social classes – foregoing the 
advantages which would result from a wider participation in combat, for the sake of 
maintaining the social hierarchy. A redistribution of material power and access to the ‘means 
of destruction’ within a society (both domestic and international) therefore has the potential 
to upset its order; as war goes on, and continues to alter the material balance of power, its 
effects ripple out in unpredictable and immensely significant ways – unrestrained by rules, 
which in other contests would insulate society from these corrosive effects.  
  
This understanding of war, though novel in its way, is not dramatically different from 
previous theories and doctrinal approaches – as I have mentioned, many of these have already 
either implicitly or explicitly referenced war’s lack of rules without fully exploring the 
implications of this fact. Perhaps this is a point in its favour; to claim to have produced a 
totally innovative theory in a field which has been worked over for literally thousands of 
years is probably an indication of error. However, there are some advantages to conceiving of 
war in this way. The first such benefit is that which should be provided by all theoretical 
models – a better understanding of its subject. I hope I have provided enough evidence to 
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show that understanding war through an appreciation of its lack of rules provides a new and 
fruitful perspective on a number of its other theoretical aspects and physical manifestations; I 
believe this is the case. Theoretical understanding of any complex concept or process is 
important: theory simplifies a complicated reality and allows us to make sense of what would 
otherwise be chaotic and confusing, and as we have seen, war is by its very nature one of the 
most elusive concepts that we might seek to grasp. Up to this point, the most influential 
theoretical understandings of war have largely been exegeses of Clausewitz’s thought, and 
despite the validity of his ideas and writings, they are not easily digested; as recent 
experience has showed, confusion often accompanies his writings even when they are read by 
trained academics. It could be argued that theory should be simple, as well as simplifying: the 
theory of war as violent conflict without rules has a number of advantages in this regard. The 
conclusions I have come to in the various chapters of this thesis are very readily arrived at 
through an understanding of war in contrast to a mode of behaviour (i.e. rule-bound 
behaviour) to which we all have some experience; by approaching war from this angle, the 
essence of war can perhaps be more readily understood by those who have had no direct 
experience of it, even if their understanding of the function of rules in social life is less 
comprehensive than the one I advance here. I believe that the insights which can be derived 
from this understanding are potentially considerable, capable of putting a great deal of 
confusing information into perspective and also serving as a theoretical scaffolding on which 
to construct more academic analyses of war in sociological or political contexts. Not the least 
factor in its favour, is that the formulation of the theory is mercifully simple, certainly when 
compared to the occasionally confusing metaphors and analogies used in Clausewitz’s work - 
beyond clarifying the meaning of ‘rules’ as constitutional rules, there is much less scope for 
misunderstanding in this theory of war. 
  
Taking my thesis as a whole, we can see how the theory of war as violent conflict 
without rules explains a great deal about war which has been inadequately addressed by the 
existing literature. The obvious subjective characteristics of war such as violence, chance, the 
unique characteristics of each form of war – each can both be explained individually, and 
understood as parts of a greater whole, when we look at them through the prism of this 
theory. For instance, war is often defined with reference to its nature as a violent political 
conflict. Though this is undeniably true (there is no such thing as a war which does not 
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involve violence, or at least the threat of violence), this is not in itself the common 
denominator which links all wars together. Two states could theoretically agree to settle a 
political dispute by means of a boxing match; this would fit the definition of war as violent 
political conflict, but to call such a case war would be plainly ridiculous. Rather, it is the use 
of violence which is ungoverned by a framework of rules, which defines war as such: most of 
the idiosyncratic aspects of war which I have examined in this thesis can also be explained 
either wholly or in part with reference to this fact, where in the past they had either been 
ignored or unsatisfactorily dealt with. The escalatory dynamics of violence, and technological 
innovation; the changing character of war from age to age (and war to war); the nature of 
war’s political effects; the unique problems the strategist has to deal with in war - all can be 
understood as consequences of war’s unique nature as violent conflict without rules. 
 
The lack of rules inherent to war means that there are no set limits on the use of 
violence, as there are in other violent contests439 and, as Clausewitz noted, this is the reason 
why war tends to behave in accordance to a logic of escalation to the ‘absolute’ – with any 
barriers to this being external to war’s nature. The escalatory dynamic of technological 
innovation and arms racing associated with war are part of the same process as the escalation 
of violence, and both dynamics have the effect of actively undermining attempts to bind 
war’s conduct with rules and restrictions – the former, by incentivising ever-increasing levels 
of violence, and the latter, by introducing rapid technological changes which can outpace 
attempts at regulation. This change has profound implications with regards to war’s changing 
nature; the unique ways in which it is manifested from age to age have for so long confused 
attempts to derive a comprehensive and detailed theory of war. With each war differing from 
all others in so many ways, it seems to elude a clear definition; perhaps ironically, ‘war as 
ruleless conflict’ can provide such a definition, but one which explains why war cannot be 
defined and conceptualised beyond a very basic level. Each war is like all others in two 
respects; first, it is a violent conflict; and second, this violence is not conducted in accordance 
with a set of rules which constitute war as a symbolic, arbitrated contest. For a form of 
behaviour to exhibit regularities, it must by definition act in accordance with rules, but war 
lacks these; therefore there is nothing shared by all wars beyond the use of violence and their 
                                                     
439 The fact that rule-bound violence is not often used to settle political disputes nowadays should not 
blind us to the possibility that there are other forms of political violence than war – at least in theory. 
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very lack of regularity. War’s conduct in the physical world, and not in an abstract rule-
governed environment means that the only ‘rules’ that can be observed are those which are 
imposed by physical limitations and the consequences of physical action - and the dynamics 
of escalation which I have discussed. The human factor might also be considered a constant, 
but with developments in military technology and robotics even this source of regularity 
might be removed. 
  
The ruleless nature of war also introduces secondary sources of irregularity, in the 
form of new sources of change, which again make one war differ from the next. As I have 
mentioned, the unrestrained escalatory dynamic of war incentivises the development of 
technologies – both in the form of materiel, and of new forms of societal organisation. Novel 
forms of technology and organisation, particularly the state, tend to be either wholly or in part 
uncertain quantities – 
as most clearly evidenced by nuclear weapons, and this is not just with regards to their direct 
military applications; accompanying the development of each new technologies, shifts occur 
in the distribution of material power both at the international level and within societies, which 
further alters the environment in which war is fought and the actors which fight it. This holds 
true both with reference to the effects of destruction, and the implications of growth which 
comes about as a result of war. The expansion of a state through military conquest will 
change its internal dynamics, thanks to shifts in material power; a prominent historical case is 
that of the Roman Republic, whose expansion into distant lands empowered generals and 
governors who might use their provinces as political bases, with the influx of slaves from war 
altering the material balance of power in Rome itself. 
  
These factors all have profound implications for strategy. Strategy, as I have 
mentioned, is defined as the coordination of resources to achieve an end, in the face of active 
opposition, without benefit of rules to guide its formulation. What strategy must be based on, 
then, is the unique physical, social, economic and technological circumstances of a given 
historical moment – an array of variables so numerous and complex that their strategic 
interpretation will necessarily be subjective and incomplete, and which is further complicated 
by the fact that these factors are in a constant state of turbulent change. As we have seen, not 
only will the enemy change his strategies and tactics in response to us, but he himself will 
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change along with them. This constant change is ultimately due to war’s escalatory dynamics 
and the physical destruction and creation associated with it – factors which can in turn be 
traced to the fact that war is not kept constant by a system of rules. This dynamic provides the 
theoretical justification for the familiar claim that “every war is unique”, in a way which 
cannot be said of every chess game, court case or general election. Such an understanding of 
war also explains the qualities required of a battlefield commander: such an individual must 
certainly thoroughly master what little he can and internalise what few regularities can be 
observed in war; but moreover, he must be possessed of a certain cast of mind, one which 
maintains its composure in unpredictable and stressful surroundings. Such a commander of 
‘genius’ as Clausewitz has it, also needs to be be able to intuit at a glance a likely course of 
action in rapidly changing and turbulent circumstances - in short, he needs to operate in an 
environment characterised by unpredictability and chance. As we have seen, the 
Clausewitzian sources of chance and uncertainty can be explained with reference to war’s 
absence of rules. Danger is much more prominent in war for this reason, and the presence of 
the various sources of friction can be explained with reference to the fact that war is not 
fought in an abstract space with symbolic means, which would insulate the conduct of war 
from extraneous physical influences. The uncertainty that results from the reciprocal action of 
two combatants might not on first appearances be attributable to war’s lack of rules, but the 
escalatory dynamic of conflict and the abundance of options open to both sides is certainly a 
consequence of this, and these are themselves prime generators of chance and uncertainty. 
 
The conclusions and implications of my thesis have obvious use in the academy, 
where much if not most of the theorising on war is done. In terms of future research potential, 
I believe that there are several areas of the study of war (and possibly of politics more 
generally) which might be explored in greater depth using the ideas I have advanced in this 
thesis. As I have mentioned, there is ample possibility for the understanding of war as ‘not-
law’ to provide the theoretical framework for future studies in various disciplines, including 
but not limited to sociology; there are probably a vast array of functions of laws and rules 
which I have not included in this thesis whose absence in war is worthy of comment. Also, 
there are some areas of this thesis which could be more fully explored; the role of customs of 
war as psychological coping mechanisms for the stress, uncertainty and dehumanisation of 
conflict is one of these; and it is certainly easy to see how the conceptual tool of the ‘means 
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of destruction’ could be more fully articulated – there of course already exists a large 
Marxian literature on the means (and modes) of production, and their role vis-a-vis the 
generation of power in a given society; applying the concepts and terms which have been 
used to discuss the productive, economic base of power to the destructive, military one 
should be relatively straightforward. Once this has been achieved, a synthesis of these two 
aspects of material power could be used to furnish a more comprehensive theory which 
explains the dynamics of power within a society, or at least provide a new perspective on the 
subject. 
  
Turning to the thesis of war as ruleless conflict as a whole, another area which might 
prove amenable to analysis is one which has not often been linked to political theory, the 
aesthetic experience of war. As Glenn Gray, Karl Marlantes, Ernst Jünger and many other 
soldiers through history have noted, war exerts a powerful appeal on our minds even as it 
horrifies us: the joy of destruction, the exhilaration felt when participating in spectacular 
events, the pronounced feelings of comradeship, anger, grief and so on, which are aroused by 
the experience of war – the intensity of these feelings and the nature of the experiences which 
provoke them might be better understood if we think of war as a form of human activity 
which is uniquely ‘raw’ and unfiltered. Comparisons might be made with the world of art, 
which has long been concerned with attempts to represent the sublime – something beyond 
which we can experience in ‘normal’ life. It has also been argued (most notoriously by 
Duchamp, with his 1917 sculpture Fountain) that there are no restrictions inherent to art 
itself, as to the means with which it can be performed. If we understand war as not being 
bound by rules – an environment “in which the creative spirit is free to roam”, as Clausewitz 
characterises it – an exploration of the ‘art of war’ in this way might prove a viable and 
illuminating research project.440 
  
Another potential application of the theory of war as ruleless conflict could be in the 
examination of the arguments concerning nonlinearity in the social sciences. Beyerchen’s 
                                                     
440 Such a project may be more directly relevant to war itself than might be thought - it has been 
argued that the Israeli military has been using theories drawn from the world of art and architecture in 
the planning of its operations, one of which in the town of Nablus apparently being inspired in its 
design by a reading of a number of post-structuralist theorists. See Eyal Weizman, “The Art of War”, 
Frieze (06 May 2006), http://www.frieze.com/article/art-war <accessed 14/03/2016> 
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arguments that war is a nonlinear process are certainly useful; and as I have said, I believe 
that they can be understood as a consequence of war being a fundamentally unregulated 
process. All conflicts, thanks to the interaction of two independent actors, have the potential 
to be nonlinear and unpredictable, but there may well be a correlation to be discovered 
between the rule-boundedness of a conflict and its nonlinearity, however defined. Though the 
precise relationship of rules to nonlinear dynamics is something which could be explored in 
greater detail, this is an area where much greater scientific and mathematical knowledge than 
I currently possess would be required, and I would give way to those who have a greater 
literacy in this regard. 
  
In the world of policy, obvious potential beneficiaries of this new theory of war might 
include military think-tanks, particularly those concerned with the formulation of strategic 
doctrine and the analysis of the impact of new military technologies. I think that perhaps the 
most promising application of the theory is as a teaching aid in military academies: by 
comparing war to the rule-bound contests with which officers in training are already familiar, 
the idiosyncratic aspects of warfare are perhaps more likely to be understood and internalised 
than by a book-bound study of war undertaken without this knowledge. This is certainly the 
case where Clausewitz is concerned - as I have argued earlier, being ‘primed’ with an 
understanding of war as a ruleless activity may help to alleviate some of the difficulties 
associated with interpreting his work. Perhaps more importantly, training scenarios can be 
developed with a specific emphasis on the task of acting and making decisions within an 
ever-changing and unpredictable environment; however, I will not make any claims that this 
will take the form of revolutionary developments in military pedagogy – after all, the 
experience of war has taught many of the lessons of my theory over the course of thousands 
of years. Practitioners aside, policymakers too will be better placed to make decisions when 
they understand the basic nature of their ultimate ‘political instrument’; the parsimoniousness 
of the theory and the ease with which its implications can be grasped might well make it a 
useful tool in the briefing of political leaders who might not have the time or inclination to 
undertake a reading of Clausewitz. Certainly, the theory is an effective way of presenting the 
potential drawbacks (and benefits) of entering into armed conflict which will be readily 
understood by those who operate in heavily rule-bound environments. 
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Nevertheless, some recurring themes in my studies suggest that the theory of ‘war as 
violent conflict without rules’ may have a limited use; again, much of what ‘ruleless conflict’ 
explains is already incorporated into effective military doctrine, if not explicitly so: I would 
treat the concept as a ‘polishing’ of existing theory rather than as a paradigm-shifting 
breakthrough for this reason. However, there are other reasons to suspect that its application 
in policymaking in particular may not be quick in coming. As the experiences of Clausewitz 
and Brodie show, conceptual understandings of war which do not have an immediate, direct 
application often lose out (if only in the short term) to theories which have a more tangible 
sense of utility: to claim once more that there is no certainty to be had in war is possibly 
unlikely to find a particularly enthusiastic following. It is possible that the more 
straightforward, mechanical explanation provided by my thesis will appeal to those who 
would otherwise wish to construct ‘scientific’ models of war, which claim that a certain 
strategy or technology can guarantee success; perhaps more likely, and more important, is 
that the understanding of ‘war as ruleless conflict’ can be added to the corpus of theory on 
war and function as other theories do – as an aid to the understanding of warfare. 
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